Sami Pihlström Sami Pihlström s a traditional theological issue and in its broader secular varieties, theodicy remains a problem in Athe philosophy of religion. In this remarkable book, Pragmatic Sami Pihlström provides a novel critical reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and Antitheodicy Realism,Pragmatic Truth, Religious and su ering. He develops and defends an antitheodicist Realism, view, arguing that theodicies seeking to render apparently meaningless su ering meaningful or justifi ed from a ‘God’s-Eye-View’ ultimately rely on metaphysical realism Religious failing to recognize the individual perspective of the su erer. Pihlström thus shows that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion is a vital starting point for a re-evaluation of the problem of theodicy. Truth, and With its strong positions and precise arguments, the volume provides a new approach which is likely to stimulate discussion in the wider academic world of philosophy of Antitheodicy religion. Sami Pihlström is professor of philosophy of religion at On Viewing the World by the University of Helsinki. He has published widely on, e.g., Acknowledging the Other the pragmatist tradition, the problem of realism, and the philosophy of religion. Pragmatic Realism, Religious Truth, and Antitheodicy On Viewing the World by Acknowledging the Other Sami Pihlström Published by Helsinki University Press www.hup.fi © Sami Pihlström 2020 First published 2020 Cover design by Ville Karppanen Cover photo: iStockphoto Print and digital versions typeset by Siliconchips Services Ltd. ISBN (Paperback): 978-952-369-004-2 ISBN (PDF): 978-952-369-005-9 ISBN (EPUB): 978-952-369-006-6 ISBN (Kindle): 978-952-369-007-3 https://doi.org/10.33134/HUP-2 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (unless stated otherwise within the content of the work). To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 94041, USA. This license allows for copying any part of the work for personal and commercial use, providing author attribution is clearly stated. The full text of this book has been peer reviewed to ensure high academic standards. For full review policies, see http://www.hup.fi/ Suggested citation: Pihlström, S. 2020. Pragmatic Realism, Religious Truth, and Antitheodicy: On Viewing the World by Acknowledging the Other. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. https://doi.org/10.33134/HUP-2. License: CC BY 4.0 To read the free, open access version of this book online, visit https://doi.org/10.33134/HUP-2 or scan this QR code with your mobile device: Table of Contents Preface v Acknowledgments xi Introduction: The Promise of Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion xv Chapter 1: A Pragmatist Approach to Religious Realism, Objectivity, and Recognition 1 Chapter 2: The Pragmatic Contextuality of Scheme (In)Dependence 29 Chapter 3: Pragmatism and Critical Philosophy 47 Chapter 4: Religious Truth, Acknowledgment, and Diversity 63 Chapter 5: The Limits of Language and Harmony 87 Chapter 6: Beyond the Theory-Practice Dichotomy 117 Conclusion: Meaningful and Meaningless Suffering 133 Notes 141 References 173 A Note on the Sources of the Chapters 187 Index 189 Preface In this book, I will argue that a pragmatist approach to the realism issue in the philosophy of religion—and more generally—is highly relevant to a novel criti- cal reassessment of the theodicy discourse addressing the problem of evil and suffering. In a number of previous publications, I have examined the problem of realism from a pragmatist perspective (already since my early work in the 1990s) as well as the problem of evil and suffering in the philosophy of religion (especially in my more recent work in the 2010s), and this volume will bring these two topics together in a novel way. I hope to show how, perhaps some- what surprisingly, they are actually closely related and how pragmatism may be helpful in navigating the philosophical thicket of these complex discourses. I have investigated the problem of evil and suffering in some of my recent books (see especially Pihlström 2014b; Kivistö & Pihlström 2016), and because those works also develop a pragmatist approach to this issue, some ideas and arguments will inevitably be repeated in the present volume. However, the close link between the problems of realism and truth, on the one hand, and evil and suffering, on the other hand, has (as far as I know) never been studied in any comprehensive manner, and the most important novelty of the present undertaking is my proposed pragmatist approach to this entanglement of those fundamental philosophical issues. Traditionally, theodicies attempt to show how, or why, an omnipotent, omniscient, and absolutely good God might allow the world to contain appar- ently meaningless horrible evil and suffering. However, theodicies can also be vi Pragmatic Realism, Religious Truth, and Antitheodicy formulated in secular contexts, as will also be explained in the book. In addi- tion to developing a pragmatist account of religious and theological beliefs and language use, including the concept of truth applicable in these areas, this book firmly defends antitheodicism as an ethically motivated approach to the problem of evil and suffering, seeking to refute all theodicist attempts to force human beings’ experiences of meaningless suffering (or the sincere communication of such experiences) into grand narratives of alleged meaningfulness or purpo- siveness.1 Thus, I will argue for a pragmatic form of religious and theological realism as well as a pragmatist understanding of antitheodicism as a presupposi- tion for morally serious engagement in religion and theology genuinely seeking to recognize others’ experiences (of suffering) as something irreducible to our own attempts to view the world as meaningful. Fundamental issues concern- ing religious diversity as well as the ethical acknowledgment of otherness and perspectivalness more generally will thereby also be addressed in what follows. The most significant and (I hope) original philosophical suggestion of the present volume is, as already remarked, the argument that the theodicy issue and the problem of realism are thoroughly entangled, or even inseparable. It is precisely from the standpoint of metaphysical realism that theodicies seeking to justify apparently meaningless suffering (as something that is morally and metaphysically meaningful, after all) arise—with all their ethically problematic tendencies to instrumentalize others’ suffering in the service of some alleged overall good.2 The individual perspective of the sufferer, or the victim of evil, tends to be non- or misrecognized when one begins from a ‘God’s-Eye View’ metaphysical realism postulating a pre-fixed ontological—and ethical—struc- ture of the world in general. As some recent contributors to the problem of evil (particularly Susan Neiman in her 2002 book, Evil in Modern Thought, but also others) have argued, the problem of evil is in the end a problem concerning the comprehensibility of the world in general. It is therefore not merely a problem to be addressed by the theist, or to be used in an evidential role in the theism vs. atheism controversy; it concerns everyone engaging in serious thought about the moral and existential meaningfulness (vs. meaninglessness) of our lives. It is a problem concerning the way(s) we view the world. Therefore, the meta- physically realistic background assumptions of theodicist thinking need to be exposed to thoroughgoing critical assessment, and this can be best done by developing a pragmatist philosophical methodology and applying it to a critical inquiry into both realism and theodicism. Unlike some of my earlier contributions to pragmatist philosophy of religion, this book will not provide any historical overview of the pragmatist tradition, but it will employ ideas drawn from William James’s and other pragmatists’ work to critically evaluate the current discussions of both realism and theodi- cies. In addition to James, the other major philosophical classics to be discussed include Immanuel Kant (who is obviously a key background figure for prag- matism and antitheodicism alike) as well as Ludwig Wittgenstein and (in this context somewhat more marginally) Emmanuel Levinas. Preface vii My book is, I think, both specific and very broad. It addresses a carefully chosen specific topic, i.e., the way in which the (hitherto largely unnoticed) link between theodicism and metaphysical realism can be critically examined from a pragmatist perspective. At the same time, it is broad in the sense of offering pragmatist insights into the general issue of realism, building upon the results of decades of extensive work in this area. The book also shows the practical, human, and existential relevance of apparently very theoretical and abstract issues in the philosophy of religion.3 It refuses to make any artificial distinc- tion between theory and practice; instead, it argues that attempts to defend the theodicy discourse from antitheodicist criticisms by claiming that theodicies are merely theoretical are themselves ethically problematic, failing to recognize the ethical need to avoid excessive theorization when it comes to reacting to others’ suffering. The book aims at taking very seriously our need to recognize the genuine otherness of other human beings, especially their experiences