SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Pluralism, Democracy, and the ‘Empty Place of Power’: Using Lefort’s Political Theory to Address the Problem of Tolerance A Dissertation Presented by Michael Roess to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University December 2012 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Michael Roess We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Dr. Richard Howard – Dissertation Advisor Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Philosophy Department Dr. Lorenzo Simpson – Chairperson of Defense Professor, Philosophy Department Dr. Gary Mar – Inside Reader Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Dr. David Carr – Outside Reader Professor Emeritus, Philosophy Department, Emory University This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Charles Taber Interim Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation Pluralism, Democracy, and the ‘Empty Place of Power’: Using Lefort’s Political Theory to Address the Problem of Tolerance by Michael Roess Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2012 Though widely adopted since the European wars of religion in the 16th and 17th centuries, liberal solutions to the problem of tolerance continue to face difficulties over issues, such as abortion and religious freedom, where deeply held values and matters of governance intersect. In this dissertation I provide a new argument for political tolerance that is supported by a Lefortian conception of democratic political legitimacy. In the first half of the dissertation I argue that two forms of liberalism, public reason liberalism and liberalism of conscience, fail to adequately address the difficulties posed by religious pluralism. In its Rawlsian form, the former cannot answer a reasonable theocrat’s demand for a right to participate in governance according to non-public reasons. While the latter approach avoids this difficulty by allowing for semi-sovereign religious communities within a liberal state, it cannot address intolerance that arises within such politicized religious communities. In the third chapter I provide a prudential argument for the practice of political tolerance. Drawing on the works of Machiavelli, I argue that a tolerant pluralist state is better able to identify new political difficulties because it can draw upon the situated knowledge of diverse groups within its population. Insofar as each group depends on the success of the state for its own wellbeing, it is in the best interest of all to tolerate the others. In the final chapter I supplement this prudential argument with a conception of political legitimacy, drawn from Claude Lefort’s work, that can be endorsed by those who are asked to tolerate one another in spite of deep moral differences. By holding empty the ‘symbolic place of power,’ modern democracy is able to sever the link between political legitimacy and a transcendent moral foundation. This breakage permits those who disagree about the source and meaning of political legitimacy to carry those disagreements into their political life, while demanding that all citizens be extended civil and political liberties. It has the added benefit of iii granting flexibility in addressing the source of intolerance—permitting new grievances to be raised as new sources of intolerance arise. iv Dedication Page This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of Brendan Fyfe (1985-2010). v Table of Contents Introduction: Toward a New Model of Political Tolerance 1 Three Components of Tolerance 3 Three Paradoxes Within the Conception of Tolerance 11 Practical Concerns 17 Program of Work 19 Chapter 1: Public Reason Liberalism and the Problem of Tolerance 32 Liberalism and the New Problem of Tolerance 32 Public Reason Liberalism’s Conception of Tolerance 38 The Reasonable Theocrat as a Challenge to Public Reason Liberalism 45 Swaine’s Liberalism of Conscience 51 Conclusion 62 Chapter 2: Intolerance in Politicized Religious Communities 63 Introduction 63 From Magical Practice to Ethical Religion: the Development of 65 Spiritual Success Post-Prophetic Religions: Managing the Tension between 73 Worldly and Spiritual Success Sources of Intolerance within a Church 82 Iranian Revolution as Exemplary of the Dynamic of Intolerance 91 Conclusion 99 Chapter 3: Machiavelli: A Prudentially Justified Republican Conception 102 of Tolerance Introduction 102 A Brief Note on Interpretation and Modern Machiavelli Scholarship 107 Republican Thought before Machiavelli 109 Aristotle’s Objections and the Foundation of Republican Pessimism 114 vi Polybius: Socially Conditioned Virtue, a Historian’s View of Fortune, 122 and the Natural Decline of Republics Machiavelli’s Transformation of Republican Theory 128 Transforming Private Vice to Public Virtue through Regular 144 Public “Tumults” Conclusion: Prudential Tolerance and Political Illegitimacy 153 Chapter 4: The Empty Place of Power and Modern Democratic Tolerance 156 Introduction 156 Three approaches to political thought: ideal theoretical, positivist, 157 and phenomenological. The Symbolic, The Real and The Imaginary in Lefort’s Political Theory. 164 Markers of Certainty 175 The Empty Place of Power 180 Modern Democracy and Legitimate Tolerance 186 Tolerance and Rights 200 Conclusion 210 Bibliography 217 vii Acknowledgments Though the shortcomings within these pages are my responsibility alone the same cannot be said for its strengths. First among the many who helped bring this project to fruition is Dick Howard, advisor, mentor and friend. From the beginning of my graduate studies through the completion of this project his guidance and encouragement were invaluable to the development of my thinking. He provided direction when needed, and room for exploration when appropriate. Gary Mar, Lorenzo Simpson, and David Carr also provided invaluable assistance, insightful questions, and support throughout. This project also benefited tremendously from the comments of Celina Bragagnolo and Cara O’Connor on countless drafts. Cara deserves special thanks for her tremendous generosity in treating crises, philosophical and otherwise, as they arose. Finally, my spouse Zoh Rothberg deserves special mention for her unflagging support throughout. In addition to providing insightful discussion and editorial guidance, she showed more patience throughout this process than I had any right to ask. viii Introduction: Toward a New Model of Political Tolerance In March 2012 CNN broadcast an interview with Kirk Cameron, a former child actor whose celebrity had passed decades earlier, which by any reasonable expectations should have gone unnoticed by the broader culture.1 In this interview Mr. Cameron, a late comer to evangelical Christianity, insisted that homosexuality is “unnatural, detrimental, and ultimately destructive to so many of the foundations of civilization.” The public reaction was so strong that within 24 hours Mr. Cameron was forced to publicly respond, defending his statement. What makes this relatively innocuous volley in the “culture wars” remarkable is that both sides defended their position by appealing to the ideal of tolerance. Those who objected to Cameron’s statements did not insist that they were factually incorrect, but rather that they were intolerant, and hence unfit to be broadcast publicly. Mr. Cameron responded by insisting that those who “preach tolerance” were themselves being intolerant of his right to “express moral views on social issues.” Both parties, insisting that tolerance is core American value, disagree entirely about what practices this value entails. Such disputes over the meaning and reach of tolerance are a common occurrence in modern pluralist democracies, and the stakes are often higher than the reputation of a former television star. They frequently appear at the center of legislative debate, both local and national in scope.2 In December of 2011 protests swept through Israel when members of what has been called an “ultra-orthodox sect” of Judaism spat on an eight year old girl as she walked to school 1 Piers Morgan, Interview with Kirk Cameron. Piers Morgan Tonight, CNN. March 12, 2012. 2 In the months leading up to the 2009 NYC mayoral election, a public bike lane was removed from a Hasidic neighborhood in Brooklyn. Residents of this neighborhood championed the removal as a step toward tolerance on the grounds that female bikers offended the modesty laws of the local community. Many of those who opposed the lane’s removal insisted that the modesty laws themselves were intolerant of women. 1 for dressing immodestly. One protester held up a sign reading “stop Israel from becoming Iran.”3 This sign clearly appealed to the image of Iran as an intolerant state. In France, where nearly 10% of the population is of Muslim faith, head scarves have been banned in state primary and secondary schools since 2004 and full-face veils were banned in any public place in 2011. In many US states there are “hate-crimes” laws that impose stiffer penalties on those crimes motivated by hate. The fact that each side in these disputes insists on the intolerance of the other’s position illustrates