University of Arkansas, Fayetteville ScholarWorks@UARK Theses and Dissertations 5-2012 Divine Hiddenness and the Challenge of Inculpable Nonbelief Matthew R. Sokoloski University of Arkansas, Fayetteville Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Sokoloski, Matthew R., "Divine Hiddenness and the Challenge of Inculpable Nonbelief" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. 342. http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/342 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. DIVINE HIDDENNESS AND THE CHALLENGE OF INCULPABLE NONBELIEF DIVINE HIDDENNESS AND THE CHALLENGE OF INCULPABLE NONBELIEF A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy By Matthew Ryan Sokoloski Freed-Hardeman University Bachelor of Science in Biology, 2003 Freed-Hardeman University Masters of Arts in New Testament, 2004 University of Mississippi Masters of Arts in Philosophy, 2006 May 2012 University of Arkansas Abstract Divine hiddenness is the idea that God is in some sense hidden or obscure. This dissertation responds to J.L. Schellenberg’s argument, based on divine hiddenness and human reason, against the existence of God. Schellenberg argues that if a perfectly loving God exists, we would not expect to find such widespread nonbelief in God’s existence. Given the amount of reasonable nonbelief in the world, Schellenberg argues that an agnostic ought to conclude that God does not exist rather than conclude that God is hidden. Schellenberg’s argument has three major premises: (1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving; (2) If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur; (3) Reasonable nonbelief occurs. I provide a theistic response to the argument from divine hiddenness in an attempt to offer the agnostic a reasonable reply that prevents an atheistic conclusion. In order to defeat the prima facie evidence for Schellenberg’s argument, I first question the amount of reasonable nonbelief in an effort to reduce the evidential force of Schellenberg’s third premise. This is followed by a consideration of possible defenses to challenge the second premise that if a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur. Free-will defenses are considered, but I conclude that they are not sufficient as a response to the challenge that Schellenberg has developed. Instead, I argue that skeptical theism is a defense which can be successful in preventing an agnostic from being necessarily led, epistemically, to conclude that God does not exist. Finally, I develop a second defense motivated by concepts from Paul K. Moser that I take to be the most promising response to Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness. By casting the evidence for God in a new context, I conclude that the challenge that Schellenberg has developed can be overcome by providing a defense which shows that God, motivated by divine love, may in some sense be hidden so as to allow reasonable nonbelief to occur at least for a time. This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council. Dissertation Director: Dr. Thomas Senor Dissertation Committee: Dr. Lynne Spellman Dr. Jacob Adler Dissertation Duplication Release I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this dissertation when needed for research and/or scholarship. Agreed Matthew Ryan Sokoloski Refused Matthew Ryan Sokoloski Acknowledgements Special thanks to my parents, Larry and Terri, who have always shown their love and support. Also, special thanks to my wife, Aleshia, for supporting me and helping me through this journey, and for always being understanding whenever I had to give attention to writing this dissertation. I owe her many evenings, weekends, and home-cooked meals. I want to thank my dissertation advisor, Tom Senor, for guiding me through this process and seeing it through to the end. I also want to thank my supervisor in the Office of International Students and Scholars, Michael Freeman, for always being supportive and understanding of this endeavor. And finally, I want to thank Rolland Pack, a great man and philosopher, for being my mentor and role model throughout my entire higher education experience. Dedication For my wife, Aleshia, who is a blessing and an everyday reminder of God’s love for me. Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1 The Argument ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Responses ................................................................................................................................................. 2 A Look Ahead ............................................................................................................................................ 3 Chapter 1: The Argument from Divine Hiddenness ...................................................................................... 6 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Schellenberg’s Three Premises ................................................................................................................. 7 If there is a God, he is perfectly loving.................................................................................................. 7 If a perfectly loving God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur ................................................. 8 Reasonable nonbelief occurs .............................................................................................................. 10 Implications of Schellenberg’s three premises ....................................................................................... 12 The Hiddenness Argument from Analogy ............................................................................................... 14 Challenging the argument from divine hiddenness ................................................................................ 17 Parameters of the responses .............................................................................................................. 17 Relationship to the argument from evil .............................................................................................. 19 Common Approaches .......................................................................................................................... 20 Questioning Premise (3)...................................................................................................................... 21 Questioning Premise (2)...................................................................................................................... 25 Skeptical Theism ................................................................................................................................. 28 Reinterpreting the Question ............................................................................................................... 31 Understanding the God in question........................................................................................................ 34 Chapter 2: Inculpable Nonbelief ................................................................................................................. 35 Motivations for questioning (3) .............................................................................................................. 35 Culpability ............................................................................................................................................... 37 Schellenberg’s definition of culpability ............................................................................................... 37 Model Penal Code ............................................................................................................................... 40 Involuntary Sins ................................................................................................................................... 42 Nonbelief ................................................................................................................................................. 48 Reflective Inculpable Nonbelief .......................................................................................................... 49 Unreflective Inculpable Nonbelief ...................................................................................................... 57 The Noetic Effects of Sin ......................................................................................................................... 60 John Calvin and the Fall ...................................................................................................................... 61 Jonathan Edwards and true benevolence ........................................................................................... 63 Heinrich Emil Brunner and the law of the closeness of relation .......................................................