Kant and Schiller on Pure Ethics Artigos / Articles KANT AND SCHILLER ON PURE ETHICS: WHY PHILOSOPHERS SHOULD CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH GERMAN LITERATURE (AND VICE VERSA)1 Laura Anna MACOR2 1 STATE-OF-THE ART research concerned: whereas German In his book Kant’s Impure Ethics, Robert Literature scholars saw in Schiller’s criticisms Louden has deinitively invalidated the the heritage of his medical education at the 4 traditional interpretation of a narrowly Stuttgart Karlsschule, philosophers conceived purist reading of Kant’s ethics, assessing his position as the beginning of an important 5 «the numerous pitfalls» associated with the process of the recovery of the sensuous, or, very notion of “empirical ethics” in Kantian an outcome of the recent rehabilitation of philosophy, «with the aim of clarifying the Kant’s moral philosophy, as the starting point 6 meaning, role and status» of impure ethics in a long tradition of misinterpretations. In and the importance of moral anthropology.3 sum, both readings hold that Schiller did not endorse Kantian purism. A pivotal role in the discussion of Kant’s pure ethics is played by the philosopher and In spite, or perhaps precisely because, poet Friedrich Schiller. Schiller’s relationship of this general agreement, Frederick Beiser to Kant’s moral philosophy and, in particular, has recently tried to free Schiller of any to its ethical purism has always been responsibility for the legend of Kant’s controversial: Schiller professed himself to be “asceticism”, claiming that Schiller’s aim as a Kantian but nevertheless criticized Kant’s a philosopher was to improve, not refute, lack of anthropological awareness through his Kantian ethics through the concept of consideration of man as a moral agent. Over “inclination” (Neigung) insofar as it «describes the years, diferent solutions to this apparent not why someone does something but how contradiction have been found according they do it, that is, whether they do it gladly 7 to the point of view of the ield of scholarly or reluctantly, with great efort or with ease». Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 1, n. 1, p. 125-138, Jan./Jun., 2013 125 https://doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501/2013.v1n1.3068 MACOR, L. A. he reactions to this new insight have varied Lambert, Kant referred to moral philosophy from moderate approvals8 to subtle but as something to be considered from a “pure incisive corrections.9 Beiser’s own reply does point of view”, since it cannot be known not seem to have solved every doubt,10 since but by the «pure Understanding [intellectus some of the latest studies maintain, though purus]» (MSI, AA 02: 396) and, as a «[…] the renewal Kant-scholarship has undergone pure moral wisdom, has not to contain any in recent decades, the image of Schiller as empirical principles». (Br, AA 10: 97). From Kant’s philosophical opponent from the that point on Kant rejected any empirical moral standpoint.11 foundation of ethics and maintained the his essay aims to deal with this issue from rational, conceptual or intellectual character a perspective which is in some ways new, since of moral notions. Needless to say, this purism it addresses, irst, Kant’s own assessment of his did not remain a vague claim for the necessity pure ethics (§ 2), and second, the real extent for a non-sensible moral theory but became to which Schiller endorsed it (§ 3), in order to more complex during the 1770s and was show that there was in fact far more agreement expounded in its entirety in the Groundwork between them than is usually admitted. Kant of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and in the and Schiller undoubtedly did not propose the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In these same ethical system, yet their systems were works it is clear that “purism” includes two not completely antithetical. he inal scope of speciic aspects, which are reciprocally related this paper is, therefore, to prove that a true but not identical. interdisciplinary approach would have saved Explicitly, purism concerns moral law two centuries of misinterpretations, since it both a) as originating in pure practical reason would have shown Kant scholars that Schiller and b) as a motivating force for the realization endorsed what one is accustomed to calling of its own demands. herefore, two steps are Kant’s ethical purism, and to Schiller scholars necessary in order to analyse Kant’s alleged that Kant was not the blind, biased moralist purism. they persist in assuming he was (§ 4). a) First of all, Kant refers the legislative power in ethics to pure practical reason, which alone can preserve the objectivity of morals 2 KANT’S ALLEGED PURISM and avoid its contamination with egoism. Kant’s ethics isgrounded in a comprehensive Neither feelings nor rational concepts such as th knowledge of the major theories of the 18 the search for perfection and the intention to century and aims to overcome their aporias. follow the will of God can seriously be taken By relecting on the Wolian system in the as authorities in this ield. Feelings, emotions heterodox version of Alexander Gottlieb and drives are, from the “purist shift” in about 12 Baumgarten, and on the British tradition of 1770, unsuitable candidates as sources of 13 moral sense, Kant developed the “purist” trait necessary moral prescriptions, but the non- in his moral philosophy, whose irst systematic empirically founded concepts of “perfection” appearance can symbolically be traced back and “will of God” also lack all consistency: to the year 1770. Both in the dissertation De in both these cases, a man has indeed mundis sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et himself and his own utility in mind, because principiis and in a letter to Johann Heinrich furtherance of his own talents and skills has 126 Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 1, n. 1, p. 125-138, Jan./Jun., 2013 Kant and Schiller on Pure Ethics Artigos / Articles a value only in relation to «the advantages of only from reason and not from feelings, life» they guarantee, and obedience to the will conceptions of self-improvement or religious of God («if agreement with it has been taken prescriptions. as the object of the will without an antecedent b) Secondly, Kant refers the motivating practical principle independent of this idea») power to pure moral law itself. he problem becomes a motive only with regard to «the of moral motivation, i.e. the problem of how happiness we expect» from it. (KANT, KpV, ethical norms can be efective, has been one AA 05: 41; CPR, 37). of the most widely discussed questions in the Happiness is a material principle of Western philosophical tradition since Socrates morality and leads to the «[…] direct opposite but gained new relevance in eighteenth- of the principle of morality», if it is made «the century empirical psychology as a consequence determining ground of the will». (KANT, of the discovery of the irresistible force exerted KpV, AA 05: 25; CPR, 32). As a matter by obscure and confused representations, also of fact, it leads the moral agent to follow deined as “unconscious”.14 Johann Georg hypothetical imperatives, whose formula is: «I Sulzer devoted his psychological essays to this ought to do something because I will something topic and found out that passions, emotions else», whereas the moral action is led by the and drives often have a greater impact on categorical one, which rests on the opposite human actions than reason does, which is rule: «I ought to act in such or in such a way why the sole knowledge of what is right does even though I have not willed anything else». not guarantee that it will be efected. On (KANT, GMS, AA 04: 441; GMM, 47). the contrary, everyday experience shows that Actions which conform to hypothetical theoretical convictions nearly always lack imperatives therefore destroy the distinction necessary efectiveness and remain therefore between morality and ability/prudence, «[…] useless.15 put motives to virtue and those to vice in one Kant was acquainted with Sulzer’s analysis class and only teach us to calculate better». and was well aware of the importance of the (KANT, GMS, AA 04: 442; GMM, 48). In problem. In the Groundwork he says he had all these cases, the will shows heteronomy and «a letter from the late excellent Sulzer in stands in contrast to «[…] the supreme principle which he asks [him] what the cause might be of morality», which is «autonomy». (KANT, that the teachings of virtue, however much GMS, AA 04: 440; GMM, 47). Autonomy they contain that is convincing to reason, is realized when the will «[…] is subject only accomplish so little». Kant informs us that to laws given by [it]self but still universal» and «[…] [b]y trying to prepare a complete therefore determines itself in the fullest sense answer» he «delayed too long». (GMS, AA 04: of the expression». (KANT, GMS, AA 04: 411n; GMM, 22f./n).16 As a matter of fact, 432; GMM, 40). «Autonomy of the will is Kant seems to have comprehensively dealt the property of the will by which it is a law with this problem in the 1770s, without, to itself (independently of any property of the however, inding a solution. In his lessons, objects of volition)». (KANT, GMS, AA 04: he claimed that «[…] no one can, nor ever 440; GMM, 47). will, understand the fact that the intellect As thus appears evident, “purism” in must exercise a motivational force», since the this sense means that the moral law comes mechanism by which «judgment» becomes an Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 1, n. 1, p. 125-138, Jan./Jun., 2013 127 MACOR, L. A. «incentive which leads the will to the execution «sensible impulses».