Ontotheology Matthew C. Halteman Calvin College ‘Ontotheology’ has two main meanings, one arising from its usage by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and a second from its usage by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Though Kant’s influence on Heidegger suggests at least a loose connection between these two senses of ‘ontotheology’, they are largely independent of one another. For Kant, ‘ontotheology’ describes a kind of theology that aims to know something about the existence of God without recourse to scriptural or natural revelation through mere concepts of reason alone, such as the concept of the ‘ens realissimum’ (the most real being) or the ‘ens originarium’ (the original, most primordial being). Ontological arguments for the existence of God such as those offered by Anselm and Descartes are paradigm cases of ontotheology in the Kantian sense. For Heidegger, ‘ontotheology’ is a critical term used to describe a putatively problematic approach to metaphysical theorizing that he claims is characteristic of Western philosophy in general. A metaphysics is an ‘ontotheology’ insofar as its account of ultimate reality combines—typically in a confused or conflated manner—two general forms of metaphysical explanation that, taken together, aim to make the entirety of reality intelligible to human understanding: an ontology that accounts for that which all beings have in common (universal or fundamental being) and a theology that accounts for that which causes and renders intelligible the system of beings as a whole (a highest or ultimate being or a first principle). Traditionally interpreted, Platonic metaphysics is a paradigm case of ontotheology in the Heideggerian sense insofar as it explains the existence of particular beings by recourse to universal forms (ontology) and explains the origin and intelligibility of the whole of beings by recourse to the Good as that from which everything else emanates (theology). It is this Heideggerian sense of ‘ontotheology’—and, in particular, Heidegger’s influential critique of the approach to metaphysics it describes—that animates contemporary discussions of ontotheology, especially in ‘continental’ history of philosophy and philosophy of religion. The main problem with ontotheology, according to Heidegger and his heirs, is that it is driven by a desire to ‘master’ reality that masks a deeper anxiety over the challenge of existing as finite beings vulnerable to a world that resists and confounds our life projects. Critics maintain that this existential mood of stability-seeking angst disposes humanity to experience the world primarily as something to be subordinated to human intellect and will, and that this mood so pervades ontotheology that, within its purview, reality is reduced to what can be calculated, measured, and manipulated: beings are understood predominately as consumable resources, God is depersonalized into a first cause, and opportunities to experience awe and wonder at the indeterminate, inexplicable, mysterious, or holy aspects of reality are diminished or occluded. I. The Ontotheological Constitution of Western Metaphysics To grasp Heidegger’s critical interpretation of ontotheology, one must first make sense of his idiosyncratic understanding of metaphysics. Taking cues from Aristotle, Heidegger maintains that Western metaphysics has traditionally sought to explain what lies beyond (meta-) the causal order of beings (physics) for the purpose of anchoring this order in two distinct but intimately connected types of metaphysical ground. First, metaphysics attempts to discern the most universal or general feature that beings share in common, namely being. Second, it attempts to discern the highest being (or, for some thinkers in the tradition, a first principle) from which all beings derive and through which they assume their places and purposes as parts of a coherent whole. In metaphysics, thus, two specific types of metaphysical ground that ‘lie beyond beings’ in significantly different ways are investigated under the same general disciplinary heading: the subsensuous foundation of beings (general being/the being of beings); and the suprasensuous source of beings (the highest being/first principle). (Heidegger 1995, 44) Though these grounds are conceptually distinct, Heidegger maintains that in historical practice our investigations of them have become inextricably enmeshed, often confusedly, such that a mutually reinforcing feedback loop between them is now an essential part of our metaphysical heritage. In accounting for the being of beings we are led to posit a highest being; and in accounting for the highest being we arrive at a certain conception of the being of beings. (Heidegger 2002, 61) With this interpretation of metaphysics as an essentially two-fold grounding enterprise in view, the meaning of Heidegger’s oft-cited reference to ‘the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics’ comes into sharp relief (more on those hypens soon). What is at stake for metaphysics, after all, is grounding the intelligibility of the order of beings by fastening this order, via two distinct but intimately related ‘logics’ or modes of explanation, to the most basic element that undergirds its construction on the one side (being, by way of ontology—‘onto-logic’), and to a highest being (or a first principle) that causes and sustains it on the other (God, or at least a god-surrogate, by way of theology—‘theo-logic’). (Heidegger 2002, 70) The ontology of an ontotheology thus supplies an account of that which all beings have in common, in virtue of which they are beings (or entities or existents). By accounting for the fundamental nature of beings as such, an ontology explains how beings as a whole are unified by their shared nature from the ground up, so to speak. By contrast, the theology of an ontotheology involves the postulation of a highest/paradigmatic being (e.g., an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God) or first principle (Hegel’s ‘absolute spirit’) that serves to explain the origin, unity, and purpose of the rest of reality. The significance of any particular being within the whole of reality is thus a function of its relation to the highest being/principle, which secures that particular being’s place in reality from the top down, as it were. In summary, the two explanatory projects of an ontotheology together aim to render the whole of reality intelligible to human understanding, grounding it—as one leading commentator describes—both from the bottom up (ontology) and from the top down (theology). (Thomson 2005; 2011) Heidegger’s deliberate use of two hyphens to partition the ‘onto-’ and ‘theo-’ logics that he claims are simultaneously at work in metaphysics indicates an important caveat that can help to minimize confusion moving forward. It is common, if ultimately misleading, to think of ‘ontotheology’ as a term that refers, first and foremost, to a particular approach to theology (onto-theology)—a discourse (logos) about God (theos), especially the God of classical monotheism, in which foundational questions about being (ontos) motivate the account. To be sure, Heidegger’s critical interpretation of ontotheology has important implications for classically theistic metaphysics. However, one must be careful not to conflate this particular species of ontotheology with the broader genus—a much wider umbrella under which the ‘theo-logic’ in ‘ontotheology’ can be directed at explaining paradigmatic first principles as strange, un-God-like, and historically far-flung as Anaximander’s apeiron (the indefinite, infinite) and Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence. (Thomson 2005, 2; Thomson 2011, 106-131, 108) Though positing the God of the philosophers as the metaphysical source and sustenance of one’s great chain of being is perfectly sufficient to incur the charge ‘ontotheology!’, then, it is not by any means necessary. As long as the being or principle under discussion bears the weight of accounting for the unity of beings as a whole, it can be said to function as the ‘theo-logic’ in the ontotheology in question. To avoid conflating the genus ‘ontotheology’ and the species ‘theistic ontotheology,’ then, I first examine Heidegger’s account of ontotheology’s problematic legacy for Western philosophy in general, and then extend the discussion to its specific implications for Western theological and religious reflection. II. Ontotheology’s Problematic Legacy: Anxiety, Calculation, Oblivion Heidegger maintains that this ontotheological approach is traceable throughout Western metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche in a series of relatively distinct and stable if slowly evolving historical epochs (e.g., ancient, medieval, modern, contemporary). As such, ‘ontotheology’ can refer both to the general approach of Western metaphysics as a whole and to each of the particular ontotheological frames of reference characteristic of the historical epochs that compose the tradition, each frame securing the order of beings in a particular time-period by establishing the parameters within which beings are typically understood for that time. On this view of the tradition, the meaning of what it is for something to be and the vision of how beings come into existence and are unified into a cohesive whole change as the ontotheology of one epoch evolves into the next. But if the conceptions of general being and highest being that frame the way the world is understood in any given age change as metaphysics evolves, the basic approach of seeking this two-fold ontotheological grounding is said to remain constant throughout. Heidegger develops this narrative in a variety of texts by reference to many thinkers, and the territory is well surveyed in the secondary literature (Thomson 2005; Marion 1994; and Caputo 1986, 47-96). What is important here is to explain why Heidegger sees this history as one of decline in which philosophy moves toward increasingly reductive interpretations of the meaning of being that slowly but surely disenchant and flatten the world into a reserve of mere resources on demand for human consumption. The story begins back before Plato with some latent inklings on being and truth that Heidegger claims philosophy has gradually forgotten over the past several millennia, much to its detriment.