FIIA REPORT 44 Europe’s New Political Engine Germany’s role in the EU’s foreign and security policy Niklas Helwig (ed.) FIIA REPORT 44 Europe’s New Political Engine Germany’s role in the EU’s foreign and security policy Europe’s New Political Engine Germany’s role in the EU’s foreign and security policy Niklas Helwig (ed.) ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS fiia report 44 Reports can be ordered from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. +358 9 432 7707 [email protected] All fiia reports and other publications are also available on our website at www.fiia.fi. Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen Graphic design: Nordenswan & Siirilä Oy / Tuomas Kortteinen Layout: Kaarina Tammisto Printed by Grano Oy The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Ulkopoliittinen instituutti pL 400 00161 Helsinki Finland www.fiia.fi iSBN 978-951-769-481-0 (web) iSBN 978-951-769-482-7 (print) iSSN 2323-5454 The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an independent research institute that produces high-level research to support political decision-making and public debate both nationally and internationally. All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the high quality of the publications. In addition, publications undergo professional language checking and editing. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors. Acknowledgments This Report has been prepared as part of FIIA’s trans-European research task force “Towards a German EU foreign policy?” and in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. We are especially grateful for the support of the Riga office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and would like to thank Elisabeth Bauer and Katrin Ridder-Strolis for their fruitful collaboration. The Report has benefitted greatly from insights and feedback given during a workshop in Helsinki in June 2015. The authors of this Report would like to thank the other participants of the workshop: Toni Alaranta, Robert Cooper, Petri Hakkarainen, Michael Haltzel, Mikael Mattlin, Wolfgang Mühlberger, Kristi Raik, Ulrich Speck and Funda Tekin. We also like to thank Simon Bulmer and Hubert Zimmermann for their valuable comments on our research given during a project panel at the UACES 45th Annual Conference in Bilbao in September 2015. Last but not least, we would like to extend thanks to Johannes Lehtinen for his practical assistance during the project. Table of contents ackNowLedgmeNtS 7 executive Summary 11 iNtroductioN: germaNy – riSiNg to the chaLLeNge, whiLe maiNtaiNiNg the BaLaNce 15 eu institutions & poLicieS 29 1. Germany and eu foreign policy institutions: From ‘deeper integration’ to ‘deeper cooperation’ 33 Niklas Helwig 2. Germany and the eu’s Security and Defence Policy: New role, old challenges 51 Tuomas Iso-Markku 3. Germany and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Balancing stability and democracy in a ring of fire 71 Anna Lena Kirch criSiS maNagemeNt 89 4. Germany’s role in Libya and Syria: From restraint to responsibility 93 Nicole Koenig 5. Leadership in the Ukraine conflict: A German moment 111 Liana Fix reLatioNS with powerS & partNerS 133 6. The domestic sources of German foreign policy towards Russia 137 Tuomas Forsberg 7. Germany’s evolving relationship with Russia: Towards a norm-based Ostpolitik? 157 Marco Siddi 8. Germany and the United States: Partners in leadership on European security? 173 Tobias Bunde 9. Germany’s Turkey policy in troubling times: A necessary partner for Europe in an unstable region? 193 Can Büyükbay & Wulf Reiners coNcLuSioNS: germaN chaNge aNd the impLicatioNS for the eu’S foreigN aNd Security poLicy 211 aBout the authourS 217 previouSLy puBLiShed iN the SerieS 219 Executive Summary At the beginning of this decade, the EU’s foreign and security policy was leaderless to a large extent. The traditional Franco-German engine stuttered, the United Kingdom looked inwards, and a Brussels-led foreign policy continued to be more vision than reality. At the same time, several crises erupted simultaneously around Europe and put the European Union under pressure to stay united and provide solutions. These parallel developments at the European and international level forced the economically strong Germany to learn how to lead the EU’s foreign and security policy and to become Europe’s new political engine. The way in which Germany took up its new and unusual role as a foreign policy leader and the implications that German leadership has for the EU’s foreign and security policy are thoroughly analysed in this report. Germany fulfilled a leadership role that it never applied for. In the Ukraine crisis, Germany pushed for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine and led the sanctions policy of the West. With regard to the war in Syria, Germany not only followed the French call for military assistance after the Paris attacks, but is also heavily engaged in diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict. Apart from immediate crisis management, Germany is central to the development of broader EU policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Berlin is in the driver’s seat when it comes to relationships with key international actors, such as Russia, Turkey and the US. Germany’s approach to leadership is diversified, but under pressure. Germany does not see leadership merely as a display of power, but also as a mix of institution-building and consensus-fostering. Despite the engagement in Syria, Germany remains more confident in demonstrating its economic rather than its military power. Germany is better at shaping institutions than at driving action. While the building of the EU’s institutional framework was a landmark success for Germany, the current crises show that Germany has to invest heavily 11 in Europe’s resilience. In addition, diplomatic approaches aimed at fostering consensus within the EU as well as with third countries often face limits. It becomes more and more difficult for Germany to root for win-win solutions in a world that is increasingly perceived as a zero-sum game. Berlin obviously has to continue reaching out to its main partner in Paris, but also has to ensure variable pre-consensus with member states in Europe’s South, hit hardest by the recent crises, and East, in need of reassurance as former Soviet satellite countries. Germany adheres to its foreign policy tenets, while shouldering more international responsibility. Despite some setbacks and divisions in recent crises, Germany’s European vocation pushes the country to preserve and foster the EU’s unity and to counteract centrifugal forces. Berlin’s Ostpolitik of seeking dialogue and keeping channels of communication open with Russia continues to be a driving force, but became more realistic as well as contingent on Moscow’s respect for international law. Towards the West, Germany’s commitment to the transatlantic partnership has not wavered and has been marked by close cooperation throughout the recent crises. Germany continues to see military force as the last resort based on its historical experiences and on a genuine belief in the primacy of diplomacy. However, Berlin learned that it may be better to be an active part of a Western alliance than to stand on the sidelines with little political clout. Consequently, Germany is set to increase its defence spending and became unexpectedly involved in the Syrian war. The drivers of German foreign policy change are located at the top in Berlin. The recent crises have sparked a broad foreign policy debate, but the learning process flows from the top down rather than the other way around. Think-tank publications and choreographed speeches by top politicians paved the way for more international responsibility. Business interests did not undermine the primacy of politics and Germany’s firm position on Russia’s violation of international law. The party debate on the military engagement in Syria was controversial, but its impact on the parliament’s mandate to assist France remained limited. Decision- makers in the government and opinion-makers in think tanks and the media are the real drivers of German foreign policy change and they adhere to the traditional German foreign policy tenets as their navigation system. It is to the advantage of the foreign policy elite that they can base their actions on a more permissive domestic audience. 12 EUROPE’S NEW POLITICAL ENGINE Germany pushes for a stronger, but more decentralized European foreign and security policy. Acting European does not mean working only through the EU framework and its community institutions. As the Ukraine and Syria diplomacy showed, Germany became more comfortable in operating in less formal formats and in mini-lateral cooperation with key member states. Berlin also emphasizes the role of the OSCE to generate trust in Eastern Ukraine and the role of NATO as the backbone of European defence. A close network of and an increasing interoperability between EU structures, other international organizations as well as national foreign policies and defence capabilities is a crucial objective for Germany. For now, Germany has become an unlikely and unusual foreign policy leader, which still differs in various aspects from traditional foreign policy powerhouses. It leads through institutions and diplomacy rather than military power. It seeks European solutions rather than national ones. It is firmly based in the “West”, while keeping the door open to the “East”. Berlin is largely driven by deep-rooted policy lines, rather than by short-term gain and electoral pressures. However, the success and sustainability of Germany’s approach depends on securing Europe’s unity and resilience in the face of crises in the neighbourhood and the effects of globalization. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 Introduction: Germany – rising to the challenge, while maintaining the balance Niklas Helwig It is no exaggeration to say that the EU’s foreign and security policy has had a rough couple of years.