Case 2:06-cv-00045-RSM Document 122 Filed 01/21/09 Page 1 of 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 JENNIFER STRANGE, MAGAN MORRIS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 11 situated, CASE NO. C06-045RSM 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13 v. 14 LES SCHWAB TIRE CENTERS OF OREGON, 15 INC., et al., 16 Defendants. 17 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 18 COMMISSION, 19 Plaintiff, 20 v. 21 LES SCHWAB TIRE CENTERS OF WASHINGTON, INC., et al., 22 Defendants. 23 24 This matter is now before the Court for consideration of defendant Les Schwab Warehouse 25 Center’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 108). The Court has fully considered the motion, 26 plaintiffs’ opposition, and the record in this matter, as well as relevant case law, and deems oral argument 27 ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL 28 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 Case 2:06-cv-00045-RSM Document 122 Filed 01/21/09 Page 2 of 12 1 unnecessary. For the reasons set forth below, the motion shall be granted in part and denied in part. 2 BACKGROUND 3 Plaintiffs Jennifer Strange and Magen Morris are former employees of defendant Les Schwab Tire 4 Centers of Washington, Inc. They filed this employment discrimination complaint based on Washington 5 state and federal law, alleging that their employer discriminated against them on the basis of their gender 6 by failing to promote them to managerial positions, and by retaliating against them for filing an 7 employment discrimination complaint. Their second amended complaint names Les Schwab Warehouse 8 Center, Inc. (“Warehouse Center” or “Warehouse”), an Oregon corporation, as an additional defendant. 9 With respect to this defendant, the individual plaintiffs allege: 10 2.3 The defendants collectively operate under the name “Les Schwab Tire Centers.” Les Schwab Warehouse Center, Inc. has, for equal employment reporting purposes, identified 11 itself as the parent corporation for all Les Schwab Tire Center operations. For the purpose of this action, the defendants together constitute a single integrated enterprise. The principal 12 place of business of all Les Schwab Tire Center operations is Prineville, Oregon. 13 Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. # 113, p. 2. 14 After the individual plaintiffs filed this action, the EEOC brought a separate action on behalf of 15 Ms. Strange and Ms. Morris, and “similarly situated individuals who were adversely affected by 16 [defendants’] practices.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Les Schwab Tire Centers of 17 Washington, Inc., et al., C06-761RSM. The action named as defendants the Les Schwab Tire Centers of 18 Washington, Inc., and Les Schwab Warehouse Center, Inc. Id., Dkt. # 1. The two cases were 19 consolidated into one action, and the EEOC filed an amended complaint.1 With respect to defendant 20 Warehouse Center, plaintiff EEOC alleges in the amended complaint: 21 This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to correct the unlawful employment practices and to provide 22 appropriate relief to Magen Morris, Jennifer Strange and similar situated individuals who were adversely affected by such practices. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 23 (“the EEOC” or “the Commission”) alleges that defendants Les Schwab Tire Centers of Washington, Inc.[,] Les Schwab Warehouse Center, Inc., Les Schwab Tire Centers of Boise, 24 Inc., . (collectively referred to herein as “Les Schwab” or “defendants”) violated Title VII by discriminating against Ms. Morris, Ms. Strange and similarly situated individuals on the 25 26 1 The EEOC First Amended Complaint also names additional Les Schwab Tire Centers in other states than Washington, but those are not put at issue in this motion. Dkt. # 36. 27 ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL 28 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 Case 2:06-cv-00045-RSM Document 122 Filed 01/21/09 Page 3 of 12 1 basis of sex when defendants failed to provide training opportunities to them and when it failed to promote them to management positions on the basis of sex. The EEOC also alleges 2 that Les Schwab violated Title VII when it failed to hire female applicants for positions in the sale/service departments of Les Schwab Tire Center facilities on the basis of sex. 3 EEOC First Amended complaint, Dkt. # 36, p. 2. 4 Defendant Warehouse Center has moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that it should 5 not be a defendant in this action because both the individual defendants worked only for Les Schwab Tire 6 Centers of Washington, Inc. Warehouse Center, located in Prineville, Oregon, is a warehouse and 7 distribution center for the network of Les Schwab retail tire sales centers, of which Les Schwab Tire 8 Center of Washington, Inc., is one. Warehouse Center asserts that it was not plaintiffs’ employer and 9 thus not amenable to suit by them under either state or federal law. Warehouse asserts that it is a 10 separate corporation from each of the individual state’s Tire Centers, with its own by-laws and Articles of 11 Incorporation. According to Warehouse, there is no parent-subsidiary relationship between the 12 Warehouse Center and any of the Tire Centers, nor does the Warehouse Center act as an agent for the 13 Tire Centers. Warehouse does provide financial and accounting services for the Tire Centers on a fee 14 basis, but the various Tire Centers have the sole authority to manage their own business activities. 15 Defendant Warehouse’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. # 98, ¶¶ 5-6. The individual 16 plaintiffs and the EEOC have opposed the motion, contending that the relationship between the Tire 17 Centers and the Warehouse Center is sufficient to allow imposition of liability upon the Warehouse 18 Center under both state and federal law. 19 ANALYSIS 20 I. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 21 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 22 admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 23 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 24 An issue is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” and a fact is 25 material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 26 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 27 ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL 28 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 Case 2:06-cv-00045-RSM Document 122 Filed 01/21/09 Page 4 of 12 1 party. Id. “[S]ummary judgment should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence 2 from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in its favor.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 3 68 F. 3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). It should also be granted where there is a “complete failure of 4 proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 5 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving 6 party’s position is not sufficient” to prevent summary judgment. Triton Energy Corp., 68 F. 3d at 1221. 7 II. Liability for Discrimination under Title VII 8 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to 9 his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, 10 religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII only covers employers with fifteen or 11 more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The courts have developed and applied a four-part “single 12 employer” or “integrated enterprise” test to determine whether two related companies may be considered 13 one employer for the purposes of counting employees and thus determining statutory coverage under 14 Title VII. Under the four-part test, multiple businesses may be treated as a single employer for the 15 purpose of Title VII coverage if they had “(1) integrated operations, (2) common management, (3) 16 centralized control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership or financial control.” Morgan v. 17 Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F. 2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989). 18 However, this four-part test for determining whether two entities may constitute a “single 19 employer” or “integrated enterprise” is not used to determine joint liability; instead it “determines 20 whether a defendant can meet the statutory criteria of an ‘employer’ for Title VII applicability.” 21 Anderson v. Pacific Maritime Association, 336 F. 3d 924, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the 22 “coverage” cases must be distinguished from the “liability” cases, in which a court analyzes whether two 23 or more corporations are related in such a way that one may be subjected to the Title VII liability of the 24 other as either a joint or indirect employer. See, EEOC v. Pacific Maritime Association, 351 F. 3d 1270, 25 26 27 ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL 28 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 Case 2:06-cv-00045-RSM Document 122 Filed 01/21/09 Page 5 of 12 1 1272-73 (9th Cir. 2003).2 2 “Liability as an indirect employer requires that the employer have ‘some peculiar control over the 3 employee’s relationship with the direct employer’ and that the indirect employer engaged in 4 ‘discriminatory interference.’” Id.