HAO, Núm. 30 (Invierno, 2013), 135-149 ISSN 1696-2060 VIOLENT RESISTANCE IN XINJIANG (CHINA): TRACKING MILITANCY, ETHNIC RIOTS AND ‘KNIFE- WIELDING’ TERRORISTS (1978-2012) Pablo Adriano Rodríguez1 1University of Warwick (United Kingdom) E-mail: [email protected] Recibido: 14 Octubre 2012 / Revisado: 5 Noviembre 2012 / Aceptado: 10 Enero 2013 / Publicación Online: 15 Febrero 2013 Resumen: Este artículo aborda la evolución The stability of Xinjiang, the northwestern ‘New de la resistencia violenta al régimen chino Frontier’ annexed to China under the Qing 2 en la Región Autónoma Uigur de Xinjiang dynasty and home of the Uyghur people –who mediante una revisión y análisis de la officially account for the 45% of the population naturaleza de los principales episodios in the region- is one of the pivotal targets of this expenditure focused nationwide on social unrest, violentos, en su mayoría con connotaciones but specifically aimed at crushing separatism in separatistas, que han tenido lugar allí desde this Muslim region, considered one of China’s el comienzo de la era de reforma y apertura “core interests” by the government3. chinas (1978-2012). En este sentido, sostiene que la resistencia violenta, no In Yecheng, attackers were blamed as necesariamente con motivaciones político- “terrorists” by Chinese officials and media. separatistas, ha estado presente en Xinjiang ‘Extremism, separatism and terrorism’ -as en la forma de insurgencia de baja escala, defined by the rhetoric of the Shanghai revueltas étnicas y terrorismo, y Cooperation Organization (SCO)- were invoked probablemente continúe en el futuro again as ‘evil forces’ present in Xinjiang. teniendo en cuenta las fricciones existentes Countering the Chinese official account of the events, the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), a entre la minoría étnica Uigur y las políticas Uyghur organization in the diaspora, denied the llevadas a cabo por el gobierno chino. existence of a gratuitous separatist attack against civilians and talked of a clash between Uyghurs Palabras clave: China, Xinjiang, Uyghur, and Chinese military personnel, the first “no Violencia política, separatismo, terrorismo. longer bearing China's systematic repression, ______________________ 4 and using primitive fighting methods to resist” . or the first time since the founding of the Violent episodes in Xinjiang are notable for a People’s Republic of China (PRC), lack of verifiable information and accounts often FBeijing allocated in 2012 more spending contradictory by non neutral parts. This has been for national security purposes than for defense. defined by Gardner Bovingdon as “theory of This decision was announced during the last representational politics” in which politics and National People’s Congress, held in Beijing only violence are represented as a major part of the a few weeks after several ethnic Uyghur politics itself, where the actors, including assailants went on a hacking rampage that left Beijing and the Uyghur nationalist camp itself, ten Han Chinese people dead in a commercial “consciously represent their own actions and street of Yecheng (Karghilik), in the Kashgar those of their opponents as they pursue their prefecture of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 5 political aims” . Region (XUAR)1. © Historia Actual Online 2013 135 Violent resistance in Xinjiang (China)… Pablo Adriano Rodríguez After all, as the famous quote posed, "one man's revival in Xinjiang. Upsetting political measures terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". In such as family planning and constant Han the case of Xinjiang, twentieth century China’s migration into the region were seen as “terrorists” are portrayed by Uyghur exile threatening to their identity by the Uyghur groups not as ‘freedom fighters’, but as down- population, concerned for their own ethnic to-earth people ‘forced’ to resist repression, with survival. At the same time, religion gained no evident separatist agenda. weight after decades of darkness under the Cultural Revolution. Mosques were opened, All of this makes it complex to produce an Islamic seminaries were allowed and copies of assessment of the level of threat to national the Koran were reprinted. Along with this security posed by violent separatism in Xinjiang. officially sanctioned religious revitalization, If we are to believe the Chinese government - several underground Islamic schools begun to and its budget- militants in Xinjiang are a threat appear in the region. Some of these underground to “not only China's national security, but also schools were launched by Abdul Hakeem, who the peace and tranquility of the region and the had created in the 1940s the Hizbul Li-Turkistan world"6. This is a rather hyperbolic statement, (Islamic Party of Turkestan or Turkistan Islamic but at the same time violence do exists and have Movement). One of his students in Karguilik hit Xinjiang many times since the 1980’s. There was Hasan Mahsum, who would found the East is scope, so, to examine whether some of that Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in 19978. violence has been politically motivated by Despite the 1980’s are considered a time of separatism. With this aim, this paper gives an recovery and reconciliation after the excesses of overview of the violent attacks registered in the Red Guards, violent separatist episodes took Xinjiang since the 1980s and attempts to put place, mostly in the form of ethnic riots or with into a contemporary historical perspective the religious grievance as a catalyst9. evolution, nature and extent of violent dissent in the region. In the case of ethnic riots, everyday frictions such as a Han Chinese driver accidentally A critical analysis of the attacks reported in running over a Uyghur child, or a Uyghur shot Xinjiang demands a cautious stand on them dead by a Han for a property issue would result since even labeling the whole phenomenon as into wide-scale violent confrontations with Han ‘violent separatism’ would be mistaken, as many Chinese accounting for the majority of the of the events described were probably not victims and with security forces having to motivated by separatism. Same occurs with the intervene to avoid more serious riots10. Those widely stale label of ‘terrorism’, for which I years, “if a Uyghur was hit by a car, it would would favor a ‘technical’ use based on tactics, result in a major incident”11. targets and motivations of the attacks, rather than one which describes certain individuals7. Religion can be found as the indirect catalyst of violence, with the closing of a mosque by local Overall, the majority of the violence episodes Chinese officials or the ignorance of Moslem refer to ethnic riots prompted by specific precepts by Chinese policemen when dealing grievances; insurgent attacks launched by with a dead body deepening local anger in an unconnected groups of militants, targeting already violent and rarefied atmosphere. The security forces and probably trying to spread riots could result in the storming of municipal resistance; and finally terrorist actions which buildings or even an army base12. targeted Han Chinese and Uyghur civilians in order to spread fear among both communities on The most remarkable challenge out of religious migrating to Xinjiang in the first case and co- concerns came in 1989 and was described by opting with the authorities in the second. authorities as an “extremely serious” incident. Hundreds of Uyghurs stormed the Xinjiang’s 1. Post-Cultural Revolution (1978-1989): ‘If a Great Hall of the People in Urumqi in a protest Uyghur was hit by a car, it would result in a against a controversial book which described major incident’. Moslem sexual practices13. Fair to say, this episode came amidst a national spiral of The start of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and students’ political activism with no separatist openness era brought with itself a slightly more aims which finally led to the Tiananmen moderate political environment in China which ‘incident’ the same year. This movement had a favored an ethnic consciousness and religious specific religious dimension in Xinjiang, 136 © Historia Actual Online 2013 HAO, Núm. 30 (Invierno, 2013), 135-149 ISSN 1696-2060 although the main demands were the end of received military and religious training and were nuclear tests in the Lop Nor and a greater eager to bring ‘jihad’ to Xinjiang18. The political freedom. In any case, government addressees of the weapons, however, were officials in Beijing were not comfortable with Kirghiz rebels, historically more eager to take Wuer Kaixi, leading Chinese dissident and one up arms than their traditionally less belligerent of the student leaders in Tiananmen, being Uyghur cohabitants. This Afghan connection himself a son of Uyghurs. was a worrisome novelty for Beijing, and despite having been a quite sporadic one –one Although it is difficult to produce evidence of could say almost inexistent- in terms of organized armed uprisings during this period, operational connectivity with violent episodes in local officials confirmed in 1988 that earlier in Xinjiang, it has influenced the approach of the the decade a rebel group led by Kirghiz militants PRC to separatism over the years. successfully raid a military armory in Payzawat County (Kashgar) and attacked Han Chinese The climate prior to the events in Baren was people before being crushed by PLA armed already suffocating enough due to the tougher units14. official stance, with local minorities demonstrating on religious and other grievances, 2. The Baren uprising, ‘ghost’ guerrillas and such as nuclear tests conducted in the Lop Nor the first terrorist attacks (1990-1995). region or family planning measures, with ethnic survival and freedom of religion in the The emergence of the post-Soviet Central Asian background. What in the 1980’s would have states notably changed the landscape in Xinjiang translated in just another ethnic riot gained this during the 1990’s years of the past century. With time a ‘jihadist’ character. The official account the fall of the Soviet Union, the PRC moved on described a rather impromptu uprising, with a to a strategy aimed at bringing the region closer crowd of Kirghiz radicals storming a group of to the rest of the state15.