Chapter 1 The Contradictions of Developed Socialism In his address to the Bulgarian people delivered on 20 October 1981, the general secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) and chairman of the State Council of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria (NRB), Todor Zhivkov, reminded his listeners: “We are on the threshold of a major national celebration—the 1300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state, one of the oldest states of Europe, which emerged on the ground . of the ancient civilizations in our lands, covered a long distance in its development, and has now reached the highest peak in contemporary progress—the triumph of the socialist social order.” The speech skillfully outlined an appealing national nar- rative, charting in significant detail the history of the Bulgarian people, “situ- ated in one of the most neuralgic [sic ] regions of the planet . at a crossroads between East and West, North and South.” The rhetoric then moved to ideo- logical ground, emphasizing that “the victory of the socialist revolution . marked the greatest ever radical breakthrough in our 13-century-long history” because it “unfettered the powerful forces of the nation, provided an irresist- ible impetus to our country’s all-round progress, and marked the beginning of the implementation of the goals and tasks of centuries-long struggles and aspi- rations.” Zhivkov finally proposed visions for Bulgaria’s future development under developed socialism ( razvit sotsializâm ), linking the historical jubilee to domestic reforms and international initiatives already underway. 1 22 THE CONTRADICTIONS OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM 23 While the Bulgarian communist leader’s self-congratulatory view is hardly surprising, international observers confirmed the invigorating power of the 1300-year jubilee, which made evident, both domestically and inter- nationally, the Bulgarian people’s “pride in their cultural and historical heritage . and in current achievements in having raised the standard of living.” 2 British reports from Sofia on the eve of the anniversary described, rather surprisingly, “a stable country with a growing sense of national iden- tity, ruled by a self-confident and competent regime. Its people are better fed and better clothed than they used to be and have more opportunities for self-expression.” 3 Following the 1300-year celebrations, another report con- cluded: “Bulgaria’s reputation as the Soviet Union’s closest and most will- ing client state has become such a cliché that the search for evidence to the contrary is irresistible. The staging of the 1300th anniversary was . a clear demonstration of national pride well removed from the professions of soli- darity towards the Soviet Union to which we have become accustomed.”4 Integrating Bulgarian and foreign perspectives, this chapter provides back- ground information on the internal situation in Bulgaria during the long 1970s and engages long-lasting stereotypes associated with the country throughout the Cold War, while explaining the role of culture and the celebration of the 1300-year jubilee during late socialism. Both in historical scholarship and in contemporaneous Western diplomatic and media sources, Bulgaria is fre- quently presented as a ruthless dictatorship completely subservient to the Soviet Union. The country is usually described as the Soviet Union’s most loyal ally, implying a strong degree of political dependence. Bulgaria also attracts attention because of its lack of a dissident movement during a time of heightened dissent in Eastern Europe, which is explained either through the regime’s brutal repression or the ingrained passivity of the population. These assumptions, even though often based on insufficient information or a simplistic reading of the facts, made the country seem unworthy of atten- tion. Here, I take a closer look at the situation in Bulgaria to complicate both opinions. What if the “eternal Bulgarian-Soviet friendship” served the coun- try well? Or the lack of dissent meant popular acceptance of the regime’s policies? This chapter adds much-needed nuance to the history of late social- ism in Eastern Europe by analyzing the role of official culture in sustaining state socialist regimes. I demonstrate that Bulgarian cultural policies of the 1970s served the purpose of domestic legitimization as they reinvigorated Bulgarian “patriotism,” rejuvenated the social contract between the regime and its citizens, and undercut dissent by recruiting potential critics into the cultural projects sponsored by the state. 24 CHAPTER 1 Western observers typically defaulted to clichés in their descriptions of Bulgaria. In the standard view, because the country was dependent on Soviet economic assistance for raw materials, training, and markets, it “ha[d] sur- rendered much of its sovereignty” to the Soviet Union, both militarily and in foreign policy. 5 British diplomatic reports from the early 1970s spoke about its “docility” and concluded that the situation in Bulgaria served to illustrate “what Moscow would do, if it could, with the other members [of the Soviet bloc].” Because Bulgarian loyalty to the Soviet Union remained “unques- tioned,” one reason to study Bulgaria was to “provide insight into the Soviet system.” 6 Sofia’s reputation as “Moscow’s loyal flag-bearer” persisted into the 1970s. 7 Western dispatches consistently spoke about “obedient Bulgaria” and “the master satellite.” 8 Throughout the 1970s, as they learned more about the country— including from its cultural programs—diplomats began refining their assumptions. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov was sensitive to accusations of Bul- garian loyalty to the Soviet Union and its satellite role because it made “his country that much less interesting to the west.”9 Thus, the regime sought to proactively correct this view. In 1979, Zhivkov joked that “the Soviet Union was really a Bulgarian colony” since Bulgaria received its raw mate- rials from Russia and sold its finished ones there, in “the classic colonial relationship.” 10 That year, the British ambassador in Sofia observed: “If they can find a way to satisfy Moscow by form and themselves by substance, [the Bulgarians] will choose it. If they can get their own way by shouting ‘Eter- nal Friendship’ a bit louder they will do so.” 11 By the late 1970s, the Soviet proxy stereotype had been subjected to fine-tuning: now, diplomats saw the internal situation in Bulgaria as “not bad” while they detected “no specific obstacles to normalization, such as the human rights problems in Czecho- slovakia.” 12 In 1981, the Economist called Bulgaria “Un-Polish.” 13 One might argue that, in the midst of turmoil elsewhere in Eastern Europe, “un-Polish” and “not bad” meant good. At the same time, Western media covering Bulgaria usually described a climate of merciless domestic repression that allegedly eradicated all opposition. In 1975, Radio Free Europe (RFE) concluded: “apparently the intercession-intimidation mechanism is extremely intricate and always effec- tive. The regime’s elaborate bureaucratic apparatus seems to have perfected it to the point where almost nothing can be done to counteract it.” 14 But this rigid view did not withstand scrutiny. British diplomats, while describing “widespread, underlying political apathy” and “lack of enthusiasm in com- munism, particularly amongst young people and intelligentsia,” pointed out that in Bulgaria, “there was no obvious discontent.” 15 The “youth problem” THE CONTRADICTIONS OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM 25 manifested itself in work-shyness, antipathy to public service, and craving for all things Western. Yet, while young Bulgarians wanted more consumer goods, travel, cultural choices, and a better standard of living, what they did not want was political change. 16 Unable to offer a satisfactory explanation for the fact that discontent had not become dissent, Western diplomats spoke of Zhivkov’s “benevolent dic- tatorship,” a phrase that captures well the contradictions of late socialism. 17 Official policies benefited ordinary people: in 1981, the year of the 1300th anniversary, the economy “performed well . and real incomes increased,” the availability of consumer goods “continued to improve,” the political sys- tem was “stable,” and there was “no audible discontent,” while in foreign affairs the country saw the “ceaseless coming and going of delegations from overseas.” 18 Thus, observers remained skeptical of the potential for radical change: “it is tempting to believe that the apathy and the social malaise . will lead to significant changes in the political order. This would be wishful thinking.” 19 Cultural policies provide a window into the “benevolent dictatorship” of Todor Zhivkov, as they allow us to engage the shifting political and social order of the 1970s and explain the normalization of late socialism. 20 In the 1970s, but especially after Zhivkov’s daughter, Liudmila Zhivkova, took charge of culture in 1975, new ideas of aesthetic education and beauty replaced the worn-out Marxist vocabulary of domestic cultural programs. Concurrently, Bulgarian elites launched a massive campaign of cultural diplomacy to create a new image for the country. The national and inter- national aspects of these cultural policies were closely intertwined: on the global scene as well as at home, Bulgaria was showcasing not only its com- munist credentials, but also its national uniqueness and broader contribu- tions to humanity. The 1300th anniversary celebrations, in particular, had “two beneficial side-effects . first in helping to publicise