BEN- GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY Order and Disorder: The Music of the Cosmos and the Life of Philosophy THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE (M.A) Noam Cohen Under the Supervision of Dr. Andrew German and Prof. Ido Geiger March 2017 BEN- GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY Order and Disorder: The Music of the Cosmos and the Life of Philosophy THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE (M.A) Noam Cohen Under the Supervision of Dr. Andrew German and Prof. Ido Geiger Signature of student:____________________________________ Date:_________________ Signature of supervisor: _________________________________ Date:_________________ Signature of chairperson of the committee for graduate studies: ____________________________________________________ Date:_________________ March 2017 Abstract In the following study, I focus on an ancient philosophical problem, as it unfolds in Plato’s Timaeus and Philebus, concerning the possibility of successfully leading a good life through the guidance of reason, despite the fact that human nature is not completely rational. Because the irrational elements of the human soul cannot, by definition, perceive rational principles, it is unclear how they might still obey the authority of a rational order, allowing human beings to wholly embrace the best principles of a morally good life. Is a harmonious unity of reason and the other parts of the human soul, under the same intelligible good order, at all possible if the human being lacks internal harmony by nature? Through an in-depth inquiry of the Timaeus and the Philebus, I determine the nature of the relations between irrationality and rational order, and argue that these texts suggest a certain philosophical life which makes an internal unity of rationality and irrationality possible, in a framework which encompasses both contemplation and action. The first chapter of this study discusses the status and function of Timaeus’ speech, while giving due consideration to the manner in which it is performed. Since Timaeus mixes scientific claims with poetic imagery, I attempt not only to ascertain the epistemological status of his speech, but also its literary function. In this context, I claim that the disjointed form of the speech reflects the structure of the cosmos, and that it is not only a scientific account but also an educational poem promoting virtue. The second chapter proceeds to analyze the relations between necessity and intellect in Timaeus’ account, first by examining the complex construction of the universe by the divine craftsman, and then by analyzing its implications for the human sphere. Accordingly, I argue that in the cosmic level, the relation of intellect to necessity is twofold, consisting in a level of force I and a level of persuasion, depending on the version of necessity and stage of creation. In the human realm, in analogy to the cosmic ordering, the human being can also order his own soul on the foundation of force and persuasion, which, in turn, correspond to the function of the spirited part of the soul and to education in the form of dialectic. Since, however, our analysis of the Timaeus falls short of delineating the manner in which dialectic relates to the sensible aspects of the human soul, the third chapter of this thesis seeks a different perspective on the problem, in the Philebus. Through a critical reading of the latter dialogue, I explore the implications of dialectic for human life in general, in order to determine, on this basis, the possible practical relations of philosophical knowledge of cosmic order to the sensuous aspects of the human soul. On this basis, I argue that the education of the irrational elements in the human soul is an integral part of dialectic itself, since the latter entails intelligent agency in the everyday world, in all areas of human life. Philosophy not only implies a life of contemplation, but also a life of active engagement with the human world. Perceiving it as such is the key to making intelligible the ideal image of unity between reason and the passions. II I would like to thank Dr. Andy German for years of extensive professional and personal guidance, invaluable advice, and for his enthusiasm for Greek philosophy to which I owe my own fascination with the wondrous persistence of ancient questions. I also wish to thank Prof. Ido Geiger for his generous support, without which I could not have continued to explore and discuss the thought of Hegel, simultaneously and despite writing a research thesis about Plato. This thesis reflects four years of personal philosophical development, under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy in Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. I am indebted to each and every member of its academic staff, from whom I have learned a great deal about the rigors of philosophical reasoning. And I am exceptionally grateful for its remarkable support throughout my M.A. studies. Lastly, I wish to thank my loving family, who wholeheartedly supports my philosophical pursuits, in such practical times. Most importantly, I am indebted to my greatest supporter and skeptic challenger, Nitzan Tal, who reminds me time and again of the importance of clarity. III INTRODUCTION 1 1. THE TIMAEUS: A PRELUDE 5 1.1 BEING AND BECOMING 6 1.2 THE CRAFTSMAN 8 1.3 THE BEAUTIFUL AND PERFECTION 11 1.4 THE KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE AND ITS LIMITS 13 1.5 THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF TIMAEUS’ MYTH 16 2. THE TIMAEUS: INTELLECT AND NECESSITY 20 2.1 THE ORDER OF INTELLECT 26 2.1.1 THE COSMIC BODY 29 2.1.2 THE COSMIC SOUL 32 2.2 FORCE, PERSUASION AND NECESSITY 42 2.3 FORCE, PERSUASION AND MUSIC 47 2.4 ORDER AND THE HUMAN BEING 50 3. DIALECTIC IN THE PHILEBUS 59 3.1 THE SETTING OF THE PHILEBUS 60 3.2 THE GIFT OF PROMETHEUS 64 3.3 ONTOLOGY 66 3.4 DIALECTIC AS A PATH, OR WAY OF LIFE 70 3.5 DIALECTIC AND THE IRRATIONAL 75 CONCLUSION 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY 82 IV Introduction “How one ought to live” is a ubiquitous question, both in daily life and, naturally, in the history of philosophy. In the works of Plato, the answer to this question is intimately linked to the possibility of attaining, through philosophical inquiry, knowledge of the good. This conception of the human good emphasizes, no doubt, the essentiality of reason, as the means to attaining the knowledge crucial for living a good life. It raises, however, many serious difficulties regarding the nature of this knowledge, the nature of the world, and, perhaps most importantly, the nature of the human psyche. In the following study, I tackle one of these difficulties, which concerns the possibility of successfully leading a good life through the guidance of reason, despite the glaring fact that human nature is not completely rational. Since the human soul is composite, consisting in both rational and irrational elements, it seems that the feasibility of living only according to rational principles is, from the start, a dubious contention. That is to say, because the irrational elements of the human soul cannot, by definition, perceive rational principles, it is unclear how they might still obey the authority of a rational order, thus allowing human beings to wholly embrace the best principles of a morally good life. Is a harmonious unity of reason and the other parts of the human soul, under the same intelligible good order, at all possible if the human being lacks internal harmony by nature? It is not insignificant, anyone would agree, that throughout Plato’s dialogues the relations between the different parts of the soul always stand in the light of a broader universal metaphysical scheme. This is especially evident in the Timaeus, which gives an account of human nature in the larger framework of the creation of the cosmos. It is precisely in this dialogue where the problematic condition of the human soul emerges in the framework of an overarching cooperation between two apparently opposing forces, intellect and necessity. In order to understand ourselves, 1 Timaeus repeatedly intimates, we must first understand the constitution and order of the world in general. And this understanding holds within itself a great deal of moral significance; it itself is supposed to make a human being’s life good. Accordingly, through an in-depth inquiry of the Timaeus, I intend to ascertain the relations between irrationality and rational order, starting from the grand scheme of the cosmos, and proceeding, from this foundation, into the human sphere. Much has been written about Plato’s Timaeus. Many different philosophers and scholars have inquired into a vast and diverse array of questions concerning the contents of the dialogue. It seems, therefore, hardly justifiable to produce yet again another diligent study of its passages. Nevertheless, the following inquiry sets out to explore a question, which may have been asked many times in the context of the Timaeus, but has not, I maintain, been sufficiently answered with due consideration of certain aspects of the text itself. As Howland has pointed out,1 most commentators have largely ignored the fact that Timaeus’ speech is indeed part of a dialogue. Plato’s literary choice of writing dialogues rather than treatises has already been noted and discussed as having far-reaching interpretive implications.2 In this study, I attempt to think about the question I have presented without losing sight of this textual fact. The dialogue form adds a mimetical dimension which is lacking in other philosophical genres, and thus requires us to pay attention not only to the explicit statements of its protagonists, but also to their actions, that is, to the context and manner in which their words are said.