c4ads Guide to a Post-Conflict Mali © 2013 Guide to a Post-Conflict Mali 1 Executive Summaryi “The return of stability in northern Mali will depend in reality on all the local populations and their legitimate representatives. It is they who will have to implement the results of the negotiations, as they are the ones who will build confidence and social cohesion at the local level… [whoever] takes power in Mali, you have to know that the task will be very difficult. New priorities will have to be taken into account and addressed in an objective and realistic way.” -Elmehdi Ag Muphtah, Tuareg Activist from Timbuktu In 2012, Mali suffered its worst institutional and security crisis as an independent state. Precipitated by a renewed rebellion led by separatist Tuaregs in the north and a coup d’état in the south, the Malian administration and military were forced to retreat from all of northern Mali. Northern Mali is an area the size of France and is home to a unique combination of ethnic groups, cultures, and languages. It suffers from banditry and organized crime and is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The Tuareg separatist movement, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), allied with al-Qaeda linked militants in 2012 to take over the three major regions in the north: Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. Shortly after the seizure of these regions, the Islamists sidelined the MNLA and imposed varying degrees of theocratic governance, including Sharia law, on local populations. Following the Islamists’ progression further south, the French government decided to intervene in January 2013 with 4,000 combat troops who, along with Malian troops and a coalition of African forces, reconquered the north and dispelled the terrorists from major cities. As Mali recovers from the conflict and stability is restored, the country faces a new set of challenges compounding upon those existing before the crisis. This guide aims to improve the understanding of the complex factors that led to the multiform crisis and to facilitate the efforts by international organizations, humanitarian and development workers, and the business community to reengage a post-conflict Mali. The first section addresses issues that enabled and contributed to the current political and security crises. These include a weak economy; dependency on natural resource extraction; pervasive illicit activity in the north; international aid as conflict driver; and the political transition and presidential election. The second section identifies important stakeholders in the southern parts of the country and analyzes their respective roles. The following section addresses key stakeholders in the north. The fourth section contains figures that map and analyze conflict events in Mali between January 2012 and July 2013. The fifth section discusses new aid priorities that have emerged as a result of the crisis. The final section contains maps illustrating environmental conditions and humanitarian logistics capabilities in the eight regions of Mali. i This guide was authored by Eric Wulf and Farley Mesko of c4ads, supported by a grant from Working Partners Foundation International. The opinions stated herein are those of the authors and need not represent those of c4ads, Working Partners Foundation, or their directors or associates. Finally, the authors would like to thank Grant Gill, Kim Hoffman, and Allison Schwartz for their valuable contributions. August 2013 Guide to a Post-Conflict Mali 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... 1 I. Themes .............................................................................................................................. 4 A. Natural Resource Dependency and Economic Resource Competition .................................... 4 Licit Economy ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 Illicit Economy ........................................................................................................................................................... 8 B. Aid as a Conflict Driver .............................................................................................................. 10 Heavy Dependence on Foreign Assistance ........................................................................................................ 10 Empowering Corruption ....................................................................................................................................... 12 External Priorities ................................................................................................................................................... 13 Allocation of Resources Fueling Ethnic Rivalries ............................................................................................. 13 C. Political Transition .................................................................................................................... 15 Pushed for by International Community ............................................................................................................ 15 A Disengaged Electorate ....................................................................................................................................... 16 Influence of the Junta ............................................................................................................................................. 16 The Power of Kidal ................................................................................................................................................ 17 The Ramifications of a Delayed Election ........................................................................................................... 18 II. The South: Key Stakeholders ........................................................................................ 20 A. An Entrenched Political Class .................................................................................................. 20 Political Squabbling and Corruption Continue in Bamako .............................................................................. 20 Mali’s New President .............................................................................................................................................. 21 Election Map ........................................................................................................................................................... 27 B. Religious Leaders ..................................................................................................................... 27 C. Potential Spoiler: Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo ..................................................................... 31 III. The North: Key Stakeholders ........................................................................................ 33 A. National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) ................................................... 33 B. High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) ...................................................................... 42 C. Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) .......................................................................................... 47 D. Potential Spoiler: Major-Colonel El Hadj Ag Gamou .............................................................. 50 IV. Conflict Events .............................................................................................................. 51 V. New Aid Priorities ......................................................................................................... 57 Promoting National Unity and Reconciliation ................................................................................................... 57 Improving Governance and Accounting ............................................................................................................ 58 Reintegration ............................................................................................................................................................ 58 Restoring Basic Social Services ............................................................................................................................. 59 Disarmament ........................................................................................................................................................... 59 VII. Logistics Planning ........................................................................................................ 60 August 2013 Guide to a Post-Conflict Mali 3 Table of Figures Figure 1. Mali Exports by Product, 2010 ___________________________________________________ 4 Figure 2. Mali Gold Exports Destinations, 2010 ____________________________________________ 5 Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows among Sahel Countries ___________________________ 7 Figure 4. Official Development Assistance and Aid Received ________________________________ 10 Figure 5. Largest Bilateral Aid Flows to Mali _____________________________________________ 11 Figure 7. Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections among Sahel Countries ______________________ 16 Figure 8. Mali Population by Region ____________________________________________________ 17 Figure 9. Relative Voting Power by Region _______________________________________________ 18 Figure 10. Endorsements