ALEXANDER CHRISTOPHER PASEAU Address: Wadham College, Oxford OX1 3PN E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected] Webpage: www.acpaseau.com AREAS OF SPECIALISATION Logic, Philosophy of Mathematics, Formal Philosophy (esp. Formal Metaphysics & Epistemology), Philosophy of Religion AREAS OF TEACHING COMPETENCE General Metaphysics & Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language, Decision Theory, Philosophy of Economics EMPLOYMENT University of Oxford Acting Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy (during Prof. Magidor’s leave) 2016–18 Associate Professor of Philosophy (formerly CUF Lecturer) 2005–present Stuart Hampshire Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Wadham College 2005–present University of Cambridge Research Fellow, Jesus College 2002–05 Director of Studies in Philosophy, Queens’ & Jesus Colleges 2002–04 & Autumn 2003 VISITING POSITIONS Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Paris, Visiting Researcher Spring 2017 King’s College London, Visiting Senior Research Fellow Autumn 2014 Centre for the Foundations of Science, University of Sydney, Visiting Fellow Winter 2008 RESEARCH GRANTS Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship (15 months) 2020–21 REF Strategic Support Fund, University of Oxford 2018 Mind Association Research Fellowship (6 months) 2012 British Academy & AHRB Postgraduate Studentships, Competitions A & B 1997–2001 Rouse Ball Travelling Studentship, Trinity College, University of Cambridge 2001 AHRB Overseas Visit Award 2001 Internal Graduate Studentship, Trinity College, University of Cambridge 1999 HIGHER EDUCATION MSc Economics, Birkbeck, University of London (Distinction) 2010–12 PhD Philosophy, Trinity College, University of Cambridge 1999–2003 Visiting Graduate Student, Philosophy Department, Princeton University 2001 BPhil Philosophy, Merton College, University of Oxford (First-class marks in all components) 1997–99 Part II Philosophy, Trinity College, University of Cambridge (First; overall mark 1+) 1996–97 BA Mathematics Parts IA, IB, II(b), Trinity College, University of Cambridge (First; First; Wrangler) 1993–96 PUBLICATIONS (see www.acpaseau.com for links) BOOKS One True Logic (with Owen Griffiths), Publication date: early 2022, Oxford University Press. (77,000 words) What Is Mathematics About?, under contract with OUP, 2021 ms. submission. (225,000 words) EDITED COLLECTIONS 2. Philosophy of Mathematics 5 volumes, Routledge Major Works, 2017. 1. Mathematical Knowledge (co-edited with M. Leng & M. Potter), Oxford University Press, 2007. Arabic translation forthcoming in 2021/2. JOURNAL ARTICLES (33, 2 co-authored) & BOOK CHAPTERS (5, 1 co-authored) 38. ‘Trumping Naturalism Revisited’, in J. Kennedy (ed.), On the Philosophy of Penelope Maddy: Set-theoretic Foundations and Naturalistic Methodology, Springer, forthcoming. 37. ‘Propositional Logics of Truth by Logical Form’ (with Owen Griffiths), in The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning, G. Sagi & J. Woods (eds), Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. 36. ‘Propositionalism’, The Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming. 35. ‘Logos, Logic and Maximal Infinity’, Religious Studies, forthcoming. 34. ‘Non-metric Propositional Similarity’, Erkenntnis (2020), vol. & pp. tbc 33. ‘Capturing Consequence’, Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (2019), pp. 271–95. 32. ‘A Measure of Inferential-Role Preservation’, Synthese 196 (2019), pp. 2621–42. 31. ‘Philosophy of the Matrix’, Philosophia Mathematica 25 (2017), pp. 246–67. 30. ‘Isomorphism Invariance and Overgeneration’ (with Owen Griffiths), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22 (2016), pp. 482–503. 29. ‘What’s the Point of Complete Rigour?’, Mind 125 (2016), pp. 177–207. 28. ‘Fairness and Aggregation’ (with Ben Saunders), Utilitas 27 (2015), pp. 460–9. 27. ‘Did Frege commit a cardinal sin?’, Analysis 75 (2015), pp. 379–86. 26. ‘Six Similarity Theories of Properties’, in G. Rodriguez-Pereyra & G. Guigon (eds), Nominalism about Properties (Routledge, 2015), pp. 95–120. 25. ‘Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof’ (2015), The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66, pp. 775–99. 24. ‘The Overgeneration Argument(s): a Succinct Refutation’, Analysis 74 (2014), pp. 40–7. 23. ‘An Exact Measure of Paradox’, Analysis 73 (2013), pp. 17–26. 22. ‘Against the Judgment-Dependence of Mathematics and Logic’, Erkenntnis 76 (2012), pp. 23–40. 21. ‘Resemblance Theories of Properties’, Philosophical Studies 157 (2012), pp. 361–382. 20. ‘Proving Induction’, Australasian Journal of Logic 10 (2011), pp. 1–17. 19. ‘Mathematical Instrumentalism, Gödel’s Theorem and Inductive Evidence’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2011), pp. 140–9. 18. ‘A Puzzle about Naturalism’, Metaphilosophy 41 (2010), pp. 642–8. 17. ‘Pure Second-Order Logic with Second-Order Identity’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (2010), pp. 351–360. 16. ‘Proofs of the Compactness Theorem’, History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (2010), pp. 73-98. [Corrigendum in History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2011), p. 407.] 15. ‘The Definitions of Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer’, Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010), pp. 169–175. 14. ‘Reducing Arithmetic to Set Theory’, in Ø. Linnebo & O. Bueno (eds), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 35–55. 13. ‘How to type: reply to Halbach’, Analysis 69 (2009), pp. 280–286. 12. ‘Justifying Induction Mathematically: Strategies and Functions’, Logique et Analyse 203 (2008), pp. 263–9. 11. ‘Motivating Reductionism about Sets’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), pp. 295–307. 10. ‘Fitch’s Argument and Typing Knowledge’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2008), pp. 153–176. 9. ‘Scientific Platonism’, in M. Leng, A. Paseau & M. Potter (eds), Mathematical Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 123–149. 8. ‘Boolos on the Justification of Set Theory’, Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2007), pp. 30–53. 7. ‘Genuine Modal Realism and Completeness’, Mind 115 (2006), pp. 721–9. 6. ‘The Subtraction Argument(s)’, Dialectica 60 (2006), pp. 145–156. 5. ‘Naturalism in Mathematics and the Authority of Philosophy’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005), pp. 399–418. 4. ‘On an Application of Categoricity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2005), pp. 411–415. 3. ‘The Open-Endedness of the Set Concept and the Semantics of Set Theory’, Synthese 135 (2003), pp. 379–399. 2. ‘Why the Subtraction Argument Does Not Add Up’, Analysis 62 (2002), pp. 74–76. 1. ‘Should the Logic of Set Theory Be Intuitionistic?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001), pp. 369–378. REVIEWS & SYMPOSIA 12. Review (with Michael Bevan) of Mathematics and Morality by Justin Clarke-Doane, Philosophia Mathematica 28 (2020), pp. 442–6. 11. Review of Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge, S. Bangu (ed.), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (web-published 16 May 2018). 10. Review of Truth, Objects, Infinity: New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf, F. Pataut (ed.), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (web-published 4 July 2017). 9. Review of The Laws of Belief by Wolfgang Spohn, Mind 126 (2017), pp. 273–8. 8. Review of Rigor and Structure by John Burgess, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2016), pp. 1185–7. 7. Review of Philosophical Devices by David Papineau, Philosophia Mathematica 22 (2014), pp. 121–3. 6. Review of Platonism, Naturalism and Mathematical Knowledge by James Robert Brown, Philosophia Mathematica 20 (2012), pp. 359–64. 5. ‘Practitioners First’, Book Symposium on Mathematics and Reality by Mary Leng, Metascience 21 (2012), pp. 282–8. 4. Review of Logical Pluralism by JC Beall and Greg Restall, Mind 116 (2007), pp. 391–6. 3. ‘What the Foundationalist Filter Kept Out’, Essay Review of Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics by David Corfield, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36 (2005), pp. 191–201. 2. Review of The Search for Certainty by Marcus Giaquinto, Philosophical Books 46 (2005), pp. 382–4. 1. Review of Resemblance Nominalism by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2005), pp. 146–150. ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES 3. ‘The Compactness Theorem’ (with Robert Leek), in J-Y. Beziau (ed.), Encyclopedia of Logic/Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, forthcoming. [34 pages] 2. ‘Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics’, in E. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008–present). <plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism-mathematics> 1. ‘Naturalised Philosophy of Mathematics’, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008). ARTICLES & REVIEWS FOR A GENERAL MATHEMATICAL AUDIENCE 7. ‘Why are there no infinite left-handed decimal expansions?’, The Mathematical Gazette 105 (2021), pp. tbc 6. Review of Philosophy of Mathematics by Øystein Linnebo, The Mathematical Gazette 102 (2018), pp. 379–81. 5. ‘Letter Games: A Metamathematical Taster’, The Mathematical Gazette 100 (2016), pp. 442–9. 4. Review of Why is there Philosophy of Mathematics at all? by Ian Hacking, The Mathematical Gazette 100 (2016), pp. 381–2. 3. Review of L.E.J. Brouwer: Topologist, Intuitionist, Philosopher by Dirk van Dalen, The Mathematical Gazette 98 (2014), pp. 552–4. 2. ‘The stop after k girls or N children policy’, The Mathematical Gazette 98 (2014), pp. 402–13. 1. ‘Family Planning’, The Mathematical Gazette 95 (2011), pp. 213–7. POPULAR ARTICLES Various venues incl. Fuse (Magazine of the National Association for Gifted Children), Oxford Philosophy Faculty newsletter, Varsity (Cambridge University student newspaper). INTERVIEWS