This dissertation has been microtihned exactly as received 66-10,500 JOHNSON, James Herbert, 1928- THE MARSHALL PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMEN­ TATION. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1966 Political Science, international law and relations University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHŒA GRADUATE COLLEGE THE MARSHALL PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY JAMES HERBERT JOHNSON Norman. Oklahoma 1966 THE MARSHALL PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION APPROVED BY r z ' ACKN0WLEDGÎ4ENT I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Rufus G. Hall, Jr., my uajor adviser, for his inspiring and patient guidance of the prepara­ tion of this work. His advice and recommc-n-dations were invaluable, Throughout, he gave generously of his time, energy, and abundant know­ ledge, Whereas his dedication to high standards of performance were challenging, confidence was inspired by the sincerity in which his counsel was offered. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Oliver E. Benson, for his helpful suggestions and assistance with regard to research facilities and materials, and to Dr. Joseph C. Pray, for stimulating an interest in the complexities of the legislative process. To Mr. Ralph Hudson, State Librarian, and to the members of his staff, I am indebted for the many kindnesses shown me and for their generosity in making available the excellent resources, facilities and services of the State Library. I would like to express appreciation, also, to Miss Opal Carr, of the University of Oklahoma Library, for her generous assistance in locating and making accessible im,ny of the docu­ ments used in this study. To the many other persons who have assisted in this study through their expressions of confidence, patience, and understanding, I am sin­ cerely grateful. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENT........... , iii Chapter I. FROM YALTA TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE ......... I Introduction The Deterioration of Relations Between the United States and Soviet Union after World War II Eastern Europe--After Yalta The Division of Germany Between East and West The Council of Foreign Ministers: Failure to Resolve Basic Issues Soviet Obstructionism in the United Nations The Economic and Political Deterioration of Europe: Failure to Re-establish a Viable Economy The Greek-Turkish Crisis II. AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1945-1948 ............................. 70 III. THE GREEK-TURKISH CRISIS: THE U. S. RESPONSE 9& Recognition and Delineation of the Problem Dominant Personalities in the Executive Branch Engaged in Formulation of the Truman Doctrine The Administration's Congressional Strategy and the Results Reaction to the Truman Doctrine The American Public The Response Abroad Congress and the Truman Doctrine iv IV. THE MARSHALL PLAN ......................... ... Background Developments Europe's Reaction: The Committee of European Economic Cooperation Exploration of American Capabilities to Finance European Reconstruction Congressional Reaction The Public Response Interim Aid V, THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM IN CONGRESS ....... 199 The Setting and the Forces The Administration Bill The Hearings The Committee Versions of ERP The Debates Prospects for Adoption of the Recovery Program Senate Consideration of ERP Efforts To Expedite Passage of ERP House-Consideration of ERP The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 Implementation of the Recovery Program The Appropriations Struggle House Reduction of ERP Appropriation Response to House Action Senate Consideration of EBP Appropriation Conference and Capitulation VI. CONCLUSION ........................... 322 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................... i..--- 3^9 THE MARSHALL PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPIRMENTATION CHAPTER I FROM YALTA TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE Introduction On May 8, 19^5> President Harry S. Truman announced to a thankful nation the unconditional surrender of Germany. Although the actual capitulation had occurred the previous day at Rheims, France,it was ratified formally at Berlin on May 9; 19^5- On August l4, 194$, the President announced the surrender of Japan. Officially the surrender was made on September 1, with the following day being proclaimed as "V-J Day". Thus was brought to its close the most destructive and costly war in the world's history and the first conflict actually spanning the entire globe. Stemming directly from this century's other and first "world" war, out of the devastation and fury of the war years 1939-19^5 was spawned a new era, the age of the super-states. Although the fact was not clearly discernible in 19^5, the war and its after- math heralded the end of traditional international relationships. De­ parted from the center of the world power structure were Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan. Enfeebled by a half-century of preparing for and fighting debilitating wars, these once dominant actors on the 1 world stage now found themselves in roles of secondary and even lesser importance, their places having been preempted by the new super-states, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although infinitely exhausted by the savagery of the blood-let­ ting so recently ended and conscious only of a desire to erase the memory of the holocaust through a return to the business of peace as expeditiously as possible, the peoples of the war-torn areas were to be given no surcease. Instead, they were to be catapulted into an even more intense, if less sanguine, struggle for power between the new super-states. Out of the seeds of the victorious war-time alliance were to arise the bitter fruits of hate, suspicion, mistrust and, pos­ sibly, the war to end all wars--perhaps the world itself.^ The casting of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union into the role of allies in the second World War was an apt illus­ tration of the incongruities and vagaries that fate often deals its mortal subjects. Sometimes termed the "Grand Alliance", a more ap­ propriate term might have been the "Grand Misalliance". Including, as it did, the archetypes of capitalism and communism, the "Grand Alliance" contained the seeds of its own disintegration. Cooperation among the three allies was never easy during the war. Indeed,, the path to allied harmony \often seemed to be obstructed by elements of discord strewn deliberately by the Soviet Union. At the same time, suspicion of the motives of its Western allies was not lacking on the part of the Russians. ^"If the nineteenth century, politically speaking, was the era of multiple opportunities, the twentieth century by stark contrast is the day of the single chance . ." Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and'Co., Inc., 196^), p. 8 8 . Concessions were made frequently by the Anglo-Americans to their Soviet 2 partners. Each concession was made in the hope that it would be part of the cement of a cooperative postwar relationship in the interest of enduring world peace.3 The United States had been forced into the war--so it thoqght; it was fighting to destroy the evils of Fascism, Naziism, and militarism, as exemplified by Germany, Japan, and Italy; and after the war had been won it would much prefer a return to more prosaic enterprises. The war was a nightmarish interlude in the affairs of a people dedicated to less sanguinary pursuits. The sooner it was ended, the better. Therefore, American policy during the war most frequently was dictated by military rather than political ends. There was concern, of course, for the con­ figuration of the postwar world. Great efforts were expended on the planning of a postwar international organization to guarantee the ^An American official of that period asserted, however, that the record of Yalta, "... shows clearly that the Soviet Union made greater concessions . to the United States and Great Britain than were made to the Soviets . ." The Yalta Agreements were termed a "diplomatic triumph" for the Western partners in the alliance. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians; The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter John­ son (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 19^9); PP* 295-307* •3 It was only at Yalta, late in the war, that Big Three military plans were coordinated for the first time. Ibid., pp. 110-111. One author argues that "Russia was as eager as the West to co-operate. Not until victory seemed certain did Stalin show anxiety to keep the eastern front as his exclusive theatre of military operations . ." Stephen Borsodj’-, The Triumph of Tyranny: The Nazi and Soviet Conquest of Central Europe (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 155* Herman Finer, on the other hand, itemizes the concessions made by the West in the interest of cooperation with Soviet Russia. He points out that Roosevelt consistently attempted to conciliate Russo-British differences and that Britain, under Roosevelt's lead, made serious efforts to get along with the Russians. How­ ever, Finer adds that hardly any of the conciliatory actions made to still Russian suspicions "was accepted with clear good grace . ." America * s Destiny (New York: The Macmillan Co., 19^7), p. 26$. 4 peacefully-inclined peoples of the world against would-be aggressors of the future. As during World War I and during the planning for the abortive League of Nations, the United States aspired to an idealistic state of affairs in which the specter of power politics could not rear its ugly head. There were, to be sure, realists among America’s policy- and opinion-makers. But those who saw clearly the war-time objectives of the Soviet Union frequently had to yield to the primary aim of win- ning the war.