Lu Pei-Yi To Be or Not to Be a National Pavilion: Taiwan Pavilion and Hong Kong Pavilion at Venice stablished in 1895, the Venice Biennale is the world’s oldest and most prestigious art exposition. Its unique structure consists mainly of Ea thematic pavilion organized by Biennale directors and national pavilions featuring artists chosen by the represented nation. The idea of a national pavilion can be traced back to the nineteenth-century world exposition model that emphasizes international competition through peaceful means. This model echoed the mentality of imperialist colonial expansion and represented the desire of nation-state construction. However, in the twenty-first century, the concept of nation-state is experiencing the increasing phenomenon of deterritorialization via the Internet, immigration, and the operations of global capital. If this is the case, how should we reconsider the mechanism of the national pavilion in the Venice Biennale? Many debates have risen in the past few years that question this problematic notion of the national pavilion. For example, the Spanish Pavilion at Venice in 2005 showed Santiago Sierra who allowed only visitors with a Spanish passport to enter the pavilion. In 2009, British artist Liam Gillick was invited to show in the German Pavilion, in 2011the Poland Pavilion was represented by Israel artist Yael Bartana, and in 2013 Germany and France exchanged their pavilion venues. However, could such approaches toward national pavilions be generated in some of the more politically marginalized regions such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, both of which have experienced political complications with mainland China? The first Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennale was in 1995, when Taiwan was added to the official list of national pavilions under the name of R.O.C Taiwan–Taipei, which is how it participated in the two Biennales that followed. But, after 2001, as a result of China’s obstruction,1 the Taiwan Pavilion was forced to abandon its national pavilion status and thereafter was listed as a collateral event. The year 2001 also marked Hong Kong’s first participation under the name of Hong Kong, China. In 2013, both the Taiwan and Hong Kong Pavilions encountered great concerns within their respective art communities because of their selection process. The chosen proposal for the Taiwan Pavilion, by curator Esther Lu, called for three projects, but included only one Taiwanese artist. This decision raised considerable criticism, in particular doubt about what a Taiwan Pavilion now actually means. And unlike the previous open call for curatorial projects for the Hong Kong Pavilion, M+ (a new museum 38 Vol. 12 No. 5 for visual culture to open in Hong Kong in 2017, but currently producing projects) was directly invited by the Hong Kong Arts Development Council (HKADC) to organize the presentation at the 2013 Pavilion, curated by M+ director Lars Nittve, and this particular process prompted the concern that the organizers were working “within a black box (),” in other words, lacking in transparency. Although Taiwan and Hong Kong are listed as collateral events at Venice, they actually act like national pavilions. I would argue that we should understand them as the “Taiwan Pavilion,” and the Hong Kong (China) Pavilion—the quotation marks and the deletion mark suggesting ambiguity in light of their efforts to distinguish themselves from China. This struggle of “to be or not to be a national pavilion,” one based on complex anxieties, might aggravate rather than alter, or even reverse, the problematic status of national pavilions at the Venice Biennale. Hou Chun-ming, prints on Taiwan is a National Pavilion (1995–2001) paper, 153.5 x 107.5 cm each, 1995 Venice Biennale. Courtesy The initial participation of the Taiwan Pavilion in 1995 was under the title of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. of ARTTAIWAN. This exhibition presented five selected artists’ works in the Palazzo delle Prigioni, near the tourist destination of Palazzo San Marco, and this site has served as Taiwan’s participation ever since. Attendance at the Venice Biennale was seen as a crucial breakthrough for Taiwan after such a long period of diplomatic exclusion—since 1971—the year when Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations and China replaced its seat. In addition, the emergence of the Taiwan Pavilion not only echoed the quest for Taiwanese identity after the lifting of martial law in 1987, but also embodied a specific concept of the “new Taiwanese,”2 a term coined Vol. 12 No. 5 39 by President Lee Teng-Hui that Foreground: Huang Chih- yang, The Afforestation Plan same year, as a means to bridge B: Mountains and Water, mixed media, 400 x 400 cm. internally the ethnic divide and Background: Maternity Room, 1992, ink on rice paper, 60 to promote Taiwan externally as a x 240 cm each, 1995 Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei unified country. Many Taiwanese Museum of Fine Arts. media, therefore, reported on the first Taiwan Pavilion at Venice in a victorious tone, using lines such as “flexible diplomacy got a rare achievement,” “look forward to speaking out for Taiwan,” “it is a successful attack,” and also describing the artists as a “national delegation” or “representative of Taiwan.” In this vein, the first Taiwan Pavilion at Venice was a symbol of nationalism and associated particularly with the political progress of Taiwanization in the 1990s.3 With exhibition titles such as View of the Taiwan Pavilion, Palazzo delle Prigioni, 1997 ARTTAIWAN (1995), Taiwan Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. Taiwan: Facing Faces (1997), and Close to Open: Taiwan Artists Exposed (1999), it is clear there was the intention to highlight the word “Taiwan” in order to strengthen the acknowledgement of Taiwan. Whether in the curatorial statements or the poster design, the effort of promoting Taiwan was obvious; for example, the curatorial statement for ARTTAIWAN, entitled “Rising from the Sea—Contemporary Taiwanese Art” emphasized Taiwan’s geographical location as“on the eastern fringe of the Pacific Ocean and the western reaches of the Asian continent.”4 Following this statement was a brief history beginning from the economic perspective of one of Asia’s phenomenal Four Little Dragons.5 This idea of promoting Taiwan also can be seen on the cover of the catalogue in its use of an old map—possibly made during the period when the Dutch occupied Taiwan (1624–62)—as a base to present an image of an island in the sea and the artists’ names listed on the top of a compass as a metaphor for the navigation of Taiwan. The idea of viewing Taiwan as a country representing a sea culture6 introduced a new perspective toward Taiwan that was adapted later by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to distinguish Taiwan from China in its history and culture. In a previous essay of mine, “Who is Constructing the Image of Taiwan? The Strategy of the Taiwan Pavilion at the Venice Biennial (1995/1997/1999),”7 I analyzed artworks presented in the Taiwan Pavilion that were selected by juries or curators,8 and I indicated that a sense of “Taiwaneseness,” especially in reference to its hybrid culture caused by a multi-colonization experience, could be observed in them. I further argued that these exhibitions “tried to take fragment pieces of presence on site to prove an overall absent Taiwan art.”9 The statement made by juror Francoise Chatel in 1995, “Five artists, five approaches, five trends, but a shared testimony: that of the creativity and the involvement of Taiwan’s contemporary artists with their society and with the world of art”10 supports my argument. Juror 40 Vol. 12 No. 5 Wu Tien-chang, Wounded Funeral I–IV, 1994, mixed media, 192 x 130 cm each, 1997 Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. Wang Jun-jieh, Neon Urlaub—Expo Version, 1997, installation, 1997 Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. Chen Chieh-jen, installation view at Taiwan Pavilion, 1999, laser printed photographs, 1999 Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. Huang Hai-Ming explained in 1997 that“the works on exhibit in the Taiwan Pavilion manifest several cultural phenomena in contemporary Taiwan as a virtual image connecting art of political and social criticism and a returning to inner concerns and Eastern traditions.”11 This also can be seen in the 1999 curatorial statement in which the curator J. J. Shih described the three 12 artists he selected as “three segments of a mirrored image of Taiwan.” Vol. 12 No. 5 41 Hun Tung-lu, installation view at Taiwan Pavilion, 1999, Duratran prints, 1999 Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. Hwang Buh-ching, Feast in the Wild, 1999, installation, dimensions variable, 1999 Venice Biennale. Courtesy of Taipei Museum of Fine Arts. According to the above, the Taiwan Pavilion used artworks to illustrate the characteristics of Taiwanese culture and to further demonstrate what Taiwan is. The Taiwan Pavilion, therefore, shouldered a double task: on the one hand to function as an external showcase of Taiwan through artworks, as well as to introduce Taiwanese artists to the international stage both in terms of politics and economics. On the other hand, internally it was meant to contribute to recalling the consciousness of Taiwan and to construct the imagined community of the “New Taiwanese.” In short, the Taiwan Pavilion in its initial stage as a national pavilion at Venice could be viewed as the effort, as well as the result, of Taiwanization in the1990s. The Taiwan Pavilion as Ambiguity (2001 to Now) Hong Kong was handed over to China in 1997, and Macau in 1999; therefore, only Taiwan remains out of China’s control. Under China’s ideology of “One China,” the issue of Taiwan became increasingly serious.