Lou Pingeot Wolfgang Obenland May 2014 R2PIn whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect T POR ROSA LUXEMBURG STIFTUNG NEW YORK OFFICE RE 2 Lou Pingeot/Wolfgang Obenland: In whose name? In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect Published by Global Policy Forum Königstrasse 37a D-53115 Bonn Germany Tel. +49 228 96 50 510 Internet: www.globalpolicy.org Email: [email protected] Contact: Wolfgang Obenland Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung — New York Office 275 Madison Ave., Suite 2114 New York, NY 10016 USA Tel. +1 (917) 409-1040 Internet: www.rosalux-nyc.org Email: [email protected] Contact: Albert Scharenberg Authors: Lou Pingeot and Wolfgang Obenland Editing: Jens Martens, James Hare Editorial assistance: Eleonora Hoffmann Cover Photo: Metziger/flickr.com; published under a CC BY-NC 2.0 license. Printing: blautonmedien design & druck, Troisdorf, Germany Published with support of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are avail- able in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISBN 978-3-943126-15-0 Bonn/New York, May 2014 Executive Summary 3 Executive summary The concept of the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” This report outlines the concept’s key elements and is one of the ideas that have evolved the fastest in the describes how it came into being (Part I). The report contemporary international normative arena. R2P af- then explores the concept’s positive aspects (Part II) and firms that states and governments do not only have a its problems (Part III). During our research, a gap in the right to sovereignty, but also a responsibility to protect literature around the “political economy” of the debate their populations, and that the international community on R2P became visible: who is promoting the concept, must take action when states fail to uphold this respon- how, and with what interests? The report addresses some sibility. R2P has quickly moved up the ladder of inter- of these questions. It concludes (Part IV) that, although national law, from an emerging idea in the late 1990s to R2P attempted to present innovative ideas to address its official formulation over the turn of the century. At contemporary humanitarian crises, the concept is irre- the same time, skeptics and critics have raised concerns mediably flawed and provides no real solution to prevent about the concept, arguing that it is a veil for self- and stop gross human rights violations – but there are interested interventions by major powers and a threat to alternatives. international peace and security. The origins of R2P In the face of mass-scale killings and humanitarian di- In 2000, the Government of Canada set up the Inter- sasters in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the 1990s, the national Commission on Intervention and State Sover- “international community” often failed to take decisive eignty (ICISS) to build consensus on what such criteria action to protect civilians at risk. Many observers and might be. Eschewing the term “humanitarian interven- policymakers argued that a shift in the international rela- tion,” the ICISS introduced the concept of the “Re- tions framework was needed to offer a proper response sponsibility to Protect,” outlining its three components: a to these crises. In situations where states were proving “Responsibility to Prevent,” a “Responsibility to React,” unable or unwilling to halt human suffering, their right and a “Responsibility to Rebuild.” The Commission’s re- to sovereignty should be discarded to allow interveners port sought to answer the question of “when, if ever, it is to protect populations under threat. R2P sought to go appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular beyond the idea of “humanitarian intervention” and “le military – action, against another state for the purpose of droit d’ingérence” (the right to intervene). Rather than protecting people at risk in that other state.”* It stressed letting interveners define when and where they wanted that the understanding of “sovereignty” had shifted, from to act, R2P proposes to establish criteria to determine a simple right to a right and a duty to protect. Although when, where, how, and by whom intervention had to be undertaken to be legitimate. * ICISS (2001), p. VII. 4 Lou Pingeot/Wolfgang Obenland: In whose name? the ICISS highlighted that R2P included a responsibility through reports of the Secretary-General and resolu- to protect and to rebuild, it focused on the “responsibil- tions of the Security Council. The concept was invoked ity to react,” and in particular its military component, by during crises in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the laying out six criteria for foreign military intervention. Congo, Mali, and most recently Libya. The application The ICISS envisions the UN Security Council as the of R2P to these real life situations raises questions about ultimate authority to legitimize such intervention, but it the concept: does it provide a new and effective way to does not exclude the possibility of action undertaken by put an end to large-scale killings? Could it be used by regional organizations or willing powers. interveners to justify military action not in the defense of human rights but for their own interests? After the ICISS report’s publication in 2001, R2P quickly evolved at the UN. The concept was endorsed by member states at the 2005 World Summit, but nar- rowed and significantly altered. Nevertheless, R2P con- tinued to occupy an important space on the UN scene, Positive contributions R2P rejects the misnomer “humanitarian intervention” of international response to humanitarian and political and acknowledges humanitarian workers’ concerns crises in the 1990s, the concept attempts to create more that such a concept could lead to the militarization of consistency by establishing a framework that clarifies their activities. It stresses the primary role of the state in who should intervene, when, under which criteria, and protecting its citizens, thus reiterating and strengthening how. By defining circumstances in which international obligations already outlined in several international hu- society should assume responsibility for preventing, halt- man rights instruments. R2P also highlights the role of ing, and rebuilding after a humanitarian emergency, the the international community in helping individual states ICISS report was aiming to make it more difficult for fulfill their responsibilities, in particular through support UN member states to shirk their responsibilities. for preventive efforts in the economic, social and politi- cal areas. Aware of the inconsistent and arbitrary nature The architects of R2P An analysis of the main architects and supporters of in promoting it. The political and ideological roots of R2P is key to understanding where the concept came R2P have echoed well with some NGOs, which have from, what it hoped to achieve, and what it has become. included R2P in their advocacy work on human rights Proponents of R2P often hailed from a similar politi- and the protection of civilians. cal and ideological background, which contributed to In light of such high-profile endorsement and active shaping the concept. At the state level, R2P was first support by major actors, has the R2P concept proven supported by liberal, center-left governments, including successful in preventing, halting, and responding to crises Canada’s Liberal government under Jean Chrétien and since its inception? An examination of the case of Darfur the UK’s Labour government under Tony Blair. Indeed, shows that the record is spotty. The crisis in Darfur endorsement of R2P at the national level (and promo- unfolded as the R2P doctrine gathered pace at the UN tion of the concept at the international level) has often and in the international arena. For many R2P advocates, depended on the orientation of the political party in it promised to provide a “test case” for the concept. But power. This political orientation is reflected among the NGO advocacy around the Darfur crisis proved prob- academics who have advanced the R2P doctrine and lematic. It focused on a military solution to the conflict the philanthropic foundations that have played a key role to the detriment of political mechanisms, and it often Executive Summary 5 turned out to be highly disconnected from the real- advocates that Darfur was the utmost case of a “responsi- ity on the ground. Darfur also underlined the difficulty bility to protect” and despite the unprecedented mobili- of moving R2P from theory to practice. In many years zation of time, resources, and energy. of intense advocacy, civil society organizations did not achieve much, despite a broad consensus among R2P The flaws of R2P R2P comes with many analytical gaps, problematic as- R2P fails to ask the right questions. By focusing on sumptions, and controversial solutions. The doctrine sovereignty as the main obstacle to saving lives, R2P fails remains ill-defined, as underlined by debates among to acknowledge that lack of intervention in the past has supporters who all claim to possess its “true” mean- generally been due to a lack of interest by major powers ing. The confusion around R2P is well illustrated by – or an interest in not solving the crisis – rather than a disagreements on the role of military intervention in high regard for sovereignty. R2P claims to be forcing the the doctrine. While some R2P proponents argue that “international community” to face its responsibilities, military force is just one of many components and was but in fact it does not speak truth to power. How can never made to be the principle focus, others claim that we build an international system that can address violent it is at the core of R2P. An examination of the concept’s conflicts and crimes when major powers – in particular genesis suggests that R2P was indeed intended to justify the permanent five members of the Security Council – military intervention by foreign powers on humanitarian have no interest in stopping the violence, or an interest grounds.