COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 12/13 5 New Evidence on the End of the Cold War New Evidence on the “Soviet Factor” in the Peaceful Revolutions of 1989 By Vladislav M. Zubok n 1999 Eastern European countries celebrated the tenth military, economic, political and psychological factors— anniversary of their peaceful liberation from that, in this view, broke the back of the Soviet empire and I communism. In the commemorative discussions, at set the stage for the “victory” of the West.4 conferences, workshops and in the press one would have On the Russian side, Mikhail Gorbachev, his assistants expected a detailed, informed and dispassionate and ministers Anatoly Chernyaev, Georgi Shakhnazarov, reconstruction of the events of the “annus mirabilis” when Vadim Medvedev, Alexander Yakovlev, and Eduard the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe ceased to Shevardnadze, emphasize in their writings and speeches exist. Surprisingly, however, this was not so. First, the that Soviet domination in Central and Eastern Europe had events of ten years ago remain the subject of heated and already been doomed by the mid-1980s. They claim that partisan debate in the Central and East European countries; communist leaders of those countries were incapable of even what seemed to be certain ten years before (e.g. the change, and did not follow advice from Moscow to alter role of “reformist” wings of the ruling communist establish- their traditionalist policies. They emphatically claim that ments, the positions of various factions of anti-communist there was no alternative to the Soviet policy of non- movements, etc.) are now no longer certain and, in fact, are involvement during the peaceful revolutions of 1989 which vigorously questioned. Second, the international aspects they say stemmed logically from the reformist strategy of of the collapse of communist Europe, the role of “the overcoming the legacies of the Cold War and integrating Gorbachev factor,” and of the devolution of the bipolar the Soviet Union into Europe. 5 Cold War are not evaluated and recognized in a balanced A large group, primarily former party apparatchiks, way. Sometimes they are even passed over in silence.1 military and former KGB officials of the last Soviet Other equally strong passions and biases are present administration, denounce Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and in the discussions and literature produced in the United point to the writings of American “triumphalists” as a proof States and in the former Soviet Union. For many American of Gorbachev’s ineptitude, at best, and high treason, at authors, the collapse of the Soviet Union’s external empire worst. Some contend, specifically, that the “peaceful was the beginning of the West’s victory in the Cold War. revolutions” in Central and Eastern Europe were not totally This created a strong temptation to regard the events spontaneous, that one could discern the “hidden hand” of through “triumphalist” lenses. Former CIA director Robert the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies. Some Gates contends in his memoirs that the years 1989-1991 intimate that 1989 was the beginning of the “betrayal,” were a triumph of the strategy of containment, as when the Soviet Union lost its geostrategic advantages formulated in 1946 by George F. Kennan—a vindication of and valuable “allies.” The evidence for these claims, “the belief that, denied new conquests, the inherent however, is largely absent, and those Gorbachev critics weaknesses of Soviet communism ultimately would bring it closely involved in security affairs and foreign policy (e.g., down.”2 Other former officials, particularly President former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Marshal Dmitry George Bush, his National Security Adviser Brent Yazov), conspicuously avoid blaming Gorbachev for the Scowcroft, and Robert Hutchings, then a member of the “loss” of Central and Eastern Europe.6 It is easy to notice National Security Council staff dealing with Central and that the fallout of the Soviet Union’s collapse continues to Eastern Europe, recognize the importance of Soviet non– be the main obstacle to serious and sober discussion of involvement. At the same time, they, as well as Gates and 1989 and many other issues of recent history.7 In addition, other “triumphalist” authors, argue for the importance of growing apprehension about US goals, specifically deep “the American factor,” “strategic prudence” and the mistrust of the American world role, tend to color the “vision” of the policy-makers in Washington. Specifically, fluctuating assessments of the year when Moscow “lost” they point to the United States’ quiet mediation in Poland its geopolitical security belt in Central and Eastern Eu- and other Eastern European countries between “reformist” rope.8 communists and anti–communist forces, and consistent Still, serious and balanced research has appeared on successful efforts to allay the fears of the Soviet leadership the international context and Soviet aspects of 1989. The regarding the rapid pace of change.3 Still, the main focus well-documented book by two veterans of the Bush of the “triumphalist” literature in the United States is Administration NSC staff, Philip Zelikow and Condolezza elsewhere, on the secret policies and initiatives of the Rice, reveals that the real priority for Washington was Reagan Administration between 1981 and 1987—on the NATO’s unity and particularly a peaceful reunification of 6 COLD W AR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 12/13 Germany within the Western alliance. A heated discussion and the Warsaw Pact were to be replaced by the took place from 1992 to 1995 between the proponents of integrationist international structures. “realism” and its critics, with the critics claiming that This striking change of mindset stemmed from many under Gorbachev foreign policy “became increasingly factors, the most important of which was the death of inconsistent with power transition and other realist communist ideology. At a critical oral history conference in theories,” and that the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern May 1998, Anatoly Chernyaev, veteran of the CPSU CC Europe was even more inconsistent.9 Canadian political International Department, recalled the common feeling he scientist Jacques Lévesque focused on “the enigma of had with Italian “Eurocommunists” whom he had met in the 1989” and concluded that “new thinking” and Gorbachev’s 1960s—that “the ideology had stopped working long personality played an outstanding, unique role in ago.”12 Another long-term factor was, ironically, the transforming the realities of power and ending the Cold position of the USSR as a superpower and the persistent War in Central and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev, says strivings of the Soviet leadership to gain international Lévesque, replaced the faded Stalinist imperial consensus recognition as a “normal” state. They sought it not only with a new neo-Leninist utopia, based not on force and through military build-up, but also through détente, trade, party monopoly, but on consensus and pluralism. This, and economic cooperation with Western Europe. At more than anything else, led to the quick disappearance of certain points, for instance in the early 1970s, Soviet the Soviet European empire in 1989. “Rarely in history,” he political ties to France and West Germany became more writes, “have we witnessed the policy of a great power important and perhaps warmer on a personal level than continue, throughout so many difficulties and reversals, to relations with some members of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet be guided by a such an idealistic view of the world, based diplomats as a professional corps, and various Moscow- on universal reconciliation, and in which the image of the based academic “think-tanks,” became to a considerable enemy was constantly blurring, to the point of making it extent a “pro-détente lobby.” They even attempted, practically disappear as the enemy.”10 whenever possible, to encourage the leadership to reform The most difficult task for researchers is finding links relationships inside the Warsaw Pact, holding NATO as an between Soviet policies (or non-policies) and the example.13 developments in the East-Central European countries The combination of these two developments eroded during the year of great change. What was the degree of the “imperial-revolutionary” foundation of the Soviet “spontaneity,” and was the element of a “hidden hand” imperial mentality. Soviet expansion was never present there? The main problem remaining is that posed geopolitical; it was “geo-ideological,” a blend of realism by Lévesque—the spectacular non-use of force—in total and ideological messianism.14 At the same time as that violation of the “realist” prescriptions of behavior for a blend faded, neither of its components could serve as great power. Was there at any point a danger of Soviet justification for preserving the Soviet presence in Central intervention? What options were discussed in the Kremlin and Eastern Europe. In particular, even though Marxist– as it witnessed the meltdown of the Soviet empire? How Leninist prescripts had served since Stalin’s time as a did domestic constraints (e.g., economic and financial window-dressing for Soviet security interests, those crises) and “new thinking” affect the Soviet view of interests were not systematically spelled out and “Eastern Europe”? There are still many gaps in the developed and, consequently, no consistent Soviet historical narrative and documentary evidence about 1989. “realist” school