Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 1, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za THE MILITARY ROLE OF THE REHOBOTH BASTERS DURING THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION OF GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1914-1915 GJJ.OOSTHUIZEN Department of History, Potchefstroom University for CHE SUMMARY During the course of the South African invasion (1914/15) and their forced involvement in the German war effort caused great consternation among the Rehoboth Basters. They feared that should they actively support the Germans, they could lose their land and their right to self- determination. Accordingly, Captain Cornelius van Wyk visited General Louis Botha in Swakopmund in April 1915. Botha advised them to avoid becoming involved in the war effort as far as possible. The Basters, however, in spite of Botha's advice, rebelled against the Germans. The timely arrival of the South African forces in the Rehoboth Gebiet and the resultant withdrawal of the Germans to the north prevented the Germans from delivering the final blow to the Basters. With the Peace of Khorab (9 July 1915) the German administration in South West Africa was formally ended. Gedurende die Suid-Afrikaanse inval (1914/15) het die noodgedwonge betrokkenheid van die Rehoboth-Basters by die Duitse oorlogspoging groot ontsteltenis in Bastergeledere veroorsaak. Die Basters was bevrees dat indien hulle die Duitsers aktief sou steun, hulle moontlik hulle grondgebied en reg tot selfbestuur kon verloor. Gevolglik het kaptein Cornelius van Wyk generaal Louis Botha in April 1915 te Swakopmund besoek. Laasgenoemde het hulle aangeraai om sover moontlik nie by die oorlog betrokke te raak nie. Die Basters het egter ondanks die advies van Botha teen die Duitsers in opstand gekom. Die tydige aankoms van die Suid-Afrikaanse magte in die Rehoboth-Gebiet Scientia Militaria - 28( 1) 1998 91 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 1, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za het die gevolglike onttrekking van die Duitsers na die noorde, het verhoed dat die Duitsers die Basters die finale nekslag toedien. Met die Vrede van Khorab (9 Julie 1915) is die Duitse administrasie in Suidwes-Afrika formeel beeindig. INTRODUCTION A group of people of mixed descent, who had their origin in the eighteenth century in the North-Western Cape, and who later became known as the Rehoboth Basters, left the Cape Colony in 1868 and settled in Rehoboth and vicinity in the area which would later become known as German South West Africa. Their pre-colonial settlement (1868-1884) was characterised by fruitless attempts to acquire the Rehoboth Gebietl as permanent residential area and to maintain neutrality amidst the Herero- Nama-Oorlam conflict. The establishment of German authority in South West Africa was consequently seized by the Rehoboth Basters to safeguard their own position. In September 1885 the so-called Friendship and Protection Treaty between the Basters and Germans was concluded. Although this treaty, to a great extent, confirmed the previously acquired freedom and rights of the Basters, the independent executive powers of the captain and Baster Council, especially with regard to "foreign policy", were significantly curtailed. In due course the Rehoboth Basters were increasingly involved in the German effort to subject the indigenous inhabitants. After the signing of the military treaty of 26 July 1895, the Basters were trained as soldiers and conscripted to do military service. Although the Rehoboth Basters undoubtedly enjoyed more privileges than the other local population groups during the German administration period, other aspects of their privileged position were also gradually curtailed. This was done, despite the 1885 agreement and continuous loyalty such as was, among others, proven in practice by the rendering of valuable military assistance. In this regard it was especially taxability, the gradual implementation of German laws, the abolition of the position of the captain and the impairment of the independent executive powers of The word Gebiet-(territory) dates from the German government's rule and was retained during the South African administration. 92 Scientia Militaria - 28(1) 1998 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 1, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za the Baster Council, that caused dissatisfaction. In addition, the management of boundary and land issues also drove a wedge into the initial friendly Baster-German relations.2 REINSTATEMENT OF THE BASTER CORPS The First World War which broke out in August 1914, was a dramatic event with far-reaching consequences for South Africa and South West Africa. At the request of Great Britain, the South African Government decided to occupy the harbours of Swakopmund and Liideritzbucht and to neutralise several radio stations in the area.3 This decision caused violent opposition in South Africa itself and led to the outbreak of the Rebellion. As a result the invasion was delayed for some time.4 This gave the German rulers in German South West Africa the opportunity to make final military arrangements. Aware of his own limited means of defence,5 and obviously well- informed regarding the military force that South Africa could muster against him,6 Governor Dr. T. Seitz and the military commander, Lieutenant Colonel Von Heydebreck, concentrated on keeping the South African invading forces occupied as long as possible, hoping for a German victory in Europe. To achieve this objective, they decided to conscript also non-German citizens for military service.7 This resulted in the Basters openly opposing the German government. Based on the order of the commander of the Schutztruppe (protection troops) that all able-bodied Baster men were to be called up, Captain Baron Hiller von Gaertringen, the German Bezirksamtmann (magistrate) of Rehoboth, arranged a meeting with the Baster Council G.J.J. Oosthuizen, Die Rehoboth-Basters binne die konteks van die staatkundige verhoudinge tussen Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, 1915-/939 (Ph.D., PU for CHE, 1993), p.313. G-M. Cockram, South West African Mandate (Cape Town, 1976), pp.13, 15; Archives of the South African Defence Force (SANDF), Unie van Zuid-Afrika. Departement van Verdediging, Rapport voor hetjaar geeindigd 30 Junie /92/. pp.6-7. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A modern history (Bergvlei, 1988), pp.271-272. The Germans could scarcely muster a force of 5 000 troops. Cf. E.L.P. Stals, Die ro/ van Viktor Franke in Suidwes-Afrika /896-/9/5 (Johannesburg, 1972), pp.63,65. In March 1915, South Africa had 43 402 soldiers and at the end of the campaign South Africa had 67 237 soldiers in the field. Cf. Public Record Office, London (PRO) CO 551: 129, a Historical Record of the Campaign in German South West Africa, ca. October 1920, p.55; SANDF Unie van Zuid-Afrika. Departement van Verdediging, Rapport voor hetjaar geeindig 30 Junie /92/, p.7. P. Pearson, The history and social structure of the Rehoboth Baster community of Namibia (MA dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand, 1986), p.156. Scientia Militaria - 28( I) 1998 93 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 28, Nr 1, 1998. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za early in August 1914.8 His request to assist the Germans in the protection of German South West Africa was met with fierce opposition. The council members appealed to the military treaty of 26 July 1895 and pointed out that it only applied to indigenous wars and besides that, it had in the meantime lapsed. They furthermore alleged that barely fifty members of the old Baster Corps were able to perform military service and that their children had undergone no military training.9 Lastly, the Basters did not wish to become involved, because it was a conflict between whites.lo A Baster delegation consequently visited Governor Seitz with the request that they remain neutral. Seitz, however, assured them that it was a conflict between whites and that they would only be used for police service behind the front. To this the Basters agreed. I I .' To confirm the negotiations, Seitz sent a written undertaking to the Baster Council on 21 August 1914 "dass die Bastardkompagnie eingezogen ist, um die Ruhe und Sieherheit im Lande (emphasis GJJO) aufreeht zu erha/ten und Viehdiebe und andere Rauber zu fangen. Die Bastards werden nieht zum Kampfe gegen Weisse(n) verwendet werden "./2 In the light of the assurance that they would not be used against whites and under the impression that they would only be used in the Rehoboth Gebiet, the Basters agreed to the reinstatement of the Baster COrpS,13which was established before the end of August 1914 with 176 men.14 The corps was under the command of German officers Captain Von Gaertringen, Lieutenant Von Kleist, Second Lieutenant Von Milkau and Second Lieutenant Von Kanitz, as well as twelve non-commissioned officers.ls The whole Baster Corps was issued with German uniforms. The Basters could not see the necessity for this and were afraid that, O. von Weber, Gesehiehte des Sehutzgebietes Deutseh-Siidwest-Afrika (Windhoek. 1974), p.219. H. von Oelhafen, Der Feldzug in Siidwest 19/4//5 (Berlin, 1923), p.144. '0 National Archives Windhoek (NAW) A312: 14/15, Survey of international affairs, 1929, no. Ill, p.19. " K.F.R. Budack, "Der 'Bastardaufstand' in Deutsch-Stidwestafrika", Afrikaniseher Heimatkalender. 1974, p.43. 12 D. de Waal, Report on the inquiry in regard to the German-Bastard question held at Rehoboth and other places in the Military Protectorate in June, /9/5 (Pretoria, 1915), p.32. IJ O. von Weber, Gesehichte des Schutzgebietes .... p.219. 14 D. de Waal, Report on the inquiry in regard to the German-Bastard question ..., pp.9. 18-19; Die Suidwes-Afrikaner. 22.09.1970. " H. Grimm, Das deulsche Siidwester-Buch (MUnchen, 1937), p.376; H.