COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS: Developing a Practicrl Procedure of Discourse Tamua Eileen Pravica A thesis subrnitted in conformity Ath the requirements for the de- of Master of Arts Deputment of Theory and Poliey of Education Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto O Copyright by Tamara Eileen Pravica 1999 National Library BibiiiWque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibiiograp hic Services senrices bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. nie Wonïngtoii OttawaON K1AON4 OCEawaON K1AW Canada Canade The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exciusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfoxm, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/nlm. de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the authot's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Communicative Ethics: Developing a Practicai Procedure of Discourse Master of Arts 1- Tamara Eileen Pravic? Deparbnent of Theory and Polirg of Education Ontdo Institute for Stridies in Edncation of the University of Toronto Jurgen Habermas presents a theory of discourse ethics which is a con£lict resolution theory based on a process of mord argumentation. To move discourse ethics beyond a purely theoretical venue, Habermas introduces Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive model of mord devdopment. In tum, SeyIa Benhabib questions Habermas' version of discourse ethics by examining the theory and model which she sees to be grounded on a rationalist methodology that is shared by both Habermas and Kohlberg. Using Benhabib's insights, 1 reexamine Kohlberg's idea of the moral domain and argue that Kohlberg actually supports Benhabib's analysis, and can even be seen to expand it As a result, we are left with a solid theory of discourse ethics, whereby both Kohlbeg and Benhabib can be seen to contribute to Habermas' account. While they maintain the foundations of Habermas' discourse ethics theory, they reformulate the moral domain to accommodate a practical and viable account of moral deasion making. 1 wodd like to thank my supervisors, Professor Marsha Hewitt and Professor Dwight Boyd for th& immeasurable influence and guidance, as well as thar patience and support. 1 would also like to thank Professor John Eisenberg and Professor Sherene Razack for theV kindness, consideration and advice. I am indebted to my brother Professor David William Pravica for getang me this far. Without his help and encouragement throughout my academic life this thesis would not have been possible. From teaching me to read before kindergarten, helping me with my science pwectsf believing in, encouraging and finanaally helping me throughout my undergraduate studiesf and proudly supporting me through the Master's programme, his love has continuously guided me every step of the way. I wish to thank Steven Shapiro for his tireless support throughout the MA programme. 1 do not exaggerate to say that his encouragement, editing work, and suggestions have made this thesis possible. 1 would also like to ha& Dr. MariIyn Bluestein, wha hdped make this thesis a fulfdhg, and pleasurable experience. A very specïal thanks to my colleague Lorraine Argatoff. Our academic conversations were invaluable to my work. As wd,1 must indude a thanks for the mord support 1 received - also invaluable. Finally, 1 wish to thank the individuals who seülessly and willingly donated their tirne, energy and resources to specifically help puil this thesis togethet: Elaine Basara. and Car1 Bachellier, my cousin Susan Cumming, Henny Etminan, my sister Georgina Fennell, and Cynthia Preston. 1 would also like to thank them for their continuous encouragement and suppo& friendship and good humour. 1 would also like to indude Mark Clamen, Manjit Dhanoa, Heidi Orcutt, and Carola Spiess, also for their wonderful support, friendship and good humour. iii Table of Contents ThesisOverview ..........................................................1 PART 1 DISCOURSEETHICS ...................................................... 2 Why Laquage?: Understanding Communicative Action Normative Ciaims Three Validity Qaims Conclusion The Need for Red Discourse U and D Justification of the Rules of Argumentation Summary HABERMAS CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY ................................. 22 The Critique of Reason A Paradox of Communicative Action Conclusion PART II KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT ....................... 31 Cognitive Framework Stage 6 3 Operations Understanding: KohIberg and Habermas The ProbIem of Stage 6 PART III CAROL GKLIGAN ................... ... ............... .. ............... 47 A Response to Kohlberg Reply to Gagan Habermas B-IB ...............c.....rrr..r......i.i...i.........o............ 56 The Ethic of Care Reconsidering the Rational Framework The Generalized and The Concrete Habermas and the Prinaples of Discourse A Universalist Mode1 Interrelatedness and Enlarging the Political Domain KOHLBERG ............................................................. 70 Moral Dialogue PART IV SUMh4AJXYANDCONCLUSION *......................................*.87 Habermas and Benhabib: The Discourse Ethics Distinction Bibliography ............................................................. 93 APPENDIX 1 ........................................................... % APPENDIX 2 ........................................................... 97 Endnotes and References ............................... .. ..........98 Thesis Overview Jurgen Habermas offers a theory of discourse ethics as a persuasive form of moral deasion malcing based on presupposed desof moral argumentation. Within his version of discourse ethics, Habermas presents Lawrence Kohlberg's model of mord devdopment which supports Habermas' daims of cognitive moral thought by means of an empirîcaîly founded study of moral cognition. With this, he expands his theory towards the possibility of practical application. We wiU then look at some concerw regarding the soundnes of Habermas' practical tum, with the goal of suggesting a stronger version of discourse ethics in regards to its practical applications and an interpretation of Kohlberg's contributio~isto discouffe ethia. To explore these issues I will Fvst give a basic explication of Habennas' theory. 1 will then look at how Habasuses his ideas of language to reflect upon the modern world, which moves the theory beyond a solely theoretical understanding of communicative language use. From there, we will move further into the practical hun of discourse ethics, where Habarnas introduces Kohlberg's model of moral development At this point, the essential ideas of Habermas' discourse ethics wiil have been presented. As a critique of Habermasf theory, 1 tum to Seyla Benhabib who questions Habermas and Kohlberg's rationalist methodology. Benhabib argues that the moral domain as an arena for the procedure of moral discourse is unacceptable if its context only admits moral issues which are separateci from ideas of the good life or concrete issues. Taking her argument further, 1 show that, though this is a valid criticisrn of Habermas, Kohlberg does not support this rationalist approach. 1 go further to show that in fact Kohlberg gives us an eiaborate description of the moral domain that extends Benhabib's vision of an open arena for moral debate. In the end, we are left with a theoretically and practically sound theory of discourse ethics by means of the contributions of all three theorists. PART I DISCOURSE E'IHICS= Why Language?: Understanding For Habermas, a moral theory must recognize the obligatory relationship between each individual and his or her community. If we understand moral theory as the attempt to discem the soaal dependency we have on each other to maintain ourselves and live within communities, espeaally to darify and resolve problems when there is a breakdown in these moral rdation~hips~then it is necessary to focus on the relationships between individu& and the individual with his or her community.1 This means first acknowledging that the individual and soaety are in direct and necessary relation to each other and that "they fonn and maintain themselves together."* The individual self is seen to develop in relation to the recognition and rdection of her or his self hmthe response of others, i.e, identity formation. This does not mean that the individual cannot think for her or his self, but that recognition and acceptance of our ideas, and even the genesis of such ideas, cornes from the participation within a community of people. We, as infants, develop in the presence of and in relationships with others, and in this venue, the development of our ideas continues throughout our lives. At the same tirne, the individual, as a group member, has the potential to affect, participate and communicate back to the community. In this way, the individual is also seen to participate in his or her own identity formation by being part of, and at the same time as recognized by, the larger communify. This being the case, this interrelated