WPS5313 Policy Research Working Paper 5313 Public Disclosure Authorized Growth Identification and Facilitation The Role of the State in the Dynamics Public Disclosure Authorized of Structural Change Justin Yifu Lin Célestin Monga Public Disclosure Authorized The World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized Development Economics Office of the Vice President May 2010 Policy Research Working Paper 5313 Abstract Active economic policies by developing countries’ of government interventions. First are policies that governments to promote growth and industrialization facilitate structural change by overcoming information have generally been viewed with suspicion by economists, and coordination and externality issues, which are and for good reasons: past experiences show that such intrinsic to industrial upgrading and diversification. Such policies have too often failed to achieve their stated interventions aim to provide information, compensate objectives. But the historical record also indicates that for externalities, and coordinate improvements in the in all successful economies, the state has always played “hard” and “soft” infrastructure that are needed for the an important role in facilitating structural change and private sector to grow in sync with the dynamic change helping the private sector sustain it across time. This in the economy’s comparative advantage. Second are paper proposes a new approach to help policymakers in those policies aimed at protecting some selected firms developing countries identify those industries that may and industries that defy the comparative advantage hold latent comparative advantage. It also recommends determined by the existing endowment structure—either ways of removing binding constraints to facilitate in new sectors that are too advanced or in old sectors that private firms’ entry into those industries. The paper have lost comparative advantage. introduces an important distinction between two types This paper—a product of the Office of the Vice President, Development Economics—is part of a larger effort in the department to revisit strategies for achieving sustainable growth in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at [email protected]. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Produced by the Research Support Team GROWTH IDENTIFICATION AND FACILITATION The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change Justin Yifu Lin Senior Vice president and Chief Economist and Célestin Monga Economic Advisor to the Sr. Vice President and Chief Economist The World Bank 2 1. Introduction The current global crisis, the most serious downturn since the Great Depression, has forced economists and policymakers to rethink their approaches to macroeconomic management.1 For developing countries, in the midst of a financial and economic turmoil that was not of their own making, the road ahead is likely to be rocky. Because of the sluggish recovery in high-income countries and the heavy cost of the crisis there (lower growth, high unemployment, and rising public debt) and the increasing cost of capital, they will have to confront a more difficult global environment for their exports and financing conditions. Yet, in order to continue tackling the enormous challenge of poverty and achieve convergence, they must return to the pre-crisis path of dynamic growth. How to promote economic growth has been a main topic for economic discourse and research since the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 1776. Theories and empirical evidence show that market mechanisms are essential for valuing the basic ingredients for production (factor endowments) and providing the right price signals and the appropriate incentive system for efficient allocation of resources. However, modern economic growth—a fairly recent phenomenon in human history, as Maddison (2001) pointed out—is a process of continuous technological innovation, industrial upgrading and diversification, and improvements in the various types of infrastructure and institutional arrangements that constitute the context for business development and wealth creation (Kuznets 1966). Market mechanism may not be sufficient and the government has a potential role to play in helping firms overcome the various problems of information, coordination, and externality, which arise inevitably in the process of modern economic growth. Historical evidence shows that all countries that have successfully transformed from agrarian economies to modern advanced economies—including those old industrial powers in Western Europe and North America, as well as the newly industrialized economies in East Asia—had governments that played a pro-active role in assisting individual firms in overcoming the coordination and externality problems in the process of their structural transformation. In fact, the governments in high-income countries today continue to play that role. However, the sad fact is that almost every government in the developing world has attempted, at some point in its development process, to play that facilitating role, but most have failed. In this paper, we will argue that these pervasive failures in developing countries are mostly due to the inability of governments to come up with good criteria for identifying industries that are appropriate for a given country’s endowment structure and level of development. In fact, governments’ propensity to target industries that are too ambitious and not aligned with a country’s comparative advantage largely explains why their attempts to “pick winners” resulted in “picking losers.”2 We will argue that, by contrast, spontaneously or intentionally, the governments in successful developing countries have typically targeted mature industries in countries with an endowment structure similar to theirs and with a level of development not much more advanced than theirs. The main lesson from development history and economic theory is straightforward: the government’s policy to facilitate industrial upgrading and diversification must be anchored in 1 See for instance Blanchard et al. (2010), Krugman (2009) or Monga (2009). 2 For protecting jobs, the governments in both developed and developing countries may also support old, declining industries, of which their countries have already lost comparative advantages. Such policies will fail as well. 3 industries with latent comparative advantage so that, once the new industries are established, they can quickly become competitive domestically and internationally. This paper proposes a new approach to help policymakers in developing countries identify the industries where their economies may have a latent comparative advantage and remove binding constraints to facilitate private firms’ entry into those industries. The paper broadens the scope of analysis of industrial policy by introducing an important distinction between two types of government interventions. First are policies that facilitate structural change by overcoming information and coordination and externality issues, which are intrinsic to industrial upgrading and diversification. Such interventions aim to provide information, compensate for externalities, and coordinate improvements in the “hard” and “soft” infrastructure that are needed for the private sector to grow in sync with the dynamic change in the economy’s comparative advantage. Second are those policies aimed at protecting some selected firms and industries that defy the comparative advantage determined by the existing endowment structure—either in new sectors that are too advanced or in old sectors that have lost comparative advantage. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the importance of well- functioning markets and the rationale for a facilitating state in the process of dynamic economic growth. Section 3 briefly reviews some important lessons from early industrial development strategies around the world and analyzes the role of the state in the process of structural change in today’s advanced economies. It also examines similar attempts by developing countries’ governments to adopt policy interventions to facilitate industrial upgrading and economic diversification, and analyzes the reasons for the success or failure of those attempts. Building on the foundations of new structural economics (Lin 2010), Section 4 provides a framework for formulating industrial policy based a new approach entitled “growth identification and facilitation.” Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts. 2. Structural Change, Efficient Markets, and a Facilitating State Economists have long been intrigued by the mystery of modern economic growth, typically observed through the seemingly divergent evolution of the change in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) among countries. Since taking off sometime around