Munich Personal RePEc Archive The first global financial crisis of the 21st century: Part II, June-December, 2008 Reinhart, Carmen and Felton, Andrew University of Maryland February 2009 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45125/ MPRA Paper No. 45125, posted 16 Mar 2013 04:07 UTC The First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century Part II: June – December, 2008 A VoxEU.org Publication Edited by Andrew Felton and Carmen M. Reinhart 2 Preface................................................................................................................................. 5 Introduction......................................................................................................................... 6 1. The spread of the crisis to the rest of the world.......................................................... 6 2. What is wrong with the traditional economic/financial viewpoint and models?........ 7 3. The proper governmental response............................................................................. 9 The spread of the crisis to the rest of the world................................................................ 11 Danielsson: The first casualty of the crisis: Iceland ..................................................... 11 Lane: Iceland: The future is in the EU.......................................................................... 15 Zoega: Iceland faces the music..................................................................................... 18 Buiter and Sibert: The collapse of Iceland’s banks: the predictable end of a non-viable business model.............................................................................................................. 21 Reisen: The fallout from the global credit crisis: Contagion - emerging markets under stress.............................................................................................................................. 25 Reinhart and Reinhart: From capital flow bonanza to financial crash.......................... 28 Calvo and Loo-Kung: Rapid and large liquidity funding for emerging markets.......... 34 Hesse: Stock market wealth effects in emerging market countries .............................. 38 Freytag and Pehnelt: The political economy of debt relief........................................... 41 Subramanian: India’s credit crunch conundrum........................................................... 44 Subramanian: Preserving financial sector confidence, not monetary easing, is key .... 46 Muellbauer: The folly of the central banks of Europe.................................................. 48 Gros and Micossi: Crisis management tools for the euro-area..................................... 51 Di Noia: A proposal on financial regulation in Europe for the next European Council53 Pagano: The European response to the crisis: Not quite there yet................................ 57 Rossi: Finance, market, globalisation: a plot against mankind?................................... 59 Gros: Can Europe take care of its own financial crisis? ............................................... 62 Persaud: The financial crisis may hasten European integration but slow global banking ...................................................................................................................................... 65 Gros and Micossi: A call for a European Financial Stability Fund.............................. 67 Laeven and Levine: Governance of banks.................................................................... 69 Bertola and Lo Prete: Finance, redistribution, globalisation ........................................ 73 Forbes: What Next for the Dollar? The Role of Foreigners ......................................... 77 Reinhart and Reinhart: Is the US too big to fail?.......................................................... 82 Eichengreen: Can the IMF save the world?.................................................................. 87 What is wrong with the traditional economic/financial viewpoint and models?.............. 90 Dale: The financial meltdown is an academic crisis too .............................................. 90 Kiff, Mills, and Spackman: European securitisation and the possible revival of financial innovation ...................................................................................................... 92 Pagano: The price of transparency................................................................................ 96 Cohen: The Panglossian World of Finance .................................................................. 98 Sinn: What can be learned from the banking crisis .................................................... 100 Mariano: Do reputational concerns lead to reliable ratings? ...................................... 103 Goodhart: The Financial Economists Roundtable’s statement on reforming the role of SROs in the securitisation process.............................................................................. 105 Pedersen: Liquidity risk and the current crisis............................................................ 114 Persaud: How risk sensitivity led to the greatest financial crisis of modern times .... 118 3 Frank, González-Hermosillo, & Hesse: Transmission of liquidity shocks: Evidence from the 2007 subprime crisis .................................................................................... 120 Freixas and Parigi: The lender of last resort of the 21st century ................................ 126 Persaud: Reason with the messenger; don’t shoot him: value accounting, risk management and financial system resilience.............................................................. 130 Heinemann: Escaping from a Combined Liquidity Trap and Credit Crunch............. 132 Danielsson: Complexity kills...................................................................................... 137 Bloom: Will the credit crunch lead to recession?....................................................... 139 Bloom: The credit crunch may cause another great depression ................................. 142 Repullo and Suarez: The procyclical effects of Basel II ............................................ 146 Goodhart: Central banks’ function to maintain financial stability: An uncompleted task .................................................................................................................................... 149 Giovannini: Let banks be banks, let investors be investors........................................ 152 Coutert and Gex: Stormy Weather in the Credit Default Swap Market ..................... 155 Giavazzi: Why does the spread between LIBOR and expected future policy rates persist, and should central banks do something about it?........................................... 159 The proper governmental response................................................................................. 164 Eichengreen: Anatomy of the financial crisis............................................................. 164 Calomiris: The subprime turmoil: What’s old, what’s new, and what’s next ............ 166 Rancière An international perspective on the US bailout........................................... 172 Berglöf and Rosenthal: Not the end of capitalism...................................................... 174 Corsetti and Müller: The effectiveness of fiscal policy depends on the financing and monetary policy mix ................................................................................................... 176 Gros: Fiscal policy and the credit crunch: What will work? ...................................... 180 Castanheira: Episode V: Expectations strike back ..................................................... 182 Boltho and Carlin: Germany needs high wage settlements and a serious fiscal stimulus .................................................................................................................................... 184 Zingales: Plan B.......................................................................................................... 189 Wyplosz: Why Paulson is (maybe) right .................................................................... 193 Spaventa: A (mild) defence of TARP......................................................................... 195 Persaud: The right alternative to Paulson's plan ......................................................... 198 Buiter: The Paulson Plan: A useful first step but nowhere near enough .................... 200 Acharya: From recapitalisation to restructuring and reforms..................................... 204 Zingales: Why Paulson is wrong ................................................................................ 206 Calomiris: A matched preferred stock plan for government assistance ..................... 209 Frankel: An emerging consensus against the Paulson Plan: Government should force bank capital up, not just socialise the bad loans ......................................................... 211 Onado: Banks’ losses and capital: The new version of the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise ........................................................................................................................ 212 Cesari: TARP2: A totally alternative relief programme............................................. 219 Boeri: Involving European citizens in the benefits of the rescue plan: The political paradoxes of bank socialism....................................................................................... 221 Pagano: What is a