William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 23 (2014-2015) Issue 1 Article 11 October 2014 Governmental Sovereignty Actions Ann Woolhandler Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Repository Citation Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 209 (2014), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol23/iss1/11 Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj GOVERNMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY ACTIONS AnnWoolhandler* InArizona v. United States,1 thefederalgovernmentsuedtoenjoinenforcementof Arizonas immigration laws on preemption grounds.2 AndinVirginia exrel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,3 thestateattorneygeneralarguedthatthestatehadstandingtochallengethe AffordableCareActbecauseitwouldunconstitutionallypreemptastatelawdisallow- inghealthinsurancemandates.4 Ineachcase,thegovernmentplaintiffassertedthatit hadthepowertoregulateaparticularsubjecttotheexclusionof,orinadditionto,the governmentdefendant.Thesedisputesmaybecharacterizedasseekingtovindicate sovereigntyinterests. Inapreviousarticle,MichaelCollinsandI arguedthatthecourtsshouldbe reluctanttocountenancesuchgovernment-initiatedsuits.5 Inadditiontolookingtothe Courts traditional treatment of these cases as nonjusticiable, we arguedas had AlexanderBickel6that disallowing intergovernmental suits to vindicate sovereignty * WilliamMinorLileProfessorofLaw,UniversityofVirginia.ThankstoMichaelCollins, John Harrison, Jonathan Nash, Caleb Nelson, and George Rutherglen. John Harrisons views on sourcesofimpliedactionswereextremelyhelpful. 1 132 S. Ct.2492 (2012). 2 Id. at2498;see also UnitedStatesv.Alabama,813 F. Supp.2d1282 (N.D. Ala.2011) (entertaining a federal preemption challenge to Alabamas immigration laws). 3 702 F. Supp.2d598 (E.D. Va.2010). 4 Id. at 601 (indicating that the plaintiff alleged that the statute was beyond Congresss commercepowerandinterferedwithstatelaw, andentertainingtheaction), revd, 656 F.3d 253 (4thCir.2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.59 (2012). 5 AnnWoolhandler&MichaelG. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA.L.REV. 387, 396 (1995) (arguing,interalia,thatsuchsuitsshouldgenerally require legally protected interestssuch asaninjurylikethatwhichwouldallowaprivatepartytosue,orstatutoryauthorization); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 53637 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguingthatrelaxingthestandingrequirementsforstatesisunwarranted);AlexanderBickel, The VotingRights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 8590 (1967) (criticizing the Courts recognition of the states standing in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)); RonaldA. Cass,Massachusettsv.EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75, 7879 (2007) (arguing against easing standing requirements for states); StephenI. Vladeck, States Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 84849 (2012) (arguingthatCuccinellididnotpresentacasewherethestatehadaninterestseparate fromitscitizensthatwouldallowforsuit);cf. KevinC. Walsh, The Ghost That Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 57, 6566 (2012) (questioning whether Cuccinelli had a cause ofactiontochallengetheAffordableCareAct,butassumingthattheUnitedStateshadan actionagainstArizona). 6 Bickel, supra note5, at89 (allowingstatesuitstocontesttheconstitutionalityof federal statutes would be a fundamental denial of the principle that the federal government 209 210 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol.23:209 interestsreinforcedthefederalismprinciplethatstateandfederalgovernments shouldactprimarilyonthepeopleratherthanoneachother.7 Wealsoarguedthat preferenceforsuitsbetweenindividualsandgovernmentenhancedthestatusof individualsasrights-holdersagainstgovernment,particularlywithrespectto structuralclaims.8 Discouragingsovereignty-basedclaimswouldalsohelptoavoid abstractjudicialdeterminationsofthevalidityofgovernmentalaction.9 Commentatorshavecriticizedrestrictiveviewsofgovernmentstanding,including ours,asinsufficientlytakingintoaccountthatdualfederalismhasbeendisplaced byoverlappingfederalism.10 Theyarguethatinsovereignty-basedsuits,thegovern- mentisseekingtovindicateitsowninterests,11 andthatthegovernmentshouldeven isasovereigncoexistinginthesameterritorywiththestatesandacting,notthroughthem, like some international organization, but directly upon the citizenry). 7 Woolhandler&Collins, supra note5, at439. 8 Id. at 43940, 50304; see also Vladeck, supra note 5, at 87374 (arguing that ex- pandingstatestandingwouldcrowdoutindividualsuits);cf. TylerWelti,Note,Massachusetts v.EPAs Regulatory Interest Theory: A Victory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintiffs, 94 VA. L.REV. 1751, 1775 (2008) (arguingthattheCourtinMassachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), based standing on the states regulatory interest in the federal governments failure toactinanareawhereithadpreemptedstatelaw, andthatsuchstandingmaycreatearegime in which state attorneys general have monopoly power over public law adjudication.). 9 See Woolhandler&Collins, supra note5, at440;see also Bickel, supra note5, at90 (arguingthatallowingstatestosuethefederalgovernmentwouldaggrandizethejudicial function, andbringabstractdisputesbeforetheCourt);Vladeck, supra note5, at872 (arguingthatexpandingstatestandingriskedconvertingfederalcourtsintocouncilsof revision);cf. Woolhandler&Collins, supra note 5, at 44243 (arguing that expansion of the notionofacasedidnotsuggestbroadgovernmentalstanding). 10 See SethDavis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8, 5153 (2014) (arguingthatseparatespheresnolongeraccuratelydescribesgovernmentandthat governmentalstandingrulesshouldbemodifiedaccordingly);cf. KatherineMimsCrocker, Note, SecuringSovereignState Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051 (2011) (arguingagainsta popularsovereigntistargumentthatfailstorecognizetheseparateinterestofthestatesin vindicatingtheirrightstogovern). See generally RoderickM.Hills,Jr., Against Preemption: HowFederalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4, 17 (2007) (arguing that dual federalism notions are outdated, but favoring courts use of a clear- statementanti-preemptionruleofconstruction, becausestateregulationwillencourage Congresstobeamorepoliticallyaccountableregulator). 11 See DavidBarron, Why (and When)Cities Have a Stake in Enforcingthe Constitution, 115 YALE L.J.2218, 2242 (2006) (inarguingforenhancedstandingofcitiestoconteststate laws in state and federal courts, suggesting that a governments interests in maintaining its owncapacitytoserveasaforumfordemocraticcontestationandpolicyshouldbepreferred totheroleofthegovernmentasaguardianoftherightsofitsowncitizens);id. at2249 (defendingsuchstandingwhenitistopreservelocalpolicymakingratherthantryingfora uniformsolution);Crocker, supra note10, at2068 (statingthatsovereigntyinterestsare independent,whilequasi-sovereigninterestsarederivative,suchthatstatesshouldgenerally beallowedtoassertsovereigntyinterestsbutnotparens patriae interests);KennethT. Cuccinelli,II etal., State SovereignStanding:Often Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64 2014] GOVERNMENTAL SOVEREIGNTY ACTIONS 211 betreatedasthebestplaintifftopursuestructuralclaims.12 Theyalsoclaimthatrestric- tiveviewsofgovernmentstandingreflecttoonarrowaviewofcausesofaction,failing totakeintoaccounttheregulatoryaimofenforcingfederallaw, asdistinguishedfrom theaimofvindicatingindividualimmunitiesandrights.13 ThisArticletakesupthe questionofgovernmentsuitstovindicatesovereigntyinterestsinlightofsucceeding scholarshipandcases. I. BACKGROUND A. Governmental Standingand Implied Causes of Action IssuesofgovernmentalabilitytoinitiatesuittypicallyarisewhenCongresshas notclearlyauthorizedsuitsbythestateorfederalgovernmentasplaintiffinthe federalcourts.Commentatorshaveinterchangeablyaddressedtheissueaseitherone ofstandingorimpliedcauseofaction,14 aswillthisArticle.Thetermsstandingand impliedactions,however,requirefurtherdelineation. STAN. L. REV. 89, 93 (2012) (That the Attorney General of Virginia would bring a suit to defendthevalidityofaVirginiastatutefromaclaimoffederalpreemptionshouldnothave been at all surprising.); id. at111 (disclaimingrelianceonparens patriae);Davis, supra note10, at6, 67 (arguingthereisnoneedtofavorgovernmentactionswhenitisrepresenting theinterestsofcitizens,butthatcourtsshouldfavorsuchactionswhengovernmentisvindicat- ing institutional interests such as its claims to intergovernmental immunities and authority toregulate);JonathanRemyNash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAMEL.REV.1015, 107374 (2010) (arguingthatstatesshouldbeabletochallengefederalactionthatbothpreemptsstate lawandprovidesnosubstantiveregulation);AmyJ.Wildermuth, Why State Standingin Massachusettsv.EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 273, 315 (2007) (arguingthat statesshouldbeabletosuetheUnitedStatestovindicatesovereigntyinterests,andthereby avoidsomeoftheuncertaintiessurroundingsuitsfortheirquasi-sovereigninterests). 12 See Crocker, supra note 10, at 2085 (arguing that individuals are a grossly inadequate substitutewhenitcomestoassertingthestructuralconstitutionalprotectionsunderlyingstate sovereignty); Davis, supra note 10, at 7980 (arguing that governments are the most interested partiesinstructurallitigation);AzizZ.Huq, Standingfor the Structural Constitution, 99 VA.L. REV. 1435, 1440, 1465, 1490 (2013) (arguingthatinstitutionallitigantssuchasCongress,the Executive,andstatesshouldbepreferredtoindividualsforlitigatingstructuralguarantees,given