DOCUMENT RESUME ED 232 894 SO 014 662 AUTHOR Wagner, Paul A. TITLE Kohlberg, Science and Indoctrination. PUB DATE Nov 82 NOTE 17p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Studies Association (Nashville, TN, November 3-5, 1982). PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Definitions; *Developmental Stages; *Individual Development; Models; *Moral Development; *Personality Theories; Research Design; Research Methodology; *Scientific Methodology; Scientific Research; Semantics IDENTIFIERS Developmental Theory; *Indoctrination; Kohlberg (Lawrence); Moral Reasoning ABSTRACT The author argues that unless Kohlberg's theory of moral development can be demonstrated empirically, based on scientific evidence, his ensuing plan for a program of moral education amounts to no more than a systematic program of indoctrination. Kohlberg identifies the moral stage of a person by eliciting from a subject the reasons referred to in determining to act one way rather Van another. While Kohlberg claims to study the structure of responses rather than their substance, it is questionable whether these are separable and whether relying on immediate.utterances of responses is sufficient evidence for characterizing individuals into particular stages. Determining the scientific usefulness of a proposed theory depends upon the semantic clarity of the terms used in constructing the theory, and Kohlberg's description of "stages" as "organized systems of thought" is one example of the semantic insufficiency and ambiguity characteristic of Kohlberg's paradigm. It is fundamentally important to a theory that is grounded upon the linguistic behavior of its subjects to develop clearly constructed procedures for associating observation expressions such as "justice" with terms of less ambiguous nature. In conclusion, by constructing a particular nomenclature, Kohlberg has made his ideas appear to be actual, and appear, therefore, to be a legitimate object of scientific study. (LH) *********************************************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. *********************************************************************** UM. OIPARTMINT Of BRICATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER IERICI KThis document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it. CI Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality. Points of view Or opinions stated in this docu- mem do not neceeserily represent offical NIE position or policy. "PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATEAAL HAS BE N GRANTED SY retie "te)4201,...AMI-* Kohlberg, Science and Indoctrination TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).' by Paul A. Wagner Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Studies Association (Nashville, TN, November 3-5, 1982)'. 2 r41, Kohlberg, Science and Indoctrination Kohlberg, denies that his program of moral education isindoctrinative. His claim depends uPOn an implicit argument that he candemonstrate scientifically,, how it is that human beingsdeveApmorally. Before discussing whether or not Kohlberg makes good on his claim, a few preliminary remarks are in order.. Since Kohlberg is a professional psychologist and not aphilosopher, one is justified in expecting him to *involved in the making ofspecific empirical claims that must then be defended by reference to relevantempirical evidence. This is not to deny that a psychologist maylegitimately become involved in the doing of philosophy. Rather it is only to observe that when a psychologist qua psychologist asserts the truth ofcertain propositions pertaining, say, to the nature of moral development and proceeds tocite data to support that claim, readers have a right to treat such utterances as theempirically-supported theory of a scientist and not the pronouncements of aphilosopher. I. 1 Kohlberg, is a Xantian of sorts. In specifying the character and emotional traits of a moral person, Kohlberg claims to be studyingthe structure of moral thoughts, but inevitably ends by focusing on thesubstance rather than the structure of thought. If it turns out that Kohlberg has not succeededin scientifically establishing the nature of a moral person then onemust conclude that Kohlberg is espousing a program inwhich students are simply caused to accept a pe'rticular moral commitment, a commitmentwhich neither the author of the program nor the student is able to justify. Causing a.person to accept a moral commitment for which he is ultimately unable toprdvide justification is, I take it, a paradigm case of indoctrination. More generally, anytime one person X causes another person Y to adopt abelief which Y is unable to justify 2 then Y has been indoctrinated by X. In the case of Kohlberg's program, if simple numerical correlation is insufficient grounds for identifying a Kantian as a paradigm of moral development, and since there is no further justification in Kohlberg's work for causing people to adopt a Kantian morality, then to initiate practices that cause people to adopt a set of unjustified beliefs is tantamount to indoctrinating them. Consequently, as I will argue, practices of indoctrination are in fact essential to the success of Kohlberg's program. The fact of the matter is that some of Kohlberg's own research reports suggest that students do not develop naturally into what Kohlberg conceives of as a moral person. In addition, Kohlberg is unwilling to allow students to subscribe to whatever moral attitudes and principles they findimmediately gratifying or.may naturally develop. In a recent paper prepared by Lawrence Kohlberg and Moshe Blatt the authors studied the effect of techniques for moving students closer to Kohlberg's Kantian ideals. Kohlberg and Blatt con- clude that themselves, then proceeds to construct theories about much more narrow and specific classes of events. However, merely because one gives a common name to a set of observable instances is not in itself indicative that some unique essence exists. For example, to say as Kohlberg does that because stages "can be validated by longitudinal study implies that stages havedefinite empiricalcharactóristics".3 is to make either a trivial point or nopoint at all--if the empirical character- istic referred to is no more then acoincidential statistical correlation. Certainly if a scientistlias accurately,identified some feature of the natural natural world (by "feature" I mean somereadily recognizable and reoccurring phenomenon), then given the relevantcircumstances--whether they occur in the be easily past, present or future--the samephenomenon (stage) ought to again 3 identified by the trained researcher. If, however, as in the case of Kohlberg the term 'stage" is not used to identify any distinct feature of the natural world, but refers instead to a rather loosely described collection of things and events, then any declaration that a state is again evident because one suspects that the same statistically correlated things and events are again present, does not by itself justify a claim that a distinct feature or useful taxonomic description of the world has been identified. What Kohlberg must do is present an argument that his stages represent something more than a coin- cidental statistical correlation. In elaborating upon his claim that "stages can be validated by longitudinal study", Kohlberg makes the following claim: "Stages are 'structured wholes' or organized systems of thought. Individuals are consistent in level of moral judgment.4 While it is clear what Kohlberg means by the term "organized systems of thought his use of the disjunction "or" is perplexing. If stages can be either an "organizedsystem'of thought" or a "structured whole," then it remains to be made clear what soet of thing constitutes a "structured whole" and why such a construct should be treated as an alternative buefully sufficient referent for his term "stage." To subsequently point out that "Individuals are consistent in level of moral development," explains nothing about the notion of "structured whole" or the reason why "stages" can be regarded as either "structured wholes" or "organized systems of thought."The only point made by Kohlberg's claim is that a "stage" is somehow a thing. What is not made clear by either Kohlberg's claim or his statements of observation is that what he claims to observe possesses theerelevant relational property or consistency such that it might be recognized as a thing by a trained and impartial observer. Nevertheless, without the benefit of further explanation, 4 Kohlberg seems to have concluded that simply by constructing a particular nomenclature, he can make that which is talked about (falsely) appear to be actun, and hence a legitimate object of scientific study. In questioning whether Kohlberg's "stages" and, more generally, his theory is about a scientifically interesting phenomenon, it is informative to consider some additional remarks Kohlberg offers as further explication of the nature of his stages. Kohlberg writes, "The moraldstages are 'structures of moral judgmentor 'moral reasoning'. 'Structures' of moral judgment must bedis- 5 tinguished from the content of moral judgment." At this point, since Kohlberg is interested in discussing the "structure" of moral judgment, one might expect him to discuss a particular form of deontic logic and then to justify the treatment of