Mathieu Lefèvre Local Defence in Afghanistan A review of government-backed initiatives EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Given events happening in Afghanistan and in the of the Government to provide stability and region, as well as domestic pressures building in strengthen development through community the United States and Europe regarding further security.’ A pilot project that started in Wardak in engagement in Afghanistan, decision makers are March 2009 is ongoing. To date 1,100 men – more under pressure to find new solutions to restore than the number of provincial police – have been security in large parts of the country. Against this recruited in Wardak, mainly through direct backdrop, the Afghan government and its patronage by elders, local power brokers and international supporters are giving in to a cyclical prominent jihadi commanders, bypassing the temptation of working with informal armed groups intended shura-based mechanism. Many of the to provide security, particularly in remote rural problems that had plagued the ANAP came back to areas where the Taleban are gaining ground. haunt AP3. The program has not been considered successful enough to replicate in other provinces The first initiative examined in this paper is the but a similar program (the Afghanistan Public Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Protection Force) has been included in the overall launched by the Ministry of Interior with MoI police strategy. international support in 2006 to provide a ‘community policing’ function. Recruits were The most recent and most experimental of the selected, trained, armed, equipped and deployed three programs is the Local Defence Initiatives in provinces mainly in the south and southeast. A (LDI). Experiments with LDI started discreetly in number of problems were quick to emerge on mid-2009. LDIs in different parts of the country are issues such as logistical support, vetting, command so unlike one another that it is hard to see them as and control and loyalty. Contrary to its intent, the part of the same initiative. According to policy program was used to regularise existing militias, documents, the overall aim of LDI is to ‘secure local many of which were ill suited to community communities’ by giving ‘responsibility and policing and did not result in new ‘boots on the employment to village members’ so that they ‘no ground.’ ANAP was shut down in 2008 but no longer provide support for insurgents’ and ‘will not effort was made to learn from this experience allow insurgents to live within their village’. In a before new, similar projects were initiated. part of Arghandab district in Kandahar province, the program is at a more advanced stage: a group Soon after, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), working of ‘defenders’ selected from the community almost exclusively with the US military (and US provides security and work closely with US Special Special Forces in particular) launched the Afghan Forces, while a large group of villagers receives Public Protection Program (known as AP3), the incentives in the form of agricultural and cash-for- second initiative, which aimed to ‘extend the reach 2 Mathieu Lefevre: Local Defence in Afghanistan work projects. The program is funded by the US trained international military staff. However, given military. Reports from other areas where LDI is that every valley or village in Afghanistan has its being tested are far less positive. own characteristics, and few of them are as homogeneous, it is unrealistic to assume that the A number of conclusions emerge from an Arghandab model can be replicated in other areas. examination of ANAP, AP3 and LDI: In particular, it is unclear how it could be First, the relationship between government-backed implemented in larger, more heterogeneous areas armed groups and the Afghan National Security of territory, where accountability mechanisms are Forces (ANSF) is often problematic. In many ways likely to be less effective than they are at a more these new programs replicate, rather than local level. circumvent, old problems faced by the ANSF, Discussions on the purpose of local defence particularly by the Afghan National Police (ANP) on programs have become intertwined with questions such as vetting, jihadi influence and discussions on reintegration. Those who support logistics. The new programs may in fact deter this link see informal armed groups as potential recruits from joining the ANA or the ANP. Overall, job-creation programs for returning insurgents. government-backed armed groups emerge as rivals Others, including the members of the US Special rather than partners to the ANSF. Forces who work most closely with LDI, opposed a Moreover, experience suggests that it is difficult to reintegration component, arguing that it is against avoid picking sides when working with informal the program’s ‘philosophy’ and creates dangerous armed groups and that the consequences of perverse incentives. This debate is now largely today’s alliances on tomorrow’s political and moot as the link with reintegration is being security landscape are close to impossible to presented as a fait accompli. This does not mask predict. There are reasons to believe that ANAP, conceptual differences that point to the lack of a AP3 and LDI will cause further instability in the unified approach in the way local defence future. In addition, there is a growing feeling of programs are viewed. This disagreement also alienation expressed by those, particularly non- highlights two conflicting narratives at play: one Pashtuns, who are not benefiting from the new where such tactics are part of a ‘fight-to-win’ programs. strategy and another where they are geared towards an exit from the conflict. Current Where the informal armed groups have been dynamics, at least on the question of local defence, considered a relative success, this was usually in suggest the latter has gained the upper hand. large part – though not exclusively – due to their close relations with adequately trained and experienced international military forces. It is 1. INTRODUCTION unlikely that a sufficient level and quality of involvement by the international military can be Informal armed groups have played an important replicated on a larger scale or that the relative role throughout Afghanistan’s history and the success will survive a scaling down of involvement period since the fall of the Taleban is no exception. by the international military. While some of these groups are mainly loyal to and LDIs, which are likely to expand in the future, are backed by Afghanistan’s strongmen, the Afghan not without contradiction. There is a significant government and its international backers have divergence of views on the purpose of LDI between sponsored, more or less formally, a large number those, such as the US Special Forces, who see it is a of them. These have developed in such an tool of unconventional warfare to access the so- uncoordinated and often opaque manner that it is called ‘darkest pockets of the insurgency’ and impossible to keep track of all of them. those in the Afghan government who view this is a This paper will focus on three recent and relatively governance program aimed at rewarding districts formal programs: the Afghanistan National and villages that show good governance. This Auxiliary Police (ANAP) launched in 2006 and fundamental difference affects how and where LDI abruptly shut down in 2008, the ongoing Afghan should be applied. It needs to be addressed before Public Protection Program (known as AP3) and the LDI goes further. more recent Local Defence Initiatives (LDI). The model of LDI used in parts of Arghandab is a Although operationally different, these programs best-case (or least-bad) scenario for the initiative. emerged from the same historical and doctrinal It highlights some of the ideal features of the ‘small context and were designed to reach similar is beautiful’ approach: a homogeneous community objectives. All three programs leaned heavily on led by effective tribal and district leaders working in partnership with a group of well-informed, well AAN Thematic Report 03/2010 Mathieu Lefevre: Local Defence in Afghanistan 3 interpretations of the arbakai 1 concept that To date, these and similar programs have come traditionally only existed in the southeast but has and gone with very little publicly available extended to other areas, while AP3 and LDI in information or analysis. Even internal documents particular drew from the concepts underlying the available to policymakers, implementers and Sons of Iraq program, which enrolled up to 100,000 stakeholders seem to be scarce, particularly Sunnis in the fight against Al Qaida in Iraq starting regarding the closing down of ANAP. This paper in 2006.2 All three programs were largely designed, therefore aims to fill a gap in existing information implemented and funded by the American military by making facts available about programs that are in consultation with Afghan partners, the (or were, in the case of ANAP) sizeable and may government and, more tangentially, some other well form an important part of the international countries contributing troops to the International community’s strategy in the next phase of the Security Assistance Force (ISAF). conflict. As the paper describes initiatives that are still evolving rapidly, it is by nature not The first section of the paper presents the context, comprehensive or exhaustive, particularly in the including the growing frustration with the case of LDI, which is still in its early days. Some of weakness of the Afghan National Security Forces the information presented here will become (ANSF) and Kabul politics in general, the outdated as programs change or are renamed, emergence of a counter-insurgency strategy as the expanded or shut down. However, documenting guiding doctrine for international engagement in the evolution of these programs may inform future Afghanistan and an old fascination with ‘traditional initiatives in Afghanistan and elsewhere. structures’ increasingly seen by some as a panacea for the country’s ills.