1 By Michael Whitby By Lieutenant Colonel Roy C. Bacot (USAF) Photo: Pte Melissa Spence Photo composite by CFAWC, CF photos introduction interwar years.5 There was simply neither the resources, nor the need. That changed during he Second World War fundamentally the Battle of the Atlantic, when two RCN changed the role and outlook of the officers, Captains H. N. Lay and H. G. DeWolf, t Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). It trans- recognized the importance of naval aviation in formed the service from what was essentially a the trade protection and antisubmarine warfare coastal defence force into a “blue-water” navy (ASW) role and sold the concept to their senior that was capable of carrying out a variety of officers and political masters. The RCN went on operations around the globe in concert with to man all but the air departments of the RN its Allies. The concept of a blue-water navy escort carriers HMS NABOB and PUNCH- survived—indeed thrived—after the war, and ER, but their goal of the CVEs (aircraft carriers, the navy continues to fill that role to this day. escort) working with their own escort groups Operating as an effective blue-water navy in Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command requires certain capabilities, which, of course, was frustrated when the British deployed them change over time. For most of the first half of with the Home Fleet to conduct operations the twentieth century, blue-water capability against German forces in Norway. Even as centered around battleships, battle fleets and— those missions were under way, RCN leaders for global operations—cruisers, but from the convinced the Mackenzie King government early years of the Second World War and into to contribute to the Pacific war a task group the decades that followed, aircraft carriers and built around two light fleet carriers6 (CVL) naval aviation supplanted those platforms and with newly formed Canadian air squadrons were recognized as the most potent weapons embarked. It was an ambitious plan that had as that could be wielded at sea.2 In the Pacific much to do with building up the post-war navy war in particular, the United States Navy’s as it did contributing to victory, but the war (USN) fast-carrier force had demonstrated the came to its dramatic conclusion before the task strategic flexibility, tactical mobility and sheer group could deploy. As a result, the RCN went power associated with naval aviation, both into the post-war as a one-carrier navy centred defensively during battles like Coral Sea and on HMCS WARRIOR.7 Midway and offensively in the Philippine Sea and off Okinawa.3 Although the USN fast- Running a navy with just one of any type carrier force became the embodiment of naval of platform is a precarious proposition. There power, the Royal Navy’s (RN) Fleet Air Arm is simply no redundancy. This is especially true also provided important lessons in the conduct of aircraft carriers since all fixed-wing aviation of naval aviation in operations such as the raid assets rely upon that platform to operate at sea. on Taranto, the Home Fleet’s operations in If it is sunk, damaged or requires a long refit or northern waters and the activities of the British even routine maintenance, flying squadrons are Pacific Fleet. Still recovering from a failed left stranded ashore. Simply maintaining flying pre-war marriage with the Royal Air Force and proficiency requires the carrier, since taking off also suffering a degree of internal institutional and landing from shore bases is significantly less demanding than from the restricted, pitching inertia, the Fleet Air Arm nonetheless grew 8 into a fairly effective force, although never to deck of a carrier. Naval planners generally the level of the USN in terms of equipment, assume that ships can be operational about one leadership and experience.4 third of the time, thus three becomes the magic number in generating force requirements. This Canadian naval officers observed the was well understood within the RCN, but that growth of naval air power with interest. did not mean the ideal quota was attainable, Although Canada had flirted briefly with naval or even realistic, and in the Canadian context, aviation at the end of the First World War, it two became the goal. This study will discuss had died quickly from lack of support, and there the RCN’s efforts to augment its carrier force were no attempts to resuscitate it during the by acquiring either a larger carrier or a second summer 2010 • Vol. 3, No. 3 Fouled deck: Part 1 2 carrier, and at times, both options were pursued.9 50 percent of defence funding, when Most of this activity took place within the years compared with the other services, its senior 1952–1956, when decisions of a permanent officers spoke with greater volume and choice of carrier were being made and when clarity and had a more receptive audience the shortcomings of the actual choice—HMCS in the corridors of power in Ottawa. BONAVENTURE—became apparent, but the dream remained pervasive throughout the rela- • NATO force goals, which defined the tively brief life of the Canadian naval aviation numbers and type of warships Canada branch and is even occasionally resurrected would contribute to the Supreme Allied to this day. Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) in war, limited force structure alternatives. This is not a story that came to a successful In the mid-1950s, the RCN’s contribu- conclusion. It is easy to attribute this failure tion was designated at 42 ocean escorts to limited financial support for defence, and and 1 aircraft carrier, and although those although that was a contributing factor, there numbers could have been amended to were other reasons as well. Factionalism, which include a second carrier (two carriers were featured conflict between competing viewpoints included in the RCN Mobilization Plan) and elites, played an important role. These senior naval leaders were well aware that included the RCN versus the Royal Canadian such an idea would not be well-received by Air Force (RCAF),10 the traditional sea-going politicians or the other services. navy versus naval aviators, naval leaders versus defence bureaucracy and American influence • Finally, naval aviation absorbed anywhere from one-quarter to one-third of the RCN versus British. These flashpoints were not 12 unique to the RCN, and with the exception budget, and its proponents often had a of the United States–United Kingdom aspect difficult task of persuading their colleagues (which was largely limited to Commonwealth that they should maintain a significant or navies), they existed to some degree in any even greater part of a pie that was seen as nation with a naval aviation component.11 too small to begin with and which shrunk The Canadian case, however, had five dramatically from the mid-1950s. unique characteristics: These factors, in combination or isola- tion, frustrated various attempts to augment • The Canadian naval aviation branch was the RCN carrier force. More than anything, immature and lacked history as well as attempts to deal with these factors demonstrate experience. As a result, aviators had to prove the difficulty that navies the size of Canada’s themselves and build a tradition at the same have in achieving balance and flexibility within time that they had to defend their existence. their force structure and serve as a cautionary • From the late 1940s, the RCN special- tale for small navies with big ambitions. ized in an ASW role in support of North Original concept Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bi-lateral defence agreements with the The RCN’s original conception of its air United States. This limited options and branch was for a two-carrier component. For- played against the inherent flexibility that mulated for the Pacific war, planners envisioned lay at the core of carrier capability. an RCN task group consisting of two light fleet • During the 1950s and into the 1960s, the carriers with embarked air groups, two cruisers primacy of continental air defence and and two flotillas of fleet destroyers all backed the spectre of nuclear attack from the air up by a substantial escort force. The war ended enabled the RCAF to dominate defence before the force came together, but preparation planning to an uncommon degree. Not of the naval air component was well under way. only did the Air Force receive about Two fighter squadrons—803 and 883—and two 3 Fouled deck: Part 1 summer 2010 • Vol. 3, No. 3 attack squadrons—825 and 826—were formed could provide fighter defence for the fleet as in the United Kingdom over the summer of well as ASW capability; while others proposed 1945 and were designated for the light fleet obtaining a smaller specialized ASW carrier carriers WARRIOR and MAGNIFICENT, similar to the escort carriers (CVE) of the which were to be acquired on loan from the Second World War. Commodore H. N. Lay, RN. However, the end of hostilities and the probably the strongest proponent of naval return to peacetime fiscal restraint changed aviation among senior Canadian officers, pro- everything. WARRIOR was commissioned moted a two-carrier navy. WARRIOR, which into the RCN in January 1946 with 803 and could not operate comfortably on the North 825 squadrons embarked flying Supermarine Atlantic because she had not been fitted for Seafires and Fairey Fireflies respectively. 883 cold weather, would be based in the relatively and 825 Squadrons were disbanded, and plans warm waters of the west coast, while MAG- to accept MAGNIFICENT were placed on NIFICENT, which was ready to commission hold. But the naval staff did not abandon hope in early 1947 and had been “arcticized,” would for a two-carrier navy.