NO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: THE MOBILIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION by NATHAN W. FREEMAN (Under the Direction of Jeffrey D. Berejikian) ABSTRACT In recent years representatives of civil society—including environmental and public-interest oriented groups—have become involved in the politics of international trade and investment. Joined by labor, these groups have mobilized against trade and investment liberalization. How can the mobilization of civil society in this policy area be explained? I argue that civil society’s mobilization is a reaction to fundamental changes in the process by which liberalization is legalized through binding international commercial agreements and treaties. At its core, legalization refers to three components: obligation, precision, and delegation. During the past two decades, the process of legalization has undergone dramatic changes in terms of its scope, pace, and agenda at both the regional and global level. The most important change, which has elicited civil society opposition, is the shift in the objective of legalization from an emphasis on the liberalization of trade to an emphasis on the liberalization of investment. INDEX WORDS: Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, Civil society, Globalization, Trade, Foreign direct investment, Liberalization, Legalization, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, World Trade Organization, North American Free Trade America, Free Trade Area of the Americas NO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: THE MOBILIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION by NATHAN W. FREEMAN B.A., The University of South Alabama, 2001 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ATHENS, GEORGIA 2003 © 2003 Nathan W. Freeman All Rights Reserved NO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION: THE MOBILIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION by NATHAN W. FREEMAN Major Professor: Jeffrey D. Berejikian Committee: Christopher S. Allen Markus M. L. Crepaz Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia December 2003 iv I dedicate this thesis to my parents whose ceaseless love, support, and encouragement have helped to sustain me in all of my professional endeavors, and without whom, I would not be where I am today. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Jeffrey D. Berejikian, Christopher S. Allen, and Markus M. L. Crepaz for the enormous assistance and critical feedback which they provided me with during this important endeavor. I would particularly like to acknowledge Ethan Fishman who originally sparked my interest in the field of political science and who encouraged me in my decision to pursue a career within the discipline. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................v LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED............................................. viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Battle at Seattle........................................................................................1 Questions to be Answered ..............................................................................4 The Puzzle.......................................................................................................5 The Scarcity and Inadequacy of Alternative Explanations.............................9 Giving the Coalition a Name: Civil Society .................................................15 Organization of the Thesis............................................................................22 2 EXPLAINING THE MOBILIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY AGAINST TRADE AND INVESTMENT LIBERALIZATION Writing the Constitution for a Global Economy...........................................24 Domestic Politics and International Economic Relations.............................26 Levels and Units of Analysis ........................................................................31 Mobilization: The Organized Application of Pressure ................................35 The Legalization of Liberalization................................................................44 The Core Dimensions of Legalization ..........................................................47 Changing Issues Areas: The Shift in the Object of Legalization.................56 Additional Issues: The Increased Scope and Pace of Legalization..............60 vii The Argument: Re-aggregating the Concept of Legalization......................62 3 FROM CUFTA TO NAFTA: THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL SOCIETY OPPOSITION ...................................................................................................75 The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement......................................................77 The Opposition of Canadian Civil Society to CUFTA.................................85 The North American Free Trade Agreement................................................90 The Opposition of American Civil Society to NAFTA................................93 Assessing Civil Society Mobilization Against CUFTA and NAFTA ........111 4 THE CONTINUING MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY: LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLIED TO THE MAI, SEATTLE, AND THE FTAA.118 Chapter 11: NAFTA’s Dirty Little Secret .................................................121 The Multilateral Agreement on Investment................................................130 Seattle: Taking the Fight to the WTO........................................................146 The Free Trade Area of the Americas.........................................................149 Assessing Civil Society Mobilization in a Post-Legalization Environment152 5 CONCLUSION...............................................................................................157 The Process of Legalization and the Mobilization of Civil Society ...........161 Success or Failure: Does Civil Society Have a Chance of Achieving its Goals ...........................................................................................................169 Legalized Neoliberalism vs. the Public Good: Civil Society’s Options....170 APPENDICES .................................................................................................................176 SELECTED REFERENCES ...........................................................................................195 viii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty CLC Canadian Labour Congress COC Council of Canadians CUFTA Canada—United States Free Trade Agreement FDI Foreign Direct Investment FoE Friends of the Earth FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs ICSID International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes IPE International Political Economy MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment MFN Most-Favored-Nation Treatment NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NGO Non-governmental Organization OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development UNCITRAL United Nations Commission for International Trade and Law USTR United States Trade Representative WTO World Trade Organization 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Battle at Seattle On Tuesday, November 30, 1999, more than 40,000 people filled the streets of Seattle, Washington—one of the largest public demonstrations in the United States since the end of the Vietnam War—to protest against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and what protestors alleged to be the illegitimate domination of the global economic policymaking process by unaccountable transnational corporate interests. Over 800 non- governmental organizations (NGOs) from over 75 countries were represented at the protests and inside the WTO’s ministerial meeting.1 Blocking and jamming-up major downtown intersections, demonstrators conducted a massive sit-in, their sole purpose to prevent trade ministers representing some 130 countries from attending the opening of the economic summit. Forming a human chain around Seattle’s Paramount Theater, the protesters succeeded in forcing a cancellation of the meeting’s opening ceremony. The largely peaceful protests quickly degenerated into a violent (and, according to many activists, brutal) confrontation between demonstrators and local law enforcement shortly after a handful of self-proclaimed “anarchists” broke away from the mass of predominately peaceful protesters and began vandalizing corporate chain stores such as 1 Bruner 2002, 25. Approximately 767 NGOs were officially registered as “observers” of the WTO’s ministerial meeting and were represented by 2089 delegates who were actually allowed inside the meetings (Smythe 2001, 159). Goldstein and Martin (2000, 611, n16) note that the number of groups who petitioned for observer status at the Seattle ministerial meeting was the largest in GATT/WTO history. Walter (2001, 51) claims that “thousands” of NGOs were represented at Seattle. While this may be an exaggerated estimate, there was clearly a substantial NGO presence inside the meeting as well as in the streets. 2 McDonalds, Starbucks, Old Navy, and Niketown. Police soon resorted to tear gas, pepper-spray, and rubber bullets in their efforts to disperse the demonstrators. Seattle mayor Paul Schell and Washington