Factionalism in multi-level contexts: When party organisation becomes a device Tània Verge, Universitat Pompeu Fabra ([email protected]) Raúl Gómez, EUI and Juan March Institute ([email protected]) ABSTRACT This article provides a framework through which factionalism might be examined and the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts. We discuss the dynamic connections between factionalism and party structure by setting out a model of the dimensions of factional organisation dependent on the tolerance of host parties towards dissent and their degree of vertical integration. In multi-level contexts, both dimensions come into play, their combination yielding four different strategies: centralised, interlayered, multilayered and decentralised factionalism. We also consider what implications there are for the party’s dominant coalition in episodes of high factionalism. These can act as a catalyst for the modification of party rules that regulate dissent and vertical distribution of power. The hypotheses developed are tested on four Spanish political parties which differ on the autonomy of regional branches and factions: the People’s Party, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, United Left, and the Basque Nationalist Party. Key words Factionalism, party organisation, multi-level politics, vertical integration, Spain –Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, 10-12 September 2009, Postdam, Germany– Introduction Factionalism has been poorly developed in the study of political parties and it is still orphan of conceptual approaches and hypotheses. This is so despite most parties pass through periods of unity and dissent according to particular external or internal circumstances such as electoral performance, changes in leadership or succession struggle (Hine, 1982: 48). Indeed, factionalism is ubiquitous in political parties (Sartori, 1976: 75; Harmel et al., 1994: 7). The study of factionalism is thus not confined to the understanding of party politics but to the comprehension of politics at large (Belloni and Beller, 1976: 549). Hine (1982: 38-39) identifies three dimensions of intra-party group conflict: the issues dimension, coverage and organisational solidity. Regarding the first, conflict consists of either a policy or a strategy axis, or a combination of the two. Yet, party conflict can also be motivated by patronage incentives such as power, career and spoils (Sartori, 1976: 76). Most often the two types of factionalism interrelate (Janda, 1993). Second, coverage comprises the number of arenas in which conflict occurs. Katz and Mair (2002) suggest that in the modern catch-all party conflict is mainly played out in the central office, so factions are expected to settle in this face (Carty, 2005: 5). As to organisational solidity, scholarly disagreement denotes the existence of a continuum from highly organised factions (Rose, 1964; Zariski, 1978), to loose and uncohesive tendencies (Hine, 1982: 39; Key, 1952). Institutional and internal incentives shape factions’ strategies (Boucek, 2005: 6). On the one hand, the systemic opportunity structure may encourage factions to reflect the country’s divisions (Duverger, 1964; Panebianco, 1988; Hennessey, 1968: 12). Federal or decentralised states promote the formation of regionally rooted factions (Köllner and Basedau, 2005: 17). On the other, factions’ degree of institutionalisation depends on party regulation of dissent (Zariski 1978). Intra-party actors perform ‘cost-benefit calculations on a continuous basis, making strategic decisions designed to fulfill their basic objective’ (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Since the dominant coalition may change party rules in moments of high factional conflict, factionalism is intrinsically endogenous. It must thus be studied in a dynamic perspective (Boucek, 2009: 25), contextualising its development and analysing its course of action. Analyses of group dynamics require non-exclusive views of factionalism. Abstracting out different characteristics and forms of organisation, we will 1 build upon broadly inclusive definitions, considering factions as intra-party groups that act collectively in order to achieve some common goals (Belloni and Beller 1978:447; Zariski 1960: 33; Bouceck 2009: 14). This article provides a framework through which factionalism might be examined and the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts. The second section discusses the dynamic connections between factionalism and party structure and sets out a model of the dimensions of factional organisation according to the tolerance of host parties towards dissent and their degree of vertical integration. It also considers the dominant coalition’s strategic choices in episodes of intense factionalism. The third section applies the hypotheses developed to four Spanish political parties in which the autonomy of their regional branches and of factions differ: the People’s Party/ Partido Popular (PP), the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party/ Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), United Left/ Izquierda Unida (IU), and the Basque Nationalist Party/ Partido acionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV). The final section concludes. Factionalism and party organisation in multi-level settings Factionalism can not be properly understood without taking into account how parties organise. As Köllner and Basedau (2005: 19) suggest, it is often unclear whether it results from a particular way of organising or whether the causality runs the other way round. Although one has to be cautious when drawing connections between factionalism and party structure, we suggest that this relationship can be studied if factionalism is simultaneously examined both as dependent and independent variable and if external factors (i.e. formal institutions, party system characteristics, socio- economic, cultural and political features) are kept constant. I. Factionalism as a dependent variable: the determinants of factional organization When we consider factionalism as a dependent variable, we are interested in how party rules encourage a particular type of factionalism. Belloni and Beller (1976: 548) defined the procedural details of party organisation which may invite the formation of factions as the ‘permissiveness of the parent body’. In our opinion, two basic party organisational dimensions determine what shape internal conflict adopts: the autonomy of factions and the autonomy of regional branches. Factions can turn these dimensions 2 into their advantage to pursue their goals. As Hine (1982: 38) notes ‘a group’s need for organization will depend on the rules and conventions governing party life’. The degree to which parties allow internal dissent and eventually formal organisational divisions to function at the regional level is a major issue for parties competing in multi-level systems (Houten, 2009). Territorial division and state decentralisation processes impact on the most relevant dimensions of party organisation, namely distributional conflicts over organisational resources, the definition of platforms and priorities, electoral and governing strategies (Deschower, 2006; Downs, 1998; Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Hopkin, 2003; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Biezen and Hopkin 2006). The extent to which the national level of the party is predominant in these dimensions can be measured through a continuum that defines its vertical integration, ranging from extremely weak intra-party linkages to highly integrated structures 1, and varies with institutional factors (type of power division within the polity and allocation of resources), form of party organisation and ideology, and the party’s governing or opposition status (Thorlakson 2001, 2006; Smiley, 1987). Vertical integration is defined by sub-national party influence (the representation of party branches in the central level) and sub-national party autonomy on candidate selection and on the management of the party structure and discipline (Thorlakson, 2009). Multi-level dynamics add complexity to the inherent (permanent or temporary) lack of unity within parties. Parties are composed of sub-coalitions or groups of activists who might disagree about the goals and how to pursue them (Kitschelt 1989: 47). The group that controls skills and knowledge, recruitment, finances and communications is the dominant coalition (Panebianco 1988: 37). Dominant coalitions are often non homogenous. In this case, they become coalitions of factions made of governing and opposition factions (Key, 1956). The party’s governing or dominant faction is then the coalition component which is better equipped to impose its ideological or organisational preferences (Harmel and Tan, 2003: 411). Factions, be it formally structured or loosely articulated, help individuals in different levels of the party to coordinate decisions (Carty, 2004: 15). The capacity to do so depends on the ‘internal market for consent’, that is party pluralism, party sharing and the representation of sub-party preferences and interests (Boucek, 2005: 21). Intra- 1 From weakest to highest, the categories included in the continuum are: truncated, bifurcated, confederal, integrated and unitary parties. See Thorlakson (2001), Carty (1988), Dyck (1991), and Smiley (1986). 3 party democracy is advantageous for opposition factions because it maximises their influence ( Ibid., 21). Proportional representation in internal elections provides a strong incentive for factional organisation, even if it is established in recognition of existing factionalism (Hine, 1982: 42-43).