The Meaning and Use of Proper Names A dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Philosophy by Nicole M. Wyatt University of Canterbury 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... v Preface ........................................................................................................................................ 1 Precis of the chapters ...................................................................................................... 3 Chapter 1 : Recent history ........................................................................................................... 6 1.1 Content ..................................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Frege and Russell .................................................................................................... 16 1.3 The critique of descriptivism .................................................................................. 27 Chapter 2: The contemporary views ......................................................................................... 35 2.1 Descriptivism reborn .............................................................................................. 36 2.2 The naIve theory ..................................................................................................... 47 2.3 Neo-Fregeanism ...................................................................................................... 51 2.4 The hidden-indexical theory ................................................................................... 53 2.5 Neo-Fregean HIT .................................................................................................... 56 2.6 The indexical theory of names ................................................................................ 57 2.7 The common ground of contemporary semantics of names ................................... 66 Chapter 3: The counterexamples .............................................................................................. 67 3.1 Attitude trouble for everybody ............................................................................... 68 3.2 Dressing like Superman .......................................................................................... 82 3.3 Defending the simple sentence counterexamples ................................................... 98 3.4 Scorekeeping ........................................................................................................ 103 Chapter 4: Game-theoretic semantics and the new theory of reference ................................. 105 4.1 Is the new theory of reference based on a fallacy? ............................................... 106 4.2 Independence friendly logics ................................................................................ 117 4.3 Game-theoretic semantics ..................................................................................... 120 4.4. Natural languages, GTS, and names .................................................................... 128 4.5 So, is the NTR based on a fallacy? ....................................................................... 142 2 1 JUN 2000 4.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 148 Chapter 5: Neo-medieval semantics ....................................................................................... 150 5.1 Signification and supposition ............................................................................... 151 5.2 Ampliation and Appellation ................................................................................. 159 5.3 Buridan on intentional contexts ............................................................................ 166 5.4 Reference and Quantification ............................................................................... 176 Chapter 6: Semantics, pragmatics and intuitions ................................................................... 178 6.1 The naIve theory ................................................................................................... 178 6.2 What is said versus what is implied ..................................................................... 182 6.3 Recognizing implicatures ..................................................................................... 190 6.4 The pragmatics/semantics distinction ................................................................... 204 Chapter 7: The new no-theory theory ..................................................................................... 206 7.1 What do the simple sentences show? ................................................................... 208 7.2 The semantic content of names ............................................................................ 212 7.3 Compositionality .................................................................................................. 230 7.4 Central uses and speaker-meaning ....................................................................... 244 7.5 Things we do with names .................................................................................... 248 7.6 Real life, hard cases and philosophical semantics ................................................ 251 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................ 253 References .............................................................................................................................. 257 Complete analytic table of contents ........................................................................................ 266 iv ABSTRACT The contemporary accounts of the semantic content of proper names fall into two broad categories-Millian views which maintain that the semantic content of a proper name is always its referent, and neo-Fregean views that maintain that in propositional attitude contexts the referent of a name is a sense or mode of presentation of its usual referent. I argue that neither of these two general pictures is correct and that proper names and other singular terms cannot be assigned a uniform semantic content. That is, proper names do not make exactly the same semantic contribution whenever they occur, and the contributions they do make cannot be captured by a general (and not merely disjunctive) function from context to content. I argue that the semantic contribution of proper names is highly context sensitive and that none of the contemporary accounts of proper names account for all their uses. I discuss a number of puzzling simple sentences due to Jennifer Saul and argue against the view our intuitions about the puzzle sentences can be explained in terms of the pragmatic implicatures of the utterances. Furthermore, careful attention to the puzzles shows in some cases the content contributed by the proper name cannot be specified by independent means The propositions expressed by means of such uses of names are such that the circumstances in which they are true do not have anything in common other than the fact that they are circumstances in which those propositions are true. These circumstances are instead tied together by overlapping relations of similarity. I suggest that the actual linguistic function of proper names is to make the practice of using a name salient, and that this practice then serves as input for a pragmatic process which takes account of extra-linguistic knowledge and other features of the context. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My thanks go first and foremost to Brian Wilson, who has been the sine qua non of my doctoral studies. Without his support, encouragement, and willingness to move half way around the world I would not have written this dissertation. My supervisors Jack Copeland and Philip Catton deserve considerable credit for providing encouragement and many useful and interesting conversations while allowing me to pursue my own philosophical interests. Many of the virtues of what follows stem from helpful suggestions and challenging questions from them and audiences at both the University of Canterbury and the Australian National University. Many of my friends and family have also deserve thanks. Beverly and David Wilson and Stephen and Elaine Wyatt have all provided both financial and emotional support over the last three years. Charleen and Derek Wilson and Amy Wyatt have been valuable cheerleaders and helped to remind me oflife before the Ph.D. Carolyn Mason and Stephen Sharp have been congenial office mates and good friends. I have enjoyed our frequent political and philosophical discussions. Alex Wynne has played an important role in providing two of the prerequisites for good philosophy-coffee and gOSSIp. All of the staff of the Canterbury Philosophy Department have been encouraging and supportive, but special thanks must go to Derek Browne and Carol Hiller, who went above and beyond the call of duty in ensuring that Brian and I were comfortable upon our arrival and during our three years in Christchurch. This work has been made possible by financial support from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral Fellowship,