•.v%m M AIR U N I V E R S ITY SPECIAL FOURTH CLASS MAIL CALCULATED POSTAGE PERMITG-1 rcview USAF-ECI MAXWELL AFB. AL 36112 GUNTER AFB. AL 36118 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force m War—the basis for our doctrine and Employing USAF B-52s in maritime The imelligence ram in the polic our education of sênior officers?— battle—page 45 lion's arena—page 58 page 2 The Air University Review, published bimonthly in English and quarterly in Spanish and Portuguese, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions ex- pressed or implied in the Review are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the U.S. government. A I R UNIVERSITY reuiewJanuary-February 1986 Vol. XXXVII No. 2 AFRP 50-2 2 WAR, DOCTRINE, AND THE AIR VVAR COLLEGE Col. Thomas A. Fabyanic, USAF (Ret) 30 Bring Me F atM en Editorial 32 Ira C. Eaker Fir st -Prize Essay SynchronizedS i ppo r t : A n Ir r epr essible P ringipleof W ar Lt. Col. David C. Rutenberg, USAF 39 INNOVATION AND THE MlLITARY MlND Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, RAF 45 Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress Dr. Donald D. Chipman Major David Lay, USAF 51 Air Base Survivability and V/STOL A ir c r a f t : A G ap in Air Force Doctrine? Lt. Col. Price T. Bingham, USAF 58 POLICY, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE BlLLION-DOLLAR PETROGLYPH Lt. Col. G. Murphy Donovan, USAF 72 Experimental Air c r a f t YValter J. Boyne Air Force Review 88 Lieut ena nt John O. Donaldson: World War I Air Ace and Escape Artist Dr. James J. Hudson The Classic Approach 93 Reflections ON Dochet Col. John F. Shiner, USAF 96 You've Got the Stick/Letters Books, Images, and Ideas lhe cover 103 H ollywood and the Bomb A postdiluvian Cromboi. Eon» Dr. Lawrence H. Suid ago. whcn antediluvian Crom- boi» ruled in íar-oíf galaxie», no 110 Short Bursts onc could have (athomed lhe »hape of Crombot» lo come. 119 Contributors . one cannot fight successfully a war for which one is not organizationally and doctrinally prepared.”' WAR, DOCTRINE, AND THE AIR WAR COLLEGE some relationships and implications for the U.S. Air Force COLONEL THOMAS A. FABYANIC. USAF (RET) an act of force t compel an enemy to do 1wiil *46 .V -'-. * C3 WAR. DOCTRINE, AND AIR WAR COLLEGE 3 HE U.S. Air Force exists for one reason: simplified molds or equations; such efforts, war. Its immediate tasks are to under- however, produce not analysis, but the illusion stand war, prepare for it, and deter it. But of it. Some individuais attempt to grasp the Tthe ultimate task of the U.S. Air Force is essentialsto of war by examining it in isolation wage war, appropriately and successf ully, across from political reality; but that approach is the broad spectrum of conflict. Viewed ai a doomed to failure, since it ignores the basic basic levei, this phenomenon of war probably logic of war—namely, the reasons for which it is the most odious act a man commits against is fought. Others seek to understand war by his fellowman; it is gruesome, inexplicably reducing it to principies or precepts, yet such brutal, and horrendous in its cosí of human life efforts can yield only abstractions, themselves and other resources. But to cope with this per­ of limited value, thus providing little real sistem feature of man's history, it is insufficient comprehension. The most dangerous outcomes, to merely understand war. At a minimum, the however, are reserved for those who try to ex­ planning and conduct of war require one to amine war in quantifiable terms. Using a meth- approach it at the levei of analysis, for only odology that assumes the existence of determi­ then can its essential elements and their inter- nam knowledge concerning war, these indi­ actions become reasonably clear. viduais arrive at conclusions that have enor­ The first step in such an effort should be to mous appeal because they are adorned in the address the nature of wTar, but its enormous guise of mathematical and scientific respecta- complexity defies all but rudimentary analysis. bility. But when subjected to the uncertainties To obviate this complexity, war is often cast in and nonquantifiable aspects of war as it actu- 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ally unfolds in combat, the disastrous conse- phrase Will Rogers) neat, plausible, and wrong. quences of this approach become painfully evi- The complexity and importance of these two deni. Thus, there are no quick and easy ap- interrelated matters of war and doctrine are proaches to the study of war. If one wishes such that one would find it difficult to under­ sincerely to make theessence of waran integral stand and assimilate them on an individual or part of his thought processes, he must grasp it independem basis. Although all military pro- at two different leveis. One of these is within fessionals study war, only some few are privi- the domain of rational intellectual thought; leged to gain direct exposure to it; the re- the other, ivhich :s of equal importance, is at mainder must rely exclusively on indirect ex­ the levei of instincts and intuition. In psycho- posure. With regard to doctrine, all military logical terms, both left and nghl brains must professionals concern themselves with it, but deal with this phenomenon. Only when both they do not necessarily agree on its meaning or domains are probed can the necessary synthesis importance. Part of the effort to overcome these take place; only then can one truiy “think shortcomings is made at the Air Force’s sênior war." Service school, Air War College (AW'C), by of- The effort to understand doctrine demands fering a structured approach to the study of no less. It requires the Air Force officer to take a war, doctrine, and their relationships to the long and arduous journey to gain experience in broader concerns of national security affairs. war. Ideally, some of that experience will be Although the need for this formalized study acquired by direct combat, but much of it will appears obvious, considerable disagreement beassimilated vicariously, with history serving seems to exist, even at the highest leveis, about as the primary médium. Also necessary will be its intrinsic value for those who attend AWC exposure to bureaucratic influences, because and, by inference, its utility for the Air Force’s only through it can one begin to appreciate the future. The results are a continuai introspec- final shape and structure of official doctrine tion within AWC and periodic assessments at a and the rationalizations offered for it. To their higher levei of authority in order to judge the great credit, many professional officers take overall effectiveness of an AWCeducation. The this doctrinal journey. But although they travei basic questions asked are who is being taught, the same pathways, they do not always proceed what are they taught, and who does the teach- in exactly the same sequence, nor, after com- ing? Also probed, yet never really answered, is pleting the journey, do they agree on what they the basic question: namely, what is the purpose have seen. The result, predictably, is extensive of an AWC education? Do we seek to graduate and serious controversy.* sênior staff officers or sênior combat com- Currently, the meaning, substance, and out- manders? Do we educate colonels or future put of doctrine are the subjects of a vigorous, generais? None of these groups, of course, are vital, and necessary debate of enormous impor- mutually exclusive; and therein lies the prob- tance to the role of the U.S. Air Force in U.S. lem. Should the curricula be broadly based national security matters. Although not gener- and, as a consequence, exhibit a measure of ally recognized, the stakes in the debate are superficiality? Or, alternatively, should it have enormous. Ostensibly the debate is about doc­ a relatively narrow focus with emphasis on trine, but in reality the controversy centers on depth of understanding and analysis? Arriving the meaning of war and its relationship to doc­ at answers, of course, is a far more difficult task trine. War and doctrine are inseparable, and than raising the questions. However, one might attempts to understand doctrine by isolating it suggest, as a point of departure, that without a from war as it occurs on the battlefield is likely basic understanding of war and doctrine, valid to result in formulations that are (to para- answers are not possible. WAR. DOCTRINE, AND AIR WAR C.OLLEGE 5 phenomenon so central to the profession. Regrettably, however, comprehension of war does not appear to be the sine qua non of the professional officer corps—a condition widely recognized by astute observers both within and without the officer corps. Not very long ago, for example, the editor of Air University Re- vieu> reminded his fellow officers that ‘‘the basic function of the peacetime military is to prepare for war ” and argued that today’s offi­ cers do not view their combat responsibility with clarity. He further suggested thatalthough a hallmark of the military professional is ex- pertise at war, “today’s Air Force officer corps seems to be regressing to the preprofessional status that prevailed in the American officer corps during the first half of the nineteenth century," when technical skills took prece- dence over the ability to conduct war.3 To these internai criticisms, one must add observations offered by competem nonmilitary analysts.