The Wartime Basis of Postwar Political Development: Civil War Termination, Resource Mobilization, and State-Building A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Molla Reda IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Ronald R. Krebs August 2015 © Molla Reda 2015 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the process of researching and writing this dissertation, I have been fortunate to have received years of support and encouragement from numerous sources. My deepest gratitude goes to the members of my dissertation committee for their helpful feedback and thoughtful advice on my work. I am especially indebted to Ron Krebs, who is one of the most generous advisers imaginable. Ron has over the years been an unfailing source of great support. I cannot thank him enough for his timely and careful comments, incisive questions and constructive suggestions that helped me strengthen my arguments. Ron’s guidance has been invaluable in helping me to muster the discipline to complete this project. David Blaney provided extensive comments that helped me refine my ideas and sharpen my arguments. I am also grateful to David Samuels and Ben Ansell for their helpful comments, both on previous drafts and during my dissertation defense as well as for their professional encouragement and guidance. Without financial support from numerous sources, this project would not have been possible. I owe considerable thanks to the Department of Political Science for years of generous financial support. In the final stages of writing, a dissertation completion fellowship provided relief from teaching and research responsibilities, allowing me to complete the project in a timely fashion. I am also thankful for a Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship from the Graduate School. Finally, I thank David and Janis Larson for the Larson Fellowship in Political Economy; and Catherine Guisan and Stephen Dickinson for the Andrew Dickinson Memorial Fellowship that enabled me to conduct three months of field research abroad. I am also thankful to the many people that facilitated my journey to graduate school. At Macalester College, where my interest in political economy took shape, Wendy Weber, David Blaney, and Pete Ferderer provided considerable support and encouragement. At the Humphrey School of Public Affairs, the support of Michael Barnett, Robert Kudrle and Steve Andreasen was invaluable in helping me begin my life as a Ph.D. student. And lastly, I am grateful for the support of my family, both on this project and through my years in college and graduate school. I am most indebted to my parents for the sacrifice they made for our family. They encouraged us to pursue our dreams and provided a loving home that made it possible. I am eternally grateful to my parents for letting me leave home at a very young age to explore academic opportunities abroad. Without their support and encouragement, I would not be where I am today. i ABSTRACT Can civil war build states? Since the end of World War II, civil war has eclipsed interstate war as the most dominant form of conflict. Yet, although the destructive consequences of civil war are fairly well-documented, we know little about its social and institutional legacies. Some nations have emerged from conflict and embarked on comparatively effective state-building dynamics, while others have been trapped in a vicious cycle of violence and instability. What explains this variation? I argue that two factors jointly determine the nature and magnitude of postwar state- building: the form of war termination and the nature and extent of wartime state-building. Specifically, civil wars that end decisively through military victory create a structural window of opportunity to centralize state power. By marginalizing armed sub-state actors, victory reduces the likelihood of renewed conflict and allows the victor to monopolize the legitimate means of coercion. However, the end of an armed conflict does not signal a radical break from the past. No post-conflict society inherits a ‘blank slate’ upon which a new political order can be erected. I argue that wartime strategies of resource mobilization explain variation in the degree of institutional coherence with which nations emerge from conflict. In the absence of easily extractible resource rents, combatants must generate revenue by taxing the population. Legitimate taxation requires developing institutional capacity and bargaining with society. By contrast, when combatants have access to internally and externally generated resource rents, they have no incentive to bargain with local populations. This variation in wartime institutional residue, I posit, explains variation in the degree of postwar state-building. These claims are tested using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The statistical findings show that military victory contributes to the postwar growth of state institutions, but these effects shrink when combatants can raise wartime revenue by exploiting natural resources. Three additional chapters feature case studies of post-civil war state-building in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique that serve to explore the theory’s causal claims and provide a rich narrative that deepens the analysis. I conclude the study by addressing the implications of the findings for scholarship and practice. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. i Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... iv List of Figures ......................................................................................................................v Chapter 1—Introduction ......................................................................................................1 Chapter 2—Civil War, Resource Mobilization, and State-Building: A Theory ................21 Chapter 3—Resource Mobilization, War Outcomes and Postwar State-Building: Statistical Analysis .............................................................................................................76 Chapter 4—War in the Ogaden: Resource Mobilization and State-Building in Ethiopia ............................................................................................................................119 Chapter 5—War, Natural Resource Rents and State-Building in Angola .......................166 Chapter 6—The Politics of War and Peace in Mozambique ...........................................232 Chapter 7—Conclusion ....................................................................................................300 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................322 iii LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 Summary Statistics ...................................................................................................... 106 Table 3.2 Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Total Resource Rents .................................... 107 Table 3.3 Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Oil/GDP ........................................................ 108 Table 3.4 Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Oil and Gas Rents Per Capita ....................... 109 Table 3.5 Interaction of Civil War Outcomes and Total Resource Rents .................................... 110 Table 4.1 Ethiopia: The Composition of Government Revenue (average % GDP), 1950-1989 . 159 Table 5.1 Angola: The Composition of Government Revenue (average % GDP) ...................... 225 Table 6.1 Mozambican Presidential and Parliamentary Electoral Results, 1994-2014 ............... 271 Table 6.2 Mozambican Parliamentary Electoral Results by Province, 1994 and 1999 ............... 273 Table 6.3 Trends in Mozambican Government Finances, 1992-2013 ......................................... 293 iv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity ................................111 Figure 3.2 Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity .........................111 Figure 3.3 Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity ....................................112 Figure 3.4 Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity .........................................112 Figure 3.5 Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity ................................113 Figure 3.6 Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity .........................113 Figure 3.7 Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity ....................................114 Figure 3.8 Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity .........................................114 Figure 3.9 Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State capacity .................................115 Figure 3.10 Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity .......................115 Figure 3.11 Marginal Effects of Rebel Victory on State Capacity ..................................116 Figure 3.12 Marginal Effects of Settlement on State Capacity .......................................116 Figure 3.13 Marginal Effects of Military Victory on State Capacity ..............................117 Figure 3.14. Marginal Effects of Government Victory on State Capacity ......................117 Figure 3.15 Marginal