THE ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA (2007-2012) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION April 2012 This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared by International Resources Group (IRG). THE ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA (2007-2012) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION April 2012 DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government TABLE OF CONTENTS ACRONYMS ································································································· V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ················································································ 1 COLOMBIA: STRONG DEMOCRATIC TRADITION BUT WEAK PARTIES AND ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS ......................................................................................................... 1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................... 4 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................... 7 LESSONS LEARNED ......................................................................................................................................... 8 I. INTRODUCTION ······················································································ 10 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT .................................................................................................................. 11 II. THE EPP PROGRAM: FINDINGS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ······································································· 12 MAIN FINDINGS ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL PROCESS IN COLOMBIA ........................................................................................................................................ 12 MAIN CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................. 16 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 19 III. OBJECTIVE 1: TO ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVE, PROGRAMMATIC POLITICAL PARTIES AT THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS. ················································································· 21 A. OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN COLOMBIA .................................................................... 21 B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 24 C. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 28 IV. OBJECTIVE 2: TO PROMOTE THE INCLUSION OF AFRO- COLOMBIANS, INTERNALLY-DISPLACED PERSONS, AND WOMEN IN POLITICAL PROCESSES ·················································· 30 A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN COLOMBIA ........................................................................................................................................ 30 B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 32 C. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 36 V. OBJECTIVE 3: TO SUPPORT INCLUSIVE AND TRANSPARENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES ··································································· 38 A. OVERVIEW OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN COLOMBIA .......................................................... 38 B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 41 C. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 45 VI. LESSONS LEARNED ··············································································· 48 ANNEXES ··································································································· 49 ANNEX 1. LIST OF INTERVIEWS ································································· 50 ANNEX 2. BIBLIOGRAPHY ·········································································· 55 ANNEX 3. NDI RESULTS FRAMEWORK, INDICATORS AND COMMENTS ······················································································ 58 ANNEX 4. IRI RESULTS FRAMEWORK, INDICATORS AND COMMENTS ······· 70 ANNEX 5. LIST OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS’ RESULTS AND ACTIVITIES BY OBJECTIVE ································································ 82 ANNEX 6. OAS 2011 REPORT (INFORME VERBAL) ······································· 89 ANNEX 7. FREEDOM HOUSE AND WORLD BANK GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ····················································································· 94 ANNEX 8. ELECTORAL RISK MAP ······························································· 96 ANNEX 9. MAP OF GOVERNORSHIPS WITH ALLEGED LINKS TO PARAMILITARIES ··············································································· 97 ANNEX 10. QUALITIES OF LARGE LATIN AMERICAN NATION ELECTION MANAGEMENT BODIES (EMBS) ········································ 98 ANNEX 11. SCOPE OF WORK ····································································· 99 ANNEX 12. EVALUATION WORK PLAN ···················································· 108 ACRONYMS ASI Alianza Social Independiente (ASI party) AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) BACRIMs Criminal groups (Bandas Criminales Emergentes) CEPPS Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening CNE National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral), CSDI Colombia Strategic Development Initiative DANE National Administrative Statistics Department (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística) DNP National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) EMB Electoral Management Body EPP Program Electoral and Political Processes Program FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) FUNCICAR Fundación Cívico Social pro-Cartagena ICP Instituto de Ciencia Política IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IFE Federal Electoral Institute IRG International Resources Group IRI International Republican Institute JAL Juntas de Acción Local (neighborhood councils) LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project MIRA Movimiento Independiente para la Renovación Nacional (MIRA party) MOE Electoral Observer Mission (Misión de observación electoral) NDI National Democratic Institute OAS Organization of American States PMP Program/Project Management Plan PSUN Partido Social de Unidad Nacional THE ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA (2007-2012) – PERFORMANCE EVALUATION V UIAF Unit of Information and Financial Analysis (Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero) UNDP United Nations Development Program URIEL Immediate Reaction Unit for Electoral Transparency (Unidad de Reacción Inmediata para la Transparencia Electoral) USAID United States Agency for International Development VI THE ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA (2007-2012) – PERFORMANCE EVALUATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Over the past 10 years, the Government of Colombia has made considerable progress in reducing conflict, improving security, attracting foreign investment, and reactivating the economy. As the government successfully combatted armed guerrillas, drug traffickers, and demobilized paramilitary groups, the government‘s approval ratings, and particularly, the President‘s, increased. Yet, the most important institutional infrastructure of any stable democracy – political parties and electoral institutions – remain weak, poorly institutionalized, underfunded, and vulnerable to capture by smaller criminal organizations with links to former paramilitary groups and/or drug traffickers active at the local and regional levels. As the prestigious International Crisis Group recognizes (2011, 7), by 2010, ―prosecutors had passed to competent authorities evidence that 24 governors, 225 mayors, 11 members of departmental assemblies, and 55 local councilors have links with former paramilitary groups.‖ Indeed, electoral institutions and political parties remain the Achilles‘ heel of Colombia‘s democratic consolidation. Paradoxically, the country is a longstanding democracy and an economic powerhouse, but with democratic infrastructure (parties and electoral institutions) which have been taken for granted and allowed to stagnate over decades of neglect, government authorities focused – understandably – on the more urgent battle of ending the violence and restoring order. However, strengthening political parties and electoral institutions in Colombia is critical for consolidating the Government of Colombia‘s achievements and guaranteeing stable democracy in the future. The purpose of this performance evaluation is to assess the results of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-funded Elections and Political Processes Program (EPP Program) in Colombia designed to strengthen political parties and electoral processes in Colombia. The Program was implemented by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) from 2007 to 2012.