ch ar F se o e u R ● ISSUE BRIEF THE JIHADI FACTOR IN INDIA-PAKISTANn PEACE PROCESS r d e a v t r i e o s n b O ORF ISSUE BRIEF MAY 2006 ISSUE BRIEF # 6 The Jihadi Factor in India-Pakistan Peace Process By Wilson John Senior Fellow, ORF he India-Pakistan peace process, punctuated with struments of the state policy, and make an assessment wheth- fl uctuating waves of optimism and anxiety, has com- er de-linking the issue of terrorism from the peace talks is Tpleted three years, and it is appropriate, and timely, really prudent and viable, in the long run. to review whether the primary conditions of its long-term objectives have been met and, if not, whether the failure COMPOSITE DIALOGUE would undermine the credibility of the dialogue on which On April 22, 2003 the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari peace and stability in the region have come to lean on heav- Vajpayee, told the Indian Parliament that India was unilater- ily. Such an assessment has become all the more important ally opening “the doors for talks” with Pakistan.1 The offer in view of the proposed visit of Prime Minister Manmohan was based on two simple premises: one, that Pakistan would Singh to Pakistan later this year. stop cross-border infi ltration and second, it would destroy Although it could be argued, that the peace process in the the terrorist infrastructure in place on its soil. This statement past three years has gone beyond the issue of terrorism, it was a sequel to his declaration made in Srinagar on April would be naïve to forsake, altogether, an assessment of Paki- 18 that “we are again extending the hand of friendship, but stan’s Kashmir policy and its strategy of using terrorist groups hands should be extended by both sides.”2 A signifi cant ad- in achieving some of its foreign policy objectives in India. dition to these caveats was made on January 6, 2004 when The present paper, therefore, will analyse Pakistan’s Kashmir “President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that policy, including the strategy of using terrorist groups as in- he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be Observer Research Foundation is a public policy think-tank that aims to infl uence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India’s leading public fi gures, academics and business leaders. 1 | www.orfonline.org | May 2006 ISSUE BRIEF ● THE JIHADI FACTOR IN INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE PROCESS used to support terrorism in any manner….”3 These tentative (hereafter ISI) with three primary objectives: to project Kash- but firm sequence of assurances for maintaining peace and mir on the consciousness of the global community as a po- stability in the region, subsequently, came to be known as the tential conflict zone in a nuclear environment by involving Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan. India in a low-cost but damaging (keeps a large number of Indian troops occupied in Jammu and Kashmir) proxy war; PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY two, to aid and abet Kashmiri militants to force the seces- Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has been scripted and sustained sion of Jammu and Kashmir; and three, to gainfully employ by the Pakistan Army since 1947. In the Army’s perception, the guerilla bands returning from Afghanistan to prevent an “Kashmir is so strategically situated that it can be used to internal law and order problem for Pakistan, already reeling cripple Pakistan economically and militarily.”4 Such state- under severe economic and social convulsions. ments were also based on the fact that the Indus river the life- Over the years, terrorism has remained an integral part line for Pakistan, flowed from Jammu and Kashmir, which, of Pakistan’s Kashmir strategy12 primarily because of the im- Pakistan’s strategic planners believed, gave India an omnipo- measurable dividends it brought forth. But for the terrorists, tent weapon against the former for the future. Over the years, the issue of Kashmir would have remained confined to the the Army exploited these fears to turn “Kashmir” into a ques- subcontinent and attracted little attention from the interna- tion of identity, an “unfinished task of Partition”.5 Pakistan’s tional community.13 Continued acts of terrorism not only Army leadership has vested Kashmir with explosive emotion- brought global attention on Kashmir but also gave the Paki- al potential. One of the most recent and telling remarks was stan Army an opportunity to project the region, as Pakistan made by President Pervez Musharraf on Senator and former Information Minis- January 12, 2002 in his address to the ter described, as a flashpoint of nuclear nation: “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Musharraf in a speech conflict.14 Besides, these groups gave Pakistani can afford to sever links with Pakistan a “strategic depth” and “early Kashmir.”6 This statement represents, in on Feb 5, 2006 said, warning capabilities” in India.15 The a nutshell, the official policy of Pakistan “I want to repeat it in Kargil conflict of 1999 proved that on Kashmir. these groups16 could also be effectively This policy is driven primarily by this gathering that our used to camouflage offensive operations factors like a national psyche under agenda is the same and protect regular troops from the first siege7 and the Army’s determined grip line of fire.17 No less significantly, the on Pakistan’s destiny; it is implemented as before -- the right Kashmir conflict justified the Pakistan through para-state actors like terror- of self-determination military’s growing expenditure. In over- ist groups “groomed and financed” by all strategic terms, the tactic of using different state agencies to operate in and plebiscite for the terrorist groups in Kashmir to foment Kashmir.8 When three wars and more Kashmiri people.” terrorism exerted considerable pressure than four decades of diplomatic offen- on India, undermining New Delhi’s sive failed to achieve its objective, the right over Kashmir. Pakistan Army, supported by the politi- cal establishment, chose to exploit the presence of the band IS THERE ANY POLICY CHANGE? of Mujahideen, returning flush with their victory in Afghani- Since it is the Chief of the Army Staff or the President who stan in the early nineties. Within years of Mujahideen9 in- dictates policies on “vital national interests” like Kashmir18 in volvement in Kashmir, terror-strikes were given the respect- Pakistan, it is entirely feasible to assess changes in the policy ability of jihad, and thus remained outside the purview of by analyzing the recent statements of President Musharraf international scrutiny for long, till they became “terrorist who is both the Chief of Army Staff and the President. His acts” for the West. Not only did Pakistan train secessionists address at Muzaffarabad on Kashmir Solidarity Day on Feb- from Kashmir but also backed terrorist volunteers from other ruary 5, 200619 befits such an analysis. He made it clear by groups and countries in carrying out acts of sabotage and stating: “I want to repeat it in this gathering that our agenda killings in Kashmir10, linking the cause with the emerging is the same as before -- the right of self-determination and global “jihad”.11 plebiscite for the Kashmiri people.” This is an unequivocal Various terrorist and extremist groups were incorporated affirmation of the past policy. His reiteration that “Kashmir in the new jihad for Kashmir, some already existing, others runs in Pakistan’s veins and my veins” is no different either, created anew, by the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan whether in letter or spirit, from his Address to the Nation on 2 | www.orfonline.org | May 2006 ISSUE BRIEF ● THE JIHADI FACTOR IN INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE PROCESS January 12, 200220 confirming that despite talks of reconcili- religious extremist groups like Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (whose ation and solution, the establishment in Pakistan, the Army, target is Musharraf himself)25. There are credible reports in has not altered its historical stand on Kashmir. the Pakistan media about large-scale recruitment carried out The past is further affirmed by President Musharraf’s con- by the group from rural areas in the Punjab, Balochistan and sistent reference to the “Indian Held Kashmir” as the “nation North West Frontier Province and the huge amount of dona- fighting for their freedom”, a view consistent with what he tions and contributions garnered from various national and said in February 2005: “…a freedom struggle is not terror- international sources. The group has recently set up 54 al ism…this should be clear to all.” His clarification that with- Dawa schools in Punjab, 11 in Sindh and one in Quetta, Ba- out the “struggle of Pakistan forces”, Kashmir would not have lochistan26. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) leader Hafiz Saeed is free been in the limelight only strengthens his subsequent view and conducts prayers at a Lahore mosque every Friday. Ac- that “our original agenda is the same as it was before.” cording to the vernacular media, Saeed has also been openly These views are consistent with what others in the Paki- entertaining several opposition leaders in his new house in stan establishment have been stating in the last three years.21 Lahore. His headquarters, where young students are first in- Making a presentation at the Roundtable Conference on the doctrinated in jihad before being sent for three-phase guerilla Kashmir issue, on January 11, 2005, Masood Khan, the For- warfare training, are located close to Lahore.