SHIFTING POWER Critical perspectives on emerging economies TNI WORKING PAPERS INDIA IN THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER A STATUS QUO POWER OR A REVISIONIST FORCE? DEEPSHIKHA SHAHI India in the Emerging World Order: A status quo power or a revisionist force? DEEPSHIKHA SHAHI* Any author vested with the responsibility of appraising India’s position and potential role in the emerging world order could spend a considerable time pondering an appropriate title – ‘The Rise of India as a Status Quo Power’; ‘India as a Reformist Force in the Emerging World’; ‘India in the Emerging World: A Potential Bridge between the North and the South’; and so on. The dilemma surrounding the selection of an appro- priate title in fact reflects a deeper confusion pertaining to India’s newly acquired image of a ‘rising power’ and the ability of its foreign policy to live up to that image. This chapter sets out to trace the changing contours of India’s foreign policy by throwing light on: (i) the historical and sociological compulsions shaping India’s strategic trends and the evolution of India’s model of neoliberalism; (ii) the expression of India’s strategic trends in its changing equations with the powers of the North (especially the US and the former Soviet Union, and now Russia) and the South (especially Brazil, South Africa and China); (iii) the impact of India’s currently evolving synergy with the South (IBSA, BASIC, BRICS) on India’s relationship with the North (G8+5, G20); (iv) the conflictual and cooperative tendencies within India’s strategies at intra-subregional (India-SAARC), inter-subregional (India-ASEAN) and inter-regional (India-Mercosur; India-AU; India-SADC etc.) levels; and (v) the comparative importance of the mutually contradictory forces of nationally-based TNCs and civil society movements in determining India’s foreign policy. After grasping India’s foreign policy stance in the contemporary neoliberal world, the chapter then evaluates the probability of India becoming a beacon for an alternative in a post-neoliberal world order. INDIA’s FOREIGN POLICY: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ROOTS The foreign policy formulated by India after its independence from British colonial rule in 1947 was largely influenced by the ideals of Gandhian and Nehruvian philosophies—swaraj (self-rule), ahimsa (non-violence) and panchsheel (the five principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-alignment with power blocs during the Cold War period, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and peaceful coexistence/cooperation for mutual benefit). India’s foreign policy, wherein ‘morality’ seemed to play a more prominent role than the use of force, was driven by two objectives: safeguarding hard-won sovereignty, and uplifting the underdeveloped economy. The commitment to the UN system, the initiation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with an emphasis on ‘third world solidarity’, and the adoption of a ‘mixed economy’—based on the combination of private and public sectors—were tools for attaining these objectives. While the Gandhian faith in non-violence was constantly reiterated, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared in 1956: Critical perspectives on emerging economies on emerging Critical perspectives I am not aware of our government having ever said that they have adopted the doctrine of ahimsa to our activities. They may respect it, they may honour the doctrine, but as a government it is patent 1 WER that we do not consider ourselves capable of adopting the doctrine of ahimsa. O Despite claiming to follow the principle of peaceful-coexistence, India witnessed major wars and skir- mishes with Pakistan and China over territorial disputes. The principle of non-alignment did not prevent NG P I Nehru from seeking military aid from the US and Great Britain during the brief Sino-Indian border war * Deepshikha is Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Delhi, India. She is a Research Associate with International Democracy Watch, Italy. SHIFT 2 in 1962, or from concluding the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, which ensured the transfer of a huge quantity of Soviet weapons that facilitated India’s military intervention in East Pakistan (subsequently Bangladesh) the same year. Nehru’s ‘socialist’ orientation brought India strategically closer to the USSR during the Cold War period.2 Nehruvian foreign policy also had a tremendous impact on shaping the dynamics of regional politics in south Asia. In 1946, Nehru stated: In Asia it seems inevitable that two or three huge federations will develop… India is going to be the centre of a very big federation (…) From the point of view of all these possible developments of the future, it is very desirable for us to gain contacts with countries all over Asia.3 In 1961, Nehru observed the rise of a new Asian worldview. He noted: The emergence of the independent nations in Asia naturally leads to what might be called an Asian way of looking at the world. I do not say that there is one Asian way, because Asia is a big continent, offering different viewpoints. However, it is a new angle, and is a change from the Europe-centred or any other view of the world.4 The Asian Relations Conference held at New Delhi in 1947 promoted the concept of a South Asian Community. Despite an early start in regional thinking, the volatile political scene in the south Asian region obstructed the institutionalised existence of any regional forum for a long period. After a series of meticulous discussions, it was only in 1985 that the Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was formally adopted by seven south Asian states—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Due to tumultuous domestic political conditions, Afghanistan’s formal entry into SAARC became possible only in 2007. The initiative for forming SAARC was taken by the President of Bangladesh, Zia-ur-Rahman, and was immediately endorsed by Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. However, both Pakistan and India displayed reluctance, though for different reasons. Pakistan was wary of India’s potential to use SAARC in t force? s the service of its own hegemonic designs. Pakistan had specific fears of Indian future domination of trade and commercial links, especially if these were promoted in the industrial infrastructure and in regional trade. Considering the protracted history of bilateral disputes in the region, India had apprehensions that the SAARC might be used by its neighbours to ‘gang up’ against it. An attempt by Bangladesh to bring in Nepal as a party to the central issue of sharing the Ganges River’s waters with India was seen as heading in this direction. Consequently India’s reaction to the Bangladesh proposal was marked by caution. India’s Foreign Minister insisted on confining regional cooperation to certain areas, and voiced two important pre-conditions for regional cooperation in south Asia: the exclusion of bilateral issues from deliberative discussions, and unanimity as the basis of all decisions.5 tatus quo power or a revisioni quo power tatus s The formal incorporation of these two pre-conditions in the SAARC Charter affirmed India’s normative : A hegemony in the south Asian region.6 They also clarified that the institutional form of regional cooperation in south Asia would be an inter-governmental one, not a supra-national one. The inter-governmental institutional form ensured that the functioning of SAARC would safeguard the sovereignty of the SAARC member states rather than override their sovereignty in the interest of the south Asian region. India’s foreign policy remained heavily influenced by the mixed economy model adopted by Nehru during the Cold War. However, the post-Cold War period presented a transformed political context both at the global and the domestic levels. At the global level, the collapse of the socialist bloc led to an embrace of neoliberal capitalism as the triumphant ideology. At the domestic level, the ‘Congress System’7-a de facto one-party system where the Congress party dominated Indian politics -had come to an end even earlier, and various regional political parties backed by diverse and hitherto suppressed social forces (both con- servative and progressive) started playing a more crucial role.8 Indian democracy entered into the ‘third electoral system’9, whereby the pattern of the determinants and outcomes of electoral choice underwent a sea change. In the first and the second electoral systems, which prevailed during 1952-1967 and 1967-1989 India in the Emerging World Order World in the Emerging India 3 respectively, Indian voters had the choice to vote either for or against the dominant Congress Party. However, the proliferation of regional parties in the post-1989 period offered alternative choices to Indian voters and heralded the era of coalition politics, thereby fundamentally transforming the terrain of Indian politics. The shifts in the electoral choices were largely anchored in the process of social change marked by the gradual awakening of the marginalised segments/castes of Indian society.10 Different caste-groups began to align or realign themselves with various national and regional political parties, thereby having a distinct impact on the coalition government of the day. With the alteration in electoral outcomes, the internal composition of Indian strategists also changed. Indian strategists—chiefly consisting of temporarily elected political elites and permanently selected