1 2 3 Chapter One—Preface From the end of the Qing Dynasty, China’s foreign relations came under great pressure, and could no longer continue the ‘dynastic’ system of foreign policy. Especially after the tumult of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Eight-Nation Alliance (France, Russia, Great Britain, America, Italy, Japan, Germany, and Austro-Hungary) in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), China’s international position became even weaker. The successors to the Qing, the Republican and Beijing government were thus in an extremely difficult position to carry out diplomacy. At first glance, it appears as if China was continually victim to foreign aggression, and in a difficult position. More detailed research reveals however that this period was actually a period of transition for China from the imperial vassal system to the western family of nations. Thus, apart from the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic service was also reinvigorated by individuals who replaced the literati officials. The Beijing government managed to lessen the damage caused by the unequal treaties by revising them where it could. The above measures are proof of the concrete means taken by the late-Qing and early Republican governments’ to deal with the diplomatic situation. Furthermore, from a nationalistic and partisan view of history, foreign relations from the late-Qing onwards can be/are often seen in terms of the relinquishing of power and the humiliation of the country. From this perspective, not only is it difficult to fairly evaluate the late-Qing and Beijing Republican governments and their policies, but neither can one get a real sense of Chinese foreign relations at the time. A more realistic approach towards Chinese foreign policy since the late-Qing would need to take into account the fact that China’s ability for self-determination was severely limited to the extent that it was not free to master its own destiny: it was unable to carry out foreign relations in the great country manner of the imperial court. Thus, whilst stumbling along the way, the 4 Qing tried to improve their situation and protect sovereignty through such measures as working to join the family of nations, and as such China’s foreign relations should be seen in this context as a ‘weak nation’. Under the appellation ‘weak country’, China was similar to certain small countries in that, whilst superficially respected by large nations, they nonetheless occupied an inferior, repressed position in the western international system. Facing aggression from the western world, China was a weak country. Although ‘weak country’ has no clear definition, at the very least it implies a lack of state power, an enduring through humiliation in order to carry out important missions, and a foreign policy seeking to minimise damage rather than maximise gain: all this stands in stark contrast to the foreign policies of powerful countries. When facing historical judgement, although ‘enduring humiliation to carry out a higher purpose’ may not be the best policy, it was however a common element and in some measure proved to be an effective period of Chinese foreign policy. An example being, at the time of Japan’s Twenty-One Demands on China (1915), Lu Zhengxiang (1871-1949) and Cao Rulin (1877-1966) dealt courteously but without sincerity with the Japanese, thus lessening damage to Chinese interests. They also lured the Japanese into making an ultimatum, resulting in international sympathy for China, whilst adhering to their principles. During the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Naval Conference, Gu Weijun (1888-1985), despite enjoying popularity amongst the international community, did not attend the treaty signing ceremony because the treaty did not do justice to the reality of Chinese diplomacy. Since ‘weak country’ diplomacy was unsatisfactory to nationalists, those diplomats involved in such were often attacked by the former for their practices. As a result of this, Lu Zhengxiang and Cao Rulin were arrested, whereas Gu Weijun has been lavishly praised, all because those involved did not fully understand ‘weak country’ diplomacy. Hu Weide (1863-1933) is an important diplomat from China’s period of ‘weak diplomacy’, but has been neglected for a long time. His background and experience are intimately linked with the early-modern history of Chinese diplomacy, and as such bear testimony to the evolution of that history. Yet, because he was out of the glare of the spotlight that shone on such diplomatic stars as Gu Weijun and others, and since research topics are always centred around this core group of individuals, the sources that mention Hu Weide have been neglected. 5 Additionally, the fact that Hu Weide did not leave extant manuscripts or diaries behind for researchers to consult resulted in this late-Qing old school diplomat, who was an important player in his field, not being granted the importance that was his due. In terms of background, Hu Weide was from the relatively liberal Zhejiang area. He graduated from the Shanghai Interpreters College (Guang fangyan guan), and was a talented diplomat trained under the late-Qing self-strengthening movement. After the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 and the alliance of the Eight-Nation Alliance in 1900, this group of western specialists who were originally trained as translators had the opportunity to be fast-tracked into higher positions. Although Hu Weide was not from an especially prestigious school of western studies destined to provide candidates for the diplomatic service, he worked his way up quickly. Hu Weide was the first graduate from the Interpreters College to be selected for the diplomatic service. Fellow students such as Lu Zhengxiang were appointed to positions in the diplomatic service a few years later. In terms of promotion, Hu Weide and all those graduates from western schooling backgrounds broke the cycle of candidates selected from amongst officials from Hunan and Anhui, and were the first modern ‘professional diplomats’. This dissertation will define the diplomats from this period as ‘second generation’ diplomats (see Chapter 2 for more detail), separating themselves from the first generation of traditional diplomats already mentioned, and from the third generation of diplomats that emerged in the early Republican period with students returning to China from overseas. Although the second generation has the shortest time span compared to the other two, the individuals who made up this generation were the most complex: there were scholarly gentlemen from traditional backgrounds, graduates from western academies within China, and those who had studied abroad, constituting fierce competition amongst each other. That Hu Weide was able to reveal his talent, and gradually rise to the rank of ambassador, showed that the Qing government must have thought him a reliable, worthy individual. Moreover, this second generation of diplomats were also important proponents of ‘weak country diplomacy’, and Hu Weide was one of its most significant members. Another point is that as successive generations of diplomats changed, this revealed China’s changing response as it 6 adjusted during a period of diplomatic pressure. Hu Weide’s life experience alone (he was posted in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905) constitutes an important historical record of China’s diplomatic experience at that time. Besides his role as a neutral outsider in the position of representative and spokesman, Hu Weide’s part in representing China as it entered into the international community at the first peace conference is a likewise important episode in his career. China’s participation at the peace conference is a significant turning point in its ‘weak country’ diplomatic attempts to win powerful international backing. Hu Weide was situated between two negotiators in this process, the first was Yang Ru (1848-1902), and the other who completed negotiations at the peace conference, was Lu Zhengxiang. It can perhaps be argued that Hu did in fact perform great service at the peace conference, although there is no research to corroborate this. All in all, his life and experiences have been unfortunately overlooked. Hu Weide held successive posts as a diplomat in Russia, as ambassador to Japan, and after the 1911 Revolution acted as deputy foreign affairs minister in the cabinet of Yuan Shikai (1859-1916). Apart from Hu’s status as the most distinguished graduate from the Interpreters College, much more worthy of note is the relationship between Hu Weide, Yuan Shikai and the Qing government. Especially interesting is the rumour that has been passed down of Hu Weide being Yuan Shikai’s ‘bully of officials’; as to whether this is true or not, further research needs to be done. As Hu had a gentle character, certainly no more forceful in manner than people like Yuan Shikai, Zhao Bingjun (1865-1914), and Liang Shitai (1869-1933), it is doubtful whether he could have really been an effective ‘bully’. It would also be worth researching the difference between Hu Weide’s contributions to the 1911 Revolution, as someone born into diplomatic circles, compared with that of diplomats such as Lu Zhengxiang. Hu Weide’s manoeuvres in officialdom during the late-Qing and early-Republican period are not limited to the history of diplomacy, but are closely related to the whole of China’s early modern history. During the Republican era, Hu Weide was stationed in France during World War I and was involved in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919; additionally, he was stationed in Japan during negotiations in Washington, known as the Washington Naval Conferencestdt (a conference essentially meant to limit Japanese naval expansion and 7 maintain the open door policies with China), and so during these important moments in the history of modern Chinese diplomacy, Hu was stationed where the action was taking place.