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The Platonic Conception of Intellectual Virtues Its Significance for Contemporary Epistemology and Education Alkis Kotsonis Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2018 ABSTRACT My main aim in my thesis is to show that, contrary to the commonly held belief according to which Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop intellectual virtues, there are strong indications that Plato had already conceived and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the importance of Aristotle’s work on intellectual virtues. Aristotle developed a much fuller (in detail and argument) account of both, the concept of ‘virtue’ and the concept of ‘intellect’, metaphysically, epistemologically and psychologically. Still, the first conception of intellectual virtues is to be found in the Platonic corpus. Such a realization is not only of historic interest, but most importantly, as I am going to show, the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues could prove promising in contemporary debates on virtue epistemology theories and in virtue-based approaches to education. Plato’s discussion of rational desires is the strongest indication of the presence of the concept of intellectual virtues in Platonic dialogues. Rational desires are constitutive of intellectual virtues: desires are dispositional; rational desires are dispositions to pursue rational goods. Intellectual virtues are such dispositions. Additionally, there is further evidence that Plato had conceived of intellectual virtues. His rigorous educational program in the Republic aims at the development of rational desires1, while in the Symposium he discusses the intense rational desire to know the Good2. Nevertheless, in order to be intellectually virtuous, one must not only have a desire for knowledge; one must also be systematically and reliably successful in achieving the end of their rational desires. I will show that the success component of Plato’s intellectual virtues can be 1See for example, Rep., VII, 521d-540c. 2The Symposium starts up with erotic desires but the discussion soon shifts to the rational desire for knowledge, to be a lover of wisdom. 2 | P a g e found in his dialectic method. Plato’s dialectic is both a virtue developer and a reliable method used by philosophers in order to reach the objects of their rational desires3. I will argue that episteme is one of Plato’s primary intellectual virtues. Towards this end, I will invoke Pritchard’s recent argument according to which understanding, which is distinct from knowledge, is a form of cognitive achievement and therefore what is finally valuable4. I will argue, based on textual evidence from the middle Platonic dialogues and recent discussions in the exegetical literature, that Plato’s episteme, although commonly translated as knowledge, is closer to Pritchard’s conception of understanding. I will also show that Plato’s episteme, similarly to Pritchard’s conception of understanding, is a cognitive achievement that cannot be attained by luck or testimony. The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues has something unique to offer to contemporary virtue epistemology. Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not differentiate between theoretical and practical wisdom. A wise agent, according to Plato, is wise in both practical and theoretical matters5. Moreover, Plato, unlike Aristotle does not make a sharp distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. Therefore, the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues, in comparison to the Aristotelian, offers a more suitable starting point for scholars who want to argue that intellectual virtues are but a subpart of moral6. Furthermore, I will argue that the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues is also of significant merit for virtue-based approaches to education. Plato questioned whether we can attain knowledge but nevertheless went on to develop his Socratically inspired theory of education according to which we can teach learning without knowing. 3Objections are anticipated as to the reliability of the dialectic but, like in the cases of pianists and athletes, we never have a guarantee of success. The dialectic, according to Plato, is the best method we have to reach the truth. 4Pritchard, 2010, p. 67. 5Philosophers, according to Plato, have to hold office to help the republic with practical issues and are best suited to do so because of the understanding of the form of the Good they have acquired from Plato’s rigorous educational program. 6See for example Zagzebski, 1996, p. 258 where she argues that intellectual virtues are but a subpart of moral virtues and that normative epistemology is a part of virtue ethics. 3 | P a g e Socrates proclaimed his ignorance numerous times7; nevertheless, he went on to educate the youth of Athens. This is what I will suggest that Plato’s notion of intellectual virtues can contribute to theories of education: we should teach children not by transferring knowledge to them directly but by building dispositions into them to seek and acquire the truth. I will argue that although somewhat ignored by contemporary scholars, Plato’s theory of education has much to teach us about epistemic character education today. The Platonic educational program does not advocate the direct transmission of knowledge from the teacher to the student but rather focuses on building the learners’ epistemic dispositions. Building upon the Socratic method, Plato’s educational program does not “spoon-feed” knowledge to the learners but rather fosters the growth of intellectual virtues through problem-solving8. The Platonic decades long educational regime aims at training Philosopher-Kings in three types of virtue: (i) Moral Virtue; (ii) the Cognitive Virtue of Abstraction; (iii) the Cognitive Virtue of Debate. I will explain ways in which fostering intellectual virtues through problem-solving could be applied in classrooms today and I will argue that Plato’s rigorous education program is of definite merit for contemporary theories of education, especially given the fact that scholars in the field are looking for alternatives to the traditional methods of teaching. I will also dedicate a section to showing that Socrates was not a moral philosopher but rather an epistemic character builder9. Socrates trained his students/interlocutors in desiring the truth without offering them any knowledge-education. I will also briefly highlight some of the most significant differences between the Platonic educational program, as described in the Republic, and the Socratic educational method. 7See for example the Apology, 22c: “I am wiser than this human being. For probably neither of us knows anything noble and good, but he supposes he knows something when he does not know, while I, just as I do not know, do not even suppose that I do.” 8The slave boy demonstration (82a-86a), performed by Socrates in the Meno, is an excellent example of this problem-solving teaching method. 9 Scaltsas, T., Lytra, I. and Kotsonis, A. (Forthcoming) “Socrates: The Very First Epistemic Character Builder” (tentative title). Ancient Philosophy Today: Dialogoi. Edinburgh University Press. 4 | P a g e I will also discuss, before concluding my thesis, two different accounts of educational failure as presented by Plato in the Republic. The first one is the individuals employing the eristic method (as a result of failure in dialectic education) and the second is the individuals who correspond to the four imperfect societies (brought about again by the lack of proper education). I will argue that these two accounts can inform our understanding of what should be avoided when educating for epistemic (and moral) virtue nowadays. *** 5 | P a g e DECLARATION I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, that the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise in the text, and that this work has not been submitted for any other degree or processional qualification except as specified. A. Kotsonis 6 | P a g e ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, I would like to thank Prof. Scaltsas for all his guidance and support. I would not have been able to produce this study without him as my principal supervisor. He has been my guide in this journey much like Socrates has been his interlocutors’ guide to true philosophy. I would also like to thank my second supervisor, Dr. Gasparatou, for all her feedback and support. I really enjoyed my visits to the University of Patras. I am also indebted to all the staff at the University of Edinburgh for attending presentations of my thesis and providing feedback - especially Prof. Pritchard, Prof. Ridge and Dr. Levy. I am also thankful to all my peers at the University of Edinburgh for making me feel part of this great philosophic community. I have presented almost the entirety of my thesis in various conferences (different sections of my research at different places). I am thankful to the audiences of all these conferences for putting my arguments under meticulous scrutiny. I would like to thank my family for so many reasons that I would run out of space if I tried to list them here. They have heard me talking about the topic of my thesis so many times that they can probably defend it better than me.