Notes PMPM Prime Minister’s Personal Memorandum PMPT Prime Minister’s Personal Telegram Introduction 1 W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London, 1991), 142–3; Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (London, 1987), 454; Paul Johnson, The Suez War (London, 1957), 43; Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government (London, 1987), 198; David Dutton, Anthony Eden: A Life and aReputation (London, 1997), 388; Geoffrey McDermott, The Eden Legacy: and the Decline of British Diplomacy (London, 1969), 132; Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis (London, 1996), 8 and 108–9; Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network (New York, 1978), 405–6; Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, The Suez Crisis (London, 1997), 56; Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge, 1995), 42–3; Keith Kyle, Suez (London, 1992), 137 and 148–52; Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (Harmonds- worth, 1970), 62; Alistair Horne, Macmillan, Volume I, 1894–1956 (London, 1988), 396 and 399. 2Thomas, op. cit., 28. I have focused on Thomas, Kyle and Lucas throughout the historiographical debate because they represent the most detailed and com- prehensive coverage of the crisis. Thomas’s work was the first real historical dis- cussion of the events and involved the anonymous contributions of many of the participants of the crisis, including Selwyn Lloyd. Despite the occasional factual inaccuracy, this work is still widely respected by historians. Both Kyle’s and Lucas’s work represents the most recent attempts to deal with the Suez Crisis. They have benefited from the release of many of the relevant public and private papers, as well as the co-operation of many of the participants; in Lucas’s case over fifty in number. Others, such as Diane Kunz and Tony Shaw, have also written recently, with similar benefits, but their work has been much more specific, focusing on the economic and media/propagandistic side respectively. In particular, both Kyle’s Suez and Lucas’s Divided We Stand are currently con- sidered by historians to be the greatest contributions to an historical analysis of the Suez Crisis. 3Douglas Jay, Change and Fortune: A Political Record (London, 1980), 261 remarked, ‘a case not so much of collusion as confusion’. 4 PRO: CAB 128/30. CM(56) 54, 27 July, 1956. 5 David Dutton, Anthony Eden: A Life and a Reputation (London, 1997). 6 Harold Wilson, A Prime Minister On Prime Ministers (London, 1977), 303. 7 Avon (1960), 523 and 532. Eden went on to say that ‘[t]he same plan that had been intended to deal with Nasser’s seizure of the canal fitted equally well with our new objective’. 8 Ibid., 523. 9 For example, see Avon Papers (hereafter referred to as AP) 22/44/35–37. 181 182 Notes 10 Erskine Childers, The Road To Suez: A Study of Western–Arab Relations (London, 1962), dust-jacket. 11 AP 23/44/51. Eden to Lloyd, 13 November, 1959. 12 Lucas (1991), op. cit., 155. Eden (1962), op. cit., 437. 13 For further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 1. 14 AP 23/56/1. Brook to Eden, 29 May, 1957; AP 23/56/9A. Eden to Brook, 5 November, 1957: Eden did not think the memorandum should have a wide circulation in Whitehall; AP 23/56/10. Brook to Eden, 8 November, 1956: Brook agreed that it would not be circulated in Whitehall, only ‘available for consult- ation in the Foreign Office’. 15 Interview with Sir Guy Millard, 25 February, 1998. For a contrast, see Selwyn Lloyd’s copy, kept in FO 800/728, or Eden’s, kept in AP 33/9iii, to the original kept in CAB 21/3314. 16 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London, 1998), 177. 17 Suez Oral History Project (hereafter referred to as SOHP): Interview with Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker. Dodds-Parker had learnt this information from Philip de Zulueta, Eden’s private secretary attached to the Foreign Office. 18 SOHP: Interview with Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker. 19 Terence Robertson’s Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy, published in 1965, devoted a chapter to the ‘Treaty of Sèvres’, ‘based upon the recollections of Pineau, Bourgès-Maunoury, and Abel Thomas’: see chapter 8, 157–74. 20 Peter Hennessy in conversation with Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, 30 May, 1987, cited in Hennessy, Whitehall, 165. 21 Dr. Thorpe, Selwyn Lloyd (London, 1989), 210. 22 SELO 237(3). 23 AP 23/44/86. Lloyd to Eden, 29 June, 1967. 24 McDermott, op. cit., 148–9. Compare his reconstruction of the Sèvres meetings with those of Logan or Dayan. 25 McDermott, op. cit., 11. 26 Ibid., 146. 27 For example, see Lucas (1991), op. cit., 146–7. 28 For a more in-depth study, see Keith Sainsbury, The Turning Point: Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang-Kai-Shek, 1943 – The Moscow, Cairo and Teheran Conferences (Oxford, 1986), which sees the turning point in Britain’s position as 1943. 29 Such as Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge, 1965) and J. P. Mackin- tosh, The Government and Politics of Britain (London, 1970). 30 For example, see: Kyle, op. cit., 11; Thomas op. cit., 46. 31 He had stood for Parliament in 1922, unsuccessfully contesting the Labour seat at Spennymoor. 32 For further discussion of Eden’s role in these settlements, see: Rhodes James, op. cit.; David Carlton, Anthony Eden (London, 1986) and David Dutton, op. cit. Eden attended all the major wartime conferences: Tehran, Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, Moscow, Washington, Yalta and Potsdam. He also led the British delega- tion at San Francisco in May 1945, where the final shape was put on the UN Charter. 33 PRO: PREM 11/636. Eden to Hankey, February 1953. 34 Anthony Eden, 16 February, 1953, cited in Lucas (1991), op. cit., xiv. 35 For Eden’s belief in the need to protect oil interests, see his speech to the 1922 Committee cited in Nigel Nicolson, Long Life: Memoirs (London, 1997), 160. Notes 183 36 Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London, 1967), 20. 37 AP 20/27/4. T(E) 14/53, No. 2139. Eden to Eisenhower, 5 May, 1955. 38 The Suez Base Agreement was formalised on 27 July, 1954, and ‘provided for the withdrawal of British forces within twenty months, the upholding of the 1888 Canal Convention, and for part of the Base to be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in the event of armed attack upon Egypt or any other members of the Arab League’: Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956, A Personal Account (London, 1978), 24, and Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government regarding the Suez Canal Base (Cairo, 19 October, 1954). This in itself was a fulfilment of the basic pledge of withdrawal that had accompanied the 1936 Treaty with Egypt negotiated by Eden. 39 Sir Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: Full Circle (London, 1960), 370. In addition, Eden was also perturbed by the ‘growing size of our bill for imports’: AP 20/20/47. PMPM M(E) 47/55, 17 August, 1955; AP 20/20/48. PMPM M(E) 48/55, 17 August, 1955; AP 20/20/52. PMPM M(E) 52/55, 19 August, 1955, an 8-page minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For further references to Eden’s concern over the ‘Economic Crisis’, see: The Papers of Lord Stockton (Harold Macmillan) (hereafter referred to as MP)MS.Macmillan.dep.d.22. Diary entries for 1 and 2 September, 1955; MP.MS.Macmillan.dep.d.23. Diary entries for 4, 5, 6 and 14 September, 1955. 40 AP 20/22/159. PMPT T(E) 184/55 No. 1301. Eden to Macmillan, 28 September, 1955. 41 Although as Thomas, op. cit., 35; fn.36, reflected, not necessarily right-wing on domestic issues. 42 SOHP: Interview with Julian Amery. 43 Ibid. 44 Horne, op. cit., 367. MP.MS.Macmillan.dep.c.16. Diary entry for 31 July, 1954. 45 Anthony Nutting, ‘Sir Anthony Eden’ in Herbert Van Thal (ed.), The Prime Ministers: Volume Two; From Lord John Russell to Edward Heath (London, 1975), 339. Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (Harmondsworth, 1968), 115. 46 Daily Telegraph, 3 January, 1956. 47 James Margach, The Abuse of Power: The War between Downing Street and the Media from Lloyd George to James Callaghan (London, 1978), 106. Margach was a political correspondent with the Sunday Times. 48 Ibid., 106–7. See also Shaw, op. cit., 19. 49 Ibid. 50 This was apparent with his final agreement to withdraw from the Canal Base. 51 PRO: PREM 11/91. PMPM M21/52, Churchill to Eden, 30 January, 1952. Churchill continued: ‘I think we should be very careful lest in our desire to have an easier settlement in Egypt we do not take account of the degree of atrocity committed by the Egyptians in the murders and massacres in Cairo.’ PREM 11/91. Eden to Churchill, 10 March, 1952: Eden, as Foreign Secretary, had believed that: ‘If I cannot impose my will, I must try to negotiate. This is the best government we have yet had with which to do so.’ Hansard, column 748, 29 July, 1954. 52 Shuckburgh, op. cit., 122. Diary entry for 17 December, 1953. 53 PRO: CAB 128/30. CM(56) 19, 6 March, 1956. 54 Ibid. 55 For instance see: Lucas (1991), op. cit., 54; Nutting, op. cit., 25–6; Lamb (1987), op.