Innovating in War: Risk, Organizational Cost and Successful Adoption Rafael Lopez Charlottesville, Virginia Bachelor of Science, University of Florida, 1993 Master of Science, University of Missouri-Rolla, 1998 Master of Military Arts and Sciences, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006 A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Politics University of Virginia December 2019 ii © Copyright by Rafael Lopez 2019 All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Innovating in War: Risk, Organizational Cost, and Successful Adoption December 2019 RAFAEL LOPEZ Directed by: Professor Philip B. K. Potter Why do military organizations often fail to adopt innovation in wartime even when it promises to increase military effectiveness? To answer the question, a theory was developed focusing on a gap in the literature for military diffusion. While theories for explaining the decision to adopt are well represented, less work exists to explain implementation. The theory, agent-led adoption, argues that in cases where implementation within the parent military is led by a special purpose suborganization, or lead agent, these efforts have a history of success and failure that hinges on the lead agent’s ability to moderate organizational resistance by managing risk and organizational cost. Both efforts are necessary for the organization to successfully adopt the innovation. Three questions were postured to drive an analysis of the theory. Does evidence reduce risk? Does integration support reduce organizational cost? Are both reducing risk and organizational cost necessary to increase the likelihood of permanent adoption? Among the insights are considerations for overcoming both cultural and bureaucratic constraints on adoption, the relative importance of external and internal factors on implementation, and the identification of desirable organizational features for an optimally configured lead agent. The study concludes by providing policy implications for the latest and perhaps one of the grandest Army transformations of the last century, the ongoing implementation of the Army’s new warfighting concept by its latest lead agent, the U.S. Army Futures Command. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my wife, Lauren Carbo and our five kids, Sarah, Joseph, Colby, Sarah, and Libby, for being supportive and tolerant as I retreated night after night to read and write. Without their support, this project would still be in “in progress”. Additionally, my thanks go out to my father-in-law, Gary Eng, who carefully read and edited the complete work, providing thoughtful feedback. Lastly, I am grateful and appreciative for the many times Professor Philip Potter sat with me to discuss the project and give advice. His mentorship and support has been invaluable. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................................................v LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii CHAPTER 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................1 Agent-Led Adoption ................................................................................................6 Assumptions .................................................................................................6 Principal Agent Approach............................................................................9 Research Method and Case Selection ....................................................................13 Organization ...........................................................................................................24 CHAPTER 2: Agent-Led Adoption ...................................................................................28 Explaining Military Diffusion................................................................................29 Defining Lead Agents ............................................................................................36 Creating Evidence Mitigates Risk .........................................................................40 Types of Evidence Creation .......................................................................43 Integration Support Reduces Organizational Cost .................................................48 Types of Integration Support .....................................................................50 Describing Outcomes .............................................................................................53 Case Study Framework ..............................................................................53 Summary of Findings .................................................................................55 CHAPTER 3: The Absence of Evidence: Armored Warfare in World War I ..................61 Background ............................................................................................................63 The Operational Need ................................................................................64 Ernest D. Swinton ......................................................................................67 The Innovation .......................................................................................................68 Armored Warfare .......................................................................................69 Senior Leader Support ...............................................................................72 The Lead Agent: The Royal Tank Corps ...............................................................73 Reducing Risk and Organizational Cost ....................................................74 Reducing Risk ................................................................................75 Reducing Cost ................................................................................77 End of War Outcomes ................................................................................80 Analysis..................................................................................................................82 Special Considerations ...............................................................................83 Does Evidence Reduce Risk? ....................................................................86 vi Does Integration Support Reduce Organizational Cost? ...........................87 Permanent Adoption ..................................................................................88 CHAPTER 4: Reducing Cost: Antimechanized Defense in World War II ......................91 Background ............................................................................................................93 An Operational Need .................................................................................95 Leslie J. McNair .........................................................................................97 The Innovation .......................................................................................................98 Antimechanized Defense ...........................................................................99 Senior Leader Support .............................................................................100 The Lead Agent: The Tank Destroyer Center......................................................103 Reducing Risk and Organizational Cost ..................................................104 Reducing Organizational Cost .....................................................105 Reducing Risk ..............................................................................108 End of War Outcomes ..............................................................................112 Analysis................................................................................................................113 Special Considerations .............................................................................115 Does Evidence Reduce Risk? ..................................................................119 Does Integration Support Reduce Organizational Cost? .........................120 Permanent Adoption ................................................................................122 CHAPTER 5: Evidence Is not Enough: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam ......................125 Background: The Peoples’ War ..........................................................................127 An Operational Need ...............................................................................130 Robert Komer...........................................................................................134 The Innovation .....................................................................................................136 Counterinsurgency ...................................................................................136 Senior Leader Support .............................................................................139 The Lead Agent: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support .....................................................................................................141 Reducing Risk and Organizational