= . ! SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES REVISITED SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES REVISITED CONTEMPORARY LECTURES ON CLASSIC TRANSFORMATIONAL THEORY Howard Lasnik with Marcela Depiante and Arthur Stepanov The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Contents © 2000 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Preface vii All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or informa­ Introduction tion storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in Times New Roman by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong and StructureChapter 1 and Infinity of Human Language 5 was printed and bound in the United States of America. 1.1 Structure 5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 1.2 Infinity II Lasnik, Howard. Exercises 34 Syntactic structures revisited : contemporary lectures on classic 1.3 English Verbal Morphology 35 transformational theory / Howard Lasnik with Marcela Depiante and Arthur Stepanov. Chapter 2 p. cm. - (Current studies in linguistics; 33) Transformational Grammar 51 Based on tape recordings made in the fall of 1995 of a Portion of 21 What Is a Transformation? 51 'Ii a syntax course taught by Howard Lasnik at the University of Connecticut. 2 . 2 A First Look at TransformatIons:. The Number and AUXl ary Includes bibliographical references and index. Transformations TIS and T20 53 ISBN 0-262-12222-7 (hc : alk. paper). _ ISBN 0-262-62133-9 (pb : alk. paper) 2.3 Properties of Transformations 56 1. Generative grammar. 2. Grammar, Comparative and general­ 2.4 Other Properties of Transformations 64 Syntax. 3. Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic structures. I. Depiante, 2.S Transformations in Syntactic Structures 66 Marcela A. II. Stepanov, Arthur. III. Title. IV. Series: Current studies in linguistics series; 33. Exercises 105 PIS8.L377 2000 2.6 TheoretIcal. Issues R'alse d by Syntactic Structures 106 4IS-dc2I 99-39907 2.7 Learna bII'l'ty and Language Acquisition 114 CIP Exercises 124 Chapter 3 hology' Suntactic Strllctllres and Beyond Verba l Morp . oJ' 125 3.1 Problems in Syntactic Structures 125 vi Contents 3.2 X-Bar Theory 128 3.3 Subcategorization and Selection 129 3.4 English Verbal Morph 1 .. Preface 3.5 V R . 0 ogy ReVIsIted 136 - aISmg and Split I 163 3.6 Verb Movement and E 3 conomy' Ch ky .7 Chomsky 1993 181 . oms 1991 165 3.8 Syntactic Structures R . eVlVed: Lasnik 1995 Notes 197 187 References 203 Index 207 This book is an introduction to some classic ideas and analyses of trans­ formational generative grammar, viewed both on their own terms and from a more modem perspective. Like A Course in GB Syntax (Lasnik and Uriagereka 1988), the book grew out of a transcript (created from tapes) of a portion of a course, in particular, the first several units of the first-semester graduate syntax course at the University of Connecticut. The tapes were made in the fall of 1995, and Marcela Depiante, a UConn graduate student, did the transcription and initial editing the following year. Arthur Stepanov, another UConn graduate student, did the subse­ quent editing, including organizing the material into chapters, numbering the examples, and providing bibliographic references. In the book, as in the course, I examine in considerable detail the cen­ tral analyses presented by Noam Chomsky in Syntactic Structures (1957) and the theory underlying those analyses, a theory completely formulated in Chomsky's (1955) The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. The major focus is on the best set of analyses in Syntactic Structures and The Logical Structure of Linguistic The01Y (and, in many respects, the best set of analyses in the history of our field), those treating English verbal mor­ phology. I show how the technology works, often filling in underlying assumptions and formal particulars that are left unstated in Syntactic Structures. I emphasize the virtues of these analyses because those virtues have been overlooked in recent decades. However, as is well known, the analyses are not without defects, par­ ticularly with respect to questions of explanatory adequacy, that is, ques­ tions of how the child, faced with limited data, arrives at the correct grammar out of the vast set of possible grammars made available by the theory. Thus, in this book, after laying out the Syntactic Structures account, I follow the pendulum swing the field took toward greater explanatory adequacy, as I present successive theoretical developments Introduction Our concerns in this course will be driven by two fundamental inquiries: What is "knowledge of language"? How does it arise in the individual? At the beginning, I want to forestall some potential confusion that has overtaken a .large part of the field. In fact, there are two branches of the investigation of language. One is represented by "practitioners," that is, practicing linguists, practicing psychologists, and so on. The other is the "reflective" part of the field represented by philosophers and cognitive scientists who are concerned with deep conceptual issues relating to the study of language. The confusion has arisen in the "reflective" branch, which often tries to treat natural language words as if they were technical terms and vice versa. Consider the following English sentence: (1) Howard knows English Philosophers have always been quite rightly concerned with the concept "knowledge." However, the trap is to think that a sentence like (1) can tell us something about this and other concepts. There is no a priori reason to think that it can. To see the point, consider this: (2) Howard forced Arthur to leave the room There is no reason to think that this sentence can tell a physicist some­ thing about the concept "force." That seems trivially obvious. (1) is a similar case, but it is actually misleading in two ways. One way in which it is misleading is that it uses the word know. However, there are languages (like French) that do not even use the word for know in expressing the meaning of (1). The other way in which (1) is misleading is that it looks like a two-place predicate know establishing some kind of relation (or "knowing") between Howard and English. Assuming that individuals like 2 Introduction "Howard" . t d· 3 Introduction . eXl~, an gIven this relation of "kn ." . what IS this object "English"? Owmg, the question is, Knowledge of language cannot be a list of behaviors. Linguists came to This object has some peculiar ro . sentence like p perties. One such property is that a that conclusion for many reasons, but they can be summed up in the term that Chomsky often uses (borrowed from Humboldt, and perhaps most (3) This floor needs washing significantly Descartes): the creative aspect of language use. What does is and is not a part of Engli h In this mean? Speakers of human languages can produce .and understand particular, western PennsYlva~a· . some part.s of the United States, in sentences they've never heard or produced before. How can a behavior understood), whereas in the rest'o~~:e:ence IS. n~ver said (although still that was never produced before be shaped by operant conditioning? One versely, a sentence like untry It IS perfectly good. Con- frequent answer invokes analogy; that is to say, the new behaviors we produce that we haven't produced before are "analogous" to behaviors (4) This floor needs washed that we have produced and have been reinforced for before. The hard is not and is a part of English· .. .. question is how to make the notion "analogous" precise. Ultimately, the . , Sillce It IS saId m the rt f Wereh (3) IS not acceptable wh '" pa s 0 the country right notion of analogy will have to be something like what can be found ·t ' ereas lor people in th f 1 sounds very peculiar. It is eas . e rest 0 the country in pages 111-114 of Syntactic Structures, a set of rules for one kind of "English," then, the system thath: :ultiPly parallel examples. What is structure and another set of rules for relating one structure to another. But ties? It is some sort of sociological a:d es~ .strange contradictory proper­ then, why call it analogy at all? like history and colors on a F llP01~tiCal construct, based on things The list of behaviors of which knowledge of language purportedly tin map. 0 owmg standa d ue to use terms like English dR. r usage, I will con- consists has to rely on notions like "utterance" and "word." But what is attribute much significance to than Usslan, but I will be careful not to a word? What is an utterance? These notions are already quite abstract. Th em. us, we cannot get too far investi atin Even more abstract is the notion "sentence." Chomsky has been and m Just by relying on commo g g the concepts we are interested continues to be criticized for positing such abstract notions as trans­ 1 . n sense or by lookin t anguage. We want to treat sentences of g a sentences of natural formations and structures, but the big leap is what everyone takes for need to analyze but we do not h natural languages as data that we granted. It's widely assumed that the big step is going from sentence to our field are. ' expect t em to tell us what the concepts of transformation, but this in fact isn't a significant leap. The big step is FollOWing Chomsky, the approach that I going from "noise" to "word." I will not grant (I) any theoreti al . CTn;~ want to take is the following: Once we have some notion of structure, we are in a position to address .