THE AEF WAY OF WAR: THE AMERICAN ARMY AND COMBAT IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR A Dissertation by MARK ETHAN GROTELUESCHEN Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2003 Major Subject: History THE AEF WAY OF WAR: THE AMERICAN ARMY AND COMBAT IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR A Dissertation by MARK ETHAN GROTELUESCHEN Submitted to Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved as to style and content by: ______________________________ _______________________________ Brian M. Linn Arnold P. Krammer (Chair of Committee) (Member) ______________________________ _______________________________ H. W. Brands Richard W. Stadelmann (Member) (Member) ______________________________ _______________________________ Joseph G. Dawson, III Walter L. Buenger (Member) (Head of Department) August 2003 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in the First World War. (August 2003) Mark Ethan Grotelueschen, B.S., United States Air Force Academy; M.A., University of Calgary Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian M. Linn Many scholars of the First World War have examined the European armies in new ways that have shown not only how those armies actually fought along the Western Front, but how they changed their ideas and methods over time, and why they fought the way they did. This dissertation does the same for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). It examines how four AEF divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th) planned and conducted their battles, what they learned about modern combat in those battles, and how they adapted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods during the war. Although this dissertation describes AEF training and operations, its focus is on ideas and methods, and the changes in both during the war. It shows that when the United States joined the war in 1917, the U.S. Army was doctrinally unprepared for the industrial combat of the Western Front. It demonstrates that General John J. Pershing and other AEF leaders accepted this inadequate prewar doctrine, with only minor modification, as the official doctrine of the AEF. Many early American attacks suffered from these unrealistic ideas, which retained too much faith in the infantry rifleman on a battlefield dominated by artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire. However, this dissertation also shows that AEF divisions adjusted their doctrine, tactics, and other operational methods, as they fought. Experienced divisions prepared more comprehensive attack plans, employed more flexible infantry formations, and maximized firepower to seize limited objectives. Although some of these adaptations were accepted by senior officers at AEF General Headquarters (GHQ), the American First Army, and the various corps, the lessons seem to have been learned first, and best, by officers and men within the combat divisions. Often the extent of these changes reduced the operational relevance of senior officers at GHQ, including Pershing, many of whom failed to make the same doctrinal adjustments. In short, this study exposes the battle of ideas waged within the AEF, between those who adhered to the traditional, human-centered ideas of the prewar army and those who increasingly appreciated the modern, industrial ideas then prevalent in the European armies. iv For Abigail, Grant, and Caleb And in memory of the military service of their grandfathers Paul Gerhardt Grotelueschen US Army, 1945-1948, 1951-1953 Albert Millson Gonder USMC, 1951-1954 v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful for the advice and assistance of dozens of professors, historians, archivists, librarians, friends and family members. Without this support, this dissertation would have been impossible to complete. Professors Brian M. Linn, Joseph G. Dawson III, H. W. Brands, Arnold P. Krammer, R. J. Q. Adams, and Richard Stadelmann, all read (and in some cases reread) the manuscript and provided helpful comments. I thank them for all their assistance, and also for the encouragement they provided throughout the project. I also thank scholars Tim Travers, Holger H. Herwig, Dennis Showalter, and Edgar F. Raines, Jr. for advice and encouragement along the way. Professor Robert Ferrell took time away from his own research into the Meuse-Argonne campaign to discuss the AEF with me, and even loaned me his copy of P. L. Stackpole’s diary. Major James Powell, U.S. Army, and David Campbell both provided important information. Throughout this project I have been blessed with the able help of a number of archivists, librarians, and research assistants. During my work at the National Archives and Records Administration, Mitchel Yockelson and Timothy Nenninger provided extraordinary research assistance, using not only their skills as archivists, but as Great War historians themselves. Also, Tim Nenninger allowed me access to important chapters of Charles P. Summerall’s memoir, which he was then editing for publication. The staff at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, especially Dick Sommers, Richard Baker, Kathy Olson, and David Keough, helped make my visit there as productive and enjoyable as possible. Dr. Sommers’ personal interest in my project ensured that I had access to important materials I did not know existed, and Ms. Olson went above and beyond the call of duty in assisting me both during and after my visit. At the Combined Arms Research Library at Ft. Leavenworth, Rusty Rafferty and John Roger provided important assistance while I was on-site, and loaned me materials before and after my visit. Although I was unable to travel to the Donovan Research Library at Ft. Benning, Ericka Loze sent me material unavailable anywhere else. Jane Yates, the director of the Citadel Archives & Museum, helped me make the most of my visit there. James W. Zobel did the same at the MacArthur Memorial and Archives, as did Andrew Woods at the McCormick Research Center of the First Division Museum. Finally, I thank the entire staffs of both the Massachusetts Historical Society and the manuscripts division of the Library of Congress. The research required for this project entailed a few lengthy trips, and a number of families graciously opened their homes to me during my travels. Thanks for all the logistical and moral support given by Corvin and Nadine Connolly, Paul and Sherri Grotelueschen, Mark and Liz Heinitz, Herb and Ruth Howenstein, Tom and Beth Howenstein, Jim and Tisha Powell, and John and Cindy Raquet. In some instances their support made a trip possible; in every case, they made my travels more enjoyable. Finally, thanks to my family for all their prayers, advice, and encouragement, and especially to Alison, my wife, whose love, support, and countless daily acts of service enabled this project to be vi completed. Despite all the remarkable assistance I have received throughout this undertaking, all errors of fact, faulty interpretations, and mistaken conclusions are my own. Soli Deo Gloria. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………..…………………… iii DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………………..…………… iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………………….……. v TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………….………………………… vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………..………………………. 1 II DOCTRINE AND DOGMA IN THE AEF……………………………………..…………….. 9 The United States Army, 1914-1917 ……………………………………………… 9 Pershing and the Creation of the AEF, 1917-1918………………………………… 18 Doctrinal Development in the AEF, 1918…………………………………………. 29 III THE 1st DIVISION: TRAINING AND FIRST BATTLES…………………..……………… 50 Training in France, June 1917-May 1918…………………………………………… 50 Cantigny, 28 May 1918……………………………………………………………... 57 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18-22 July 1918……………………………………… 63 IV THE 1st DIVISION: FINAL BATTLES……………………………………..………………. 88 The St. Mihiel Offensive, 12-14 September 1918…………………………………… 89 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1-12 October 1918………………………………… 98 Conclusions………………………………………………………...……………….. 105 V THE 26th “YANKEE” DIVISION: TRAINING AND FIRST BATTLES……....…….……. 114 Organization in the United States, August-September 1917………………………… 115 Training in France, November 1917-March 1918………………………………….... 116 Holding the Front Lines, April-June 1918……………………………...…………… 121 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18-25 July 1918………………………………………. 123 VI THE 26th “YANKEE” DIVISION: FINAL BATTLES…………………...……………….… 143 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12-13 September 1918…………………………………….… 143 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 14 October-11 November 1918…………………… 149 Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….. 154 VII THE 2nd DIVISION: TRAINING AND FIRST BATTLES..…………………..……………... 162 Training in the United States and France, August 1917-May 1918…………………. 162 Belleau Wood and Vaux, June-July 1918…………………………………………… 165 The Aisne-Marne Offensive, 18-19 July 1918………………………………………. 177 viii CHAPTER Page VIII THE 2nd DIVISION: FINAL BATTLES…………………..………...……………………….. 193 Retraining and Reorganizing, August 1918…………………………...…………….. 193 The St. Mihiel Attack, 12-16 September 1918……………………………………… 195 Blanc Mont Ridge, 2-10 October 1918..………………………………………...….. 201 The Meuse-Argonne Offensive, 1-11 November 1918……………………………... 210 Conclusions………………………………………………………………...………... 217 IX THE 77th “LIBERTY” DIVISION: TRAINING AND FIRST BATTLES………….…………. 226 Training in the United States, September 1917 to March 1918……………………... 226 Training in France, May-August 1918……………………………………………..... 229 The Vesle-Aisne Offensive, August-September