Daniel Weidner · Sigrid Weigel (Hg.) Benjamin-Studien 3 Daniel Weidner · Sigrid Weigel (Hg.) Benjamin-Studien 3 Wilhelm Fink Die Drucklegung dieses Werkes wurde unterstützt mit den Mitteln des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung unter den Förderkennzeichen 1UG0712 und 01UG1412. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte, auch die des auszugsweisen Nachdrucks, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Übersetzung, vorbehalten. Dies betrifft auch die Vervielfältigung und Übertragung einzelner Textabschnitte, Zeichnungen oder Bilder durch alle Verfahren wie Speicherung und Übertragung auf Papier, Transparente, Filme, Bänder, Platten und andere Medien, soweit es nicht §§ 53 und 54 UrhG ausdrücklich gestatten. © 2014 Wilhelm Fink, Paderborn (Wilhelm Fink GmbH & Co. Verlags-KG, Jühenplatz 1, D-33098 Paderborn) Internet: www.fink.de Lektorat: Bettina Moll, Berlin; www.texttiger.de Satz: Tilo Lothar Rölleke, Berlin Einbandgestaltung: Evelyn Ziegler, München Printed in Germany Herstellung: Ferdinand Schöningh GmbH & Co. KG, Paderborn ISBN 978-3-7705-5782-0 H!"#"$ C%" A Cloud of Words A Re&ection on (Dis)appearing Words of Benjamin and Wittgenstein What can disappear necessarily presupposes what can appear. What once ap- peared, however, may not disappear but instead last for ages in which one can 'nally con'rm neither its duration nor termination. And, as quite often happens in reality, what is supposed to be appearance may turn out to be nothing other than illusion. But this is also not a question about which one can easily pass judgment. (at appearance could appear illusionary is a logical fact, too. As con- cerns the logical status of appearance and, in particular, disappearance, one could fall into a quandary because the possibility of disappearance relies on negative potential, non-potential if you will, of appearance that in turn, or actually in advance, originates from (no)where in reality. (e origin of appearance as such never uncovers itself for appearance always already cannot but conceal it once it appears as appearance. (ough one might suspect that appearance is actual, it is and remains possible to the last, that is to say, its modus in reality is hypothetical. (e possibility of disappearance then becomes the possibility of possibility, i. e. negative possibility. What we (believe to) know about appearance as such is just the fact that it somehow always already appeared to us (but, to be sure, not all of us). Further- more, it seems quite symptomatic that in everyday life or even in academic dis- cussions we use the word »appearance« as something transcending the scope of visual perception, although the word, appearance, »apparently« indicates that it is something that exists only when one sees it and as long as one’s perception of it is in continuance. (e representative example is the ordinary usage of the verb »appear.« People ›rightly‹ say: »It appears (to me) ...« (e ground that renders this extravagant use of the word be circulated and settled could be found nowhere else but in language. Indeed, the problematic aspect of the usage of the words »ap- pear« and »appearance« forces us to delve into the appearance and disappearance of/in language. At the forefront of those who tenaciously pondered this issue are, I would claim, Walter Benjamin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Benjamin and Wittgenstein both are philosophers of language who tried to establish in unique ways the doctrine of resemblance respectively: »Lehre vom Ähnlichen« and »[Lehre der] Familienähn- lichkeit.« What they see and 'nd in language are not communication and mu- 234 HYOWON CHO tual understanding but instead one of the weirdest phenomena in/of the world, viz., resemblance (likeness) in/of language. ( is phenomenon, I would insist, indicates the correlation of appearing and disappearing, of di)erentiating and integrating, and of dividing and imparting of language as such. For Benjamin and Wittgenstein, to sum up, language is a paradigmatic paradoxical site of (dis)appearance, di)erentiating integrity, and divisive imparting. For this reason, it is worthwhile to pin down where their thoughts on language converge and where they diverge. 1. Tact (Takt): Common Grounds of Benjamin and Wittgenstein So far, with few exceptions, Benjamin and Wittgenstein are regarded as belong- ing to ' elds completely apart from each other. And as far as my knowledge con'rms, they did not have a chance to meet each other in their lifetime. (e philosopher from Vienna had no acquaintance with the works of the critic from Berlin. By contrast, as Detlev Schöttker suggests,1 it may well be the case that Benjamin, who had no less an interest in the problem of language than Wittgen- stein, felt sick with jealousy at him. In a bizarre interrogation in One-Way Street (1928), according to Schöttker, Benjamin reveals his envy; he would have read the 'rst book of Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which is published with an introduction by Bertrand Russell in 1921, with a frown of disapproval and hence interpolated the following statements into a fragment: »What is ›solved [gelöst]?‹ Do not all the questions of our lives, as we live, remain behind us like foliage obstructing our view?« (SW I, 449). In other words, Schöttker goes on, Benjamin might bring his antipathy, of course stealthily as he often does, into such a literary 'ght. In particular, it should be noticed here that the word ›solved‹ has quotation marks around it for no discernible reason. It could be in order to target, or at least to refer to, the kernel of a declaration that Wittgenstein inscribed in the preface to his book: »And if I am not mistaken in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved.«2 Benjamin’s abrupt question, in this sense, sounds like a mockery of Wittgenstein’s seemingly arrogant assertion. 1 (is German scholar has dealt with the relation between these two 'gures in a quite di)erent way from the ones the American philosopher Stanley Cavell and the German philosopher Dieter (omä took: a personal approach. Cf. Detlev Schöttker: »Benjamin liest Wittgenstein«, in: Sigrid Weigel/Daniel Weidner (eds.): Benjamin-Studien 1, München (Wilhelm Fink) 2008, pp. 91–105; Stanley Cavell: »Benjamin and Wittgenstein: Signals and A*nities«, in: Critical Inquiry 25 (1999) 2, pp. 235–246; Dieter (omä: Vom Glück in der Moderne, Frankfurt a. M. (Suhrkamp) 2003, pp. 59–87. 2 Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London (Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1981, p. 21 (emphasis H. C.). A CLOUD OF WORDS 235 If one accepts this hypothesis of Benjamin’s jealousy, he might be surprised that it is hardly observed that a telling resemblance exists between their theories of lin- guistic resemblance (likeness). Schöttker unfortunately has stopped researching at the very moment when a proper question should be raised. (And neither Stan- ley Cavell nor Dieter (omä acknowledges an important link between Benjamin and Wittgenstein, aside from their contributions to illuminating some momen- tous aspects of the constellation between Benjamin’s and Wittgenstein’s theories.) However, assuming Benjamin’s pangs of jealousy still seems to be a stepping stone for further researching. One could thereupon propose that the masterwork of the later Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, gives a belated answer to the late Benjamin, as if the philosopher had heard (or read) the mocking questions of the critic through one channel or another. And if this response could be imag- ined, it is still to be conceived that Benjamin for his part already prepared the reciprocation, as though he had anticipated that someday there would be an echo from the author of Tractatus. (is sort of fabrication at 'rst glance could appear a mere fancy. In what follows, however, the appearance of this fabrication will take shape, being supported by philological complements. As a 'rst step, it would be worth looking for the common grounds that pro- pelled both Benjamin and Wittgenstein to devote themselves to the theory of re- semblance of/in language. (e foremost author in this regard is the idiosyncratic Viennese critic of language (Sprachkritiker), Karl Kraus. It is widely acknowl- edged that Kraus had a huge in&uence on both of them. Benjamin was not only a subscriber and an eager reader of Kraus’ journal, Die Fackel, which for over thirty years Kraus had composed and edited almost entirely alone, but also wrote some signi'cant articles on Kraus that might cast light on the whole con'guration of Benjamin’s »Historiosophy.« Likewise, Wittgenstein for his part admired Kraus as a mentor, as Stephen Toulmin and Allen Janik convincingly assert.3 (ese two scholars go so far as to call Wittgenstein ›the most eminent Krausian.‹4 Regarding this labeling, it is revealing that Wittgenstein solicited Kraus for advice when he had to make an important decision whether to donate his fortune to sponsor artists and poets. Yet, above all, the substantial in&uence of Kraus on Benja- min and Wittgenstein must be found in the radical attitude, or better, extreme meticulousness and sharpness that Kraus showed in his Sprachkritik. (ere are numerous sources we can 'nd in his texts that reveal his radical perspective on language. To take one example from his works, one might select the following passage which is notable for its apocalyptic mood: »One must always write so, as if he wrote for the 'rst time and for the last time [Man muss jedes Mal so schreiben, 3 Allan Janik/Stephen Toulmin: Wittgenstein’s Vienna, New York (Simon and Schuster) 1973, pp. 67–91. 4 Ibid., p. 87. 236 HYOWON CHO als ob man zum ersten und zum letzten Male schriebe].«5 Kraus not only belongs to those who focus on language as such, but who also deserves to be representative for their preoccupation.