Knowles, D. (2009) Introduction to G.W.F. Hegel. In: Knowles, D. (ed.) G.W.F. Hegel. International library of essays in the history of social and political thought. Ashgate, Farnham, UK. ISBN 9780754627265. http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/34113/ Deposited on: 21 July 2010 Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770—1831) Life and Work Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is amongst the greatest and most influential of political philosophers. It is a mark of the significance and impact of his thought, as well as of its complexity and ambivalence that philosophers of both the Left (most famously Karl Marx and, in the 20th century, the Frankfurt School) and the Right (in a fashion, Max Stirner, and a century later, Michael Oakeshott and Carl Schmitt) are deeply indebted to Hegel as source or target, and often both at once. And many have also identified strong liberal elements in his work. Hegel was born in Stuttgart in 1770. His father was a civil servant at the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. At the Tübinger Stift, a Protestant Seminary which he entered in 1788, he was a close friend of two outstanding fellow students, Friedrich Hölderlin (the poet) and Friedrich Schelling (the philosopher). His interest in politics and current affairs developed along with their common enthusiasm for the revolutionary events in France. After periods as a private tutor, in 1801 he followed Schelling to the University of Jena, working as a virtually unpaid tutorial assistant until 1807. Following long spells as a newspaper editor in Bamburg and as a headmaster at the Gymnasium in Nuremburg, he took up his first fully professional university post as professor in Heidelberg in 1816 at the age of 46. In 1818 he moved to take up the Philosophy chair in Berlin, Prussia, previously occupied by Fichte. He 1 was to remain in post until his death in 1831. 1 For full details of Hegel’s life, read Terry Pinkard’s biography, Hegel (2000). As a philosopher Hegel is best known for his grandiloquent metaphysical system of absolute idealism.2 But his work in social and political philosophy is more than just a supplement to this last great effort in philosophical system-building. He thought hard about—and wrote about—ethics in its broadest sense throughout his intellectual career. His early theological works were driven by a concern for social improvement and for finding a place for religion as a vehicle of cultural reform. In Jena he finished an earlier essay on the German Constitution and published his critical (1802—3) essay on Natural Law (On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its Place in Practical Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law) in which he introduces criticisms of ‘individualist’ systems of normative ethics, notably Kantian ethics and social contract theories of the state. In his (unpublished) System of Ethical Life, and in lecture materials, the Jena System Drafts, he began to develop related concepts of spirit, mutual recognition and freedom which he would elaborate in the magnificent (1807) Phenomenology of Spirit (henceforth Phenomenology).3 Hegel’s ethics and political philosophy are sketched in the ‘Objective Mind’ section of the (1817) Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and then in much greater detail in successive drafts of the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (henceforth PR)4, his fullest and most carefully articulated text in political theory, first published in 1821 as a handbook to accompany lectures. Additional material on social and political philosophy can be found in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, the Lectures on the History of Philosophy (both published after his death) and various essays, notably his 1831 essay ‘On the English Reform Bill’. 2 The best modern exposition of this system is Charles Taylor, Hegel (1975). Two modern works which serve as excellent introductions to hegel’s philosophy are Stephen Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy (1991) and Frederick Beiser, Hegel (2005). 3 Cited at paragraph (¶) numbers as given in the Miller translation: G.W.H. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit trans. A.V. Miller (1977). 4 Cited at section (§) numbers from G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (1991). Hegel’s Idealism In Hegel’s system the study of social and political philosophy is the study of ‘objective mind’. Hegel is an absolute idealist, which is to say, at its simplest, that the world is ultimately constituted by reason. This is an exotic metaphysical thesis, but it is not unprecedented and it is not absurd. Like all deep philosophical theses, absolute idealism is grounded in strong intuitions and good questions: If the universe is not, at bottom, mathematical, how can the equations of the physicist disclose its nature? Were the natural world not itself rational or intrinsically intelligible, how could rational creatures have knowledge of it? Absolute idealism can only be dismissed, if it can be dismissed, by careful philosophical arguments—not by guffaws or by kicking stones in the fashion of Samuel Johnson’s dismissal of Berkeley’s idealism. These things said, there are not many absolute idealists nowadays. Idealism in social philosophy (of the kind that Marx aimed to turn ‘on its head’ as stated in the 1872 Preface to Capital) is an altogether more robust thesis. It claims that social institutions such as families, firms, trades unions, legal systems, states and their governments, are structures of mind (or Spirit—Geist is Hegel’s term). The social world is a system of Objective Mind (as against Subjective Mind, exemplified in the mental life of individuals), constituted by such mental entities as intentions, expectations, decisions, beliefs, values, rules, conventions and laws. In this collection, Hegel’s social idealism is broached in many papers (but notably those by Terry Pinkard [2], Robert B. Pippin [3] and Stephen Houlgate [5]). Houlgate, in particular, explains Hegel’s thesis of the unity of theoretical and practical spirit— thought and will—in the account that Hegel gives of his foundational value of freedom. This serves not only to link Hegel’s metaphysics and epistemology to his social philosophy but also to explain the structure of the Philosophy of Right as an outline of how the free will is embodied in the institutional structures of the modern rational state, as Hegel interprets it. Spirit, Reason and Freedom Objective Mind (henceforth Spirit) has a history—indeed, for Hegel, nothing else has a history—with a distinctive theme: Reason works in history to develop patterns of rationality in the social world. Think of the history of Spirit as a mental space-time worm—‘Spirit emptied out into Time’ (Phenomenology ¶808)—moving from civilization to civilization, beginning in the ancient Chinese world and moving to the German (Northern European Protestant) world of Hegel’s day via spells in India, Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome and the Europe of mediaeval Christianity, and undergoing sequential changes in the process, all driven by the motor of reason. ‘This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Spirit has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance’ (Phenomenology ¶808). Thus social worlds which are irrational, say because the citizens are faced with tragic conflicts between the norms of family life as dictated by religious beliefs and the laws of the state as commanded by the sovereign—this is the ancient world of Antigone as famously described in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology—must collapse and go under. Each such distinctively ‘ethical shape of Spirit has vanished and another takes its place’ (Phenomenology ¶475)—up to the end of history, the present day in which 5 Hegel was writing. 5 For an excellent recent introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology, see R. Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (2002). The modern social world exemplified in the Prussia which Hegel describes in the Philosophy of Right is the product and culmination of reason at work in history, the historical dialectic which is sketched in the Phenomenology and described in detail in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. As Hegel puts it in the celebrated ‘Doppelsatz’ (double-saying) of the Preface to PR: What is rational is actual; And what is actual is rational. The essence of this hard saying is the claim that the modern social world that Hegel describes in PR is rational, a structure of reason to be disclosed by the rational powers of the enquiring philosopher. This claim has been the cause of massive controversy from the time it was first published. On one reading, encouraged in modern times by Karl Popper in The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), it is the scandalous slogan of a timid and complacent conservatism, endorsing as necessarily rational the real social world of his contemporary Prussia—and thereby pleasing the censors and the government funders of his university chair. Most modern readers reject this uncompromising view, noticing that Hegel distinguishes the ‘real’ from the ‘actual’ by identifying the actual as those elements of the real world which are distinctively rational. On this interpretation, the Doppelsatz risks becoming unexceptionable but trivial—indeed a tautology—but sensitive critics argue that the relation between actuality and rationality which Hegel celebrates leaves sufficient conceptual space for the sort of social criticism and practical amelioration that can reconcile otherwise alienated citizens to their social world. The most fully developed argument to this effect is mounted in Michael Hardimon’s (1994) monograph Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation.