Cornelius Friesendorf The Military and Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) LIT The Military and Law Enforcement in Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo Cornelius Friesendorf LIT (Bibliographic information here) Contents About This Book vii Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations xi 1 Introduction 1 2 The Military, Law Enforcement and Peace Operations 9 Post-Conflict Security Gaps and International Military Forces 14 Conceptualising Military Involvement in Post-Conflict Law Enforcement 20 Conditions for Military Law Enforcement Support 28 3 Bosnia-Herzegovina 33 IFOR 33 SFOR 39 The EU Takes Over 55 The Tricky Question of Effectivenes 72 4 Kosovo 89 NATO Enters Kosovo 89 NATO in an International Protectorate 98 NATO and Serious Crime in Kosovo Before and After Independence 104 5 Conclusion: Improving Military Support to Law Enforcement 143 Case Study Findings 145 Improving Military Contributions to Post-Conflict Law Enforcement 150 Beyond the Balkans 158 Final Thoughts 161 References 165 About the Author 193 About DCAF 195 About This Book For post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts to have a chance of success, security gaps need to be closed. Domestic law enforcement agencies tend to be too weak or unreliable after war to enforce the law and fight serious crime. As a consequence, operations against organised crime, the arrest of suspected war criminals and the protection of minorities depend on international intervention forces. Much attention has been paid to domestic police reform and the problems of deploying international civilian police. This book examines the under-explored role of international military missions in post-conflict law enforcement, with a focus on serious crime. The military is under pressure to fill security gaps. Yet military involvement in crime-fighting is problematic practically (soldiers are generally not trained and equipped for it), politically (crime-fighting is seen as military mission creep) and normatively (it undermines the delineation of military and policing functions). Military support of law enforcement poses a major dilemma in peace operations. Decision-makers continue to struggle with this dilemma in an ad-hoc fashion, while scholars have so far provided few empirical accounts. This book focuses on post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo. It argues that the pros of military involvement in law enforcement outweigh the cons, given the continuing lack of strong police forces, the criminalised nature of contemporary wars and the negative influence of spoilers on stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts. Military support of the fight against serious crime is not sufficient for these efforts to succeed, but it is necessary. This book has three objectives. It describes the role of NATO and EU military missions in law enforcement in BiH and Kosovo from the 1990s through early 2009, thus filling an empirical knowledge gap. By formulating a strategy for military involvement in law enforcement, the book also makes a normative contribution to the debate on peace operations. Drawing on, among other sources, interviews in these two ‘international protectorates’, the book shows that military support of the fight against serious crime has lacked effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy, examples of success notwithstanding. Third, the book adds conceptual value to the debate on peace operations, by drawing on security governance, Security Sector Reform and Security Sector Governance. These concepts help to understand the military role in post-conflict law enforcement and to guide improved efforts. Acknowledgements Earlier drafts of this book were presented at the University of Belgrade, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in Belgrade, the University of Munich, the University of Konstanz, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, the University of Geneva and the 2009 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in New York City. Conference participants provided valuable feedback. The first case study draws on an article co- authored with my good friend and colleague Susan Penksa (in International Peacekeeping 15:5). Special thanks go to the CCMR and the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo for hosting me so kindly in 2007 and 2008. I am also grateful to the interviewees (who are cited anonymously), as well as the Volkswagen Foundation, which financed my fieldwork in Southeast Europe between 2006 and 2008. For discussions, contacts and information I thank Dejan Anastasijević, Peter Andreas, Richard Barszczewski, Wolfgang Benedek, Hans Born, Max Bornefeld-Ettmann, Benjamin S. Buckland, Christoph Buehler, Biljana Đorđević, Petrus C. van Duyne, Tobias Flessenkemper, Friedrich Christian Haas, Alice Hills, Holger Kasch, Fedor Keredzin, Alexandre Lambert, Theodore Leggett, Sanja Mihajlović, Garren Mulloy, David Nosworthy, Markus Orgis, Lulzim Peci, Susan E. Penksa, Sammi Sandawi, Albrecht Schnabel, Fred Schreier, Ursula C. Schroeder, Darko Stančić, Peter Vanhoutte, Victoria Walker, Aidan Wills and especially Heiner Hänggi, Beverly Youmans and two anonymous reviewers. Any errors and shortcomings in this book are my responsibility. It must also be noted that many of those who helped me in researching and writing this book disagree with some of the findings. Cornelius Friesendorf Frankfurt am Main, November 2009 Abbreviations ANP Afghan National Police BBP Border and Boundary Police BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina BND Bundesnachrichtendienst (German Federal Intelligence Service) CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CIU Criminal Intelligence Unit CIVPOL Civilian Police COM KFOR Commander of KFOR CRC Crowd and Riot Control DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EU European Union EUFOR European Union Force EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo EUPM European Union Police Force GSG 9 Grenzschutzgruppe 9 HUMINT Human Intelligence ICG International Crisis Group ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia IFOR Implementation Force IPTF International Police Task Force IPU Integrated Police Unit ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JFC Joint Force Command JIOC Joint Intelligence Operations Center KFOR Kosovo Force KLA/UÇK Kosovo Liberation Army/Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës KOCB Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau KPC Kosovo Protection Corps KPS Kosovo Police Service KSF Kosovo Stability Force KSK Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command) LMT Liaison and Monitoring Team LOT Liaison and Observation Team xii MNB Multinational Brigade MND Multinational Division MSU Multinational Specialised Unit MTF Multinational Task Force MUP Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova/(Police of the) Ministry of Interior NAC North Atlantic Council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-governmental Organisation NIC National Intelligence Cell OHR Office of the High Representative OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PIFWC Person Indicted for War Crimes PISG Provisional Institutions for Self-Government PMSC Private Military and Security Company PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team RoE Rules of Engagement RS Republika Srpska SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SAS Special Air Services SFOR Stabilisation Force SIPA State Information and Protection Agency/State Investigation and Protection Agency SPU Special Police Unit SRSG Special Representative of the (UN) Secretary-General SSG Security Sector Governance SSR Security Sector Reform SSU Special Support Unit STOP Special Trafficking Operations Programme SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime US United States Chapter 1 Introduction When war ends law enforcement is needed. War criminals must be arrested, organised crime checked, and attacks on minorities and refugees prevented or punished. If those committing serious crime are given free rein to violate laws and human rights with impunity, efforts to stabilise war-torn countries are bound to fail. Law enforcement is necessary for post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding. This book focuses on the role of the military and highlights a major dilemma. Military involvement in law enforcement is needed to fill security gaps.1 Domestic security forces tend to be weak or compromised after war, and international civilian police (CIVPOL) forces usually arrive late and in insufficient numbers. Moreover, conditions in post-war countries may draw the military into the law enforcement realm. Yet military involvement in law enforcement is problematic. Soldiers are trained to confront, and kill if necessary, organised enemies. But when arresting members of organised crime networks and seizing their assets, it is crucial to secure the chain of evidence. When a rioting mob pelts security forces or returning refugees with stones, opening indiscriminate fire at the rioters would be inappropriate. Military forces often do not possess the training and equipment to conduct law enforcement tasks. Not least for this reason, the evolution of democracy has gone hand in hand with the separation of military from policing tasks. Employing the military for law enforcement undermines the international message