Environmental Pragmatism, Systematism and the Reach of Environmental Ethics Anders Krosshavn Vik Master thesis of philosophy, IFIKK Faculty of Humanities Supervisor: prof. Arne Johan Vetlesen UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Autumn 2014 II Environmental Pragmatism, Systematism and the Reach of Environmental Ethics III © Anders Krosshavn Vik 2014 Title: Environmental Pragmatism, Systematism and the Reach of Environmental Ethics Author: Anders Krosshavn Vik http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Norsk Aero AS IV V The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection.[…] The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. – G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit VI Abstract This thesis deals with and defends the position in environmental philosophy known as environmental pragmatism. Contextualized against the dominant background of monistic non- anthropocentric theories in environmental ethics, this position attempts an alternative account both of intrinsic value in non-human nature, and of the task of ethics in itself. Presenting some contributions from such authors as Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, Andrew Light, Kelly Parker and Ben Minteer, the work attempts to promote a stronger practical orientation in environmental ethics which seeks to make contributions to solving concrete problems and become relevant to environmental policy. As a continuation of this project, I suggest a further expansion which I call ‘systematism’ which attempts to reorient ethics in light of large scale social dynamics and their implications for agency and an effective ethical framework. VII Acknowledgements I would like to thank my parents for their love and support throughout my project. My father in particular for his heroic last minute proofreads. You are the goodest English teacher of all. Also my mother for her care and encouragement when I needed it the most. Thank you both for teaching me to think for myself. I also extend my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Arne Johan, who has been the invaluable source of immersive discussions which I regret now being over. Whatever merit pertains to this work I share with the above, although its faults, to be sure, are mine alone. Thank you Facebook for your many distractions, but also for the likes you will now no doubt bestow upon me. Thank you last but not least Ellen for your loving support and for the countless cups of coffee served at the bedside. I promise I will now start helping with the laundry again. VIII Preface From a very young age, there was a distinct sense in my mind about the importance of sustainability and finitude. At about 4 or 5 I remember realizing that pealing snots from my nose and flicking them on the floor, was not a good idea if left unchecked in the long run. At about 10, I once declared to my parents how, when I grew up I would combat deforestation by ensuring every chopped tree be replaced by 10 more. My understanding, I hope, has since evolved, but my attitude, no doubt remained the same. Thus, my interest was soon sparked upon discovering environmental philosophy as an undergraduate. That year’s semester paper, however, proved to be a limited arena for exploring the many ideas that had caught my attention. My agreements with some of them, and indeed reservations against others were left unsatisfactorily articulated, some of which I hope will be better served here. The current work attempts to form a picture of these reservations and present an alternative position, which I luckily discovered as sharing many of my own concerns. This somewhat unknown position, known as environmental pragmatism, is here my main area of inquiry put against a background of clustering ethical positions, which I argue constitute a main paradigm in the field today. The criticism of these positions, known as monistic non-anthropocentrisms, contains both an ethical and a meta-ethical component. The first level ethical objection is that their approach to ethical theory in general is too atomistic and too theoretically confined to absolutes and dualistic distinctions. The atomistic and foundational concept of value fundamental to such ethics fails to capture the relational and interchanging character of values which defines our experience with them and which serve not only identity value attain their identities through their relationship to other values. I attempt to outline an alternative pragmatic understanding of value, which abandons the effort to capture the exact nature of each value in isolation. Thus, it takes a pluralistic approach to ethics, attempting to open the doors for cooperation. It blurs the many sharp distinctions and exclusive categories often made by monistic theories, thereby rejecting the paradigmatic project of finding moral grounding in an Archimedean point. The meta-ethical argument is that it is inadequate when returning too little of practical value to the struggles with environmental causes. Environmental pragmatists often suggest rather an approach, which is focused on making relevant contributions to policy or social movements, IX rather than delving deeper into the complexities and irresolvable differences of value theory. Rather, they suggest that taking a basis in the myriad intuitions of natural value that are already present and build upon them to cultivate better conduct in the face of urgent environmental problems. Building on this effort comes my own attempt to expand the horizon of environmental pragmatism. I try to take a systemic viewpoint to ask whether the environmental problems and environmental destructiveness and behaviour may be attacked from different angles than only moral ones. It seems that many are already clear on what needs to be done to avoid environmental destruction, but that there are further systemic, social and psychological obstacles in between, which seems to escape the scope of ethical theory. I suggest that a wider holistic notion of agency which includes higher order hierarchies may be of help in discovering new sources of moral agency that seems unavailable in the atomistic conception of the agent. Further, in the attempt to reveal the obstacles preventing environmental adaption, I argue that empirical human or social sciences may help in forming better models of how behavioural, political and social change is possible from the systemic level, an empirical approach much in line with the empirical aspirations of pragmatism. In the following text, the terms ‘environmental pragmatism’ and simply ‘pragmatism’ are sometimes used interchangeably. Hopefully, context will reveal the intended sense. X Table of Content 2.1 What is environmental pragmatism? ......................................................................... 14 2.2 Historical roots .......................................................................................................... 19 2.2.1 American pragmatism ........................................................................................ 20 2.2.2 Beginnings of environmental pragmatism ......................................................... 22 2.3 What is the question of environmental philosophy? ................................................. 26 2.4 Intrinsic value in environmental pragmatism ............................................................ 30 2.5 Pluralism and Norton’s convergence hypothesis....................................................... 38 2.5.1 Pluralism ............................................................................................................. 38 2.5.2 The convergence hypothesis .............................................................................. 39 2.6 A new type of ethics .................................................................................................. 41 2.7 Beyond intrinsic value and non-anthropocentric monism ......................................... 43 2.8 Criticism and problems .............................................................................................. 50 2.8.1 Is pragmatism self-enclosed as well? ................................................................. 51 2.8.2 Compatibility paradox of pluralism ................................................................... 58 3.1 The psycho-behavioural thesis .................................................................................. 64 3.1.1 Sensitivity of attitudes to moral persuasion ....................................................... 68 3.1.2 Sensitivity of behaviour to moral attitudes ........................................................ 70 3.2 Ethical agent holism .................................................................................................. 71 3.2.1 Supplementing the bottom-up approach ............................................................ 71 3.2.2 The banality of environmental behaviour .......................................................... 76 3.2.3 Redistributing responsibility .............................................................................. 79 3.3 Institutionalist accounts ............................................................................................. 81 4.1 The argument so far ..................................................................................................