IV THE KUOMINTANG’S SECOND NORTHERN CAMPAIGN AND AFTER 1928-1931 The Northern Campaign and the Mongol Response In early June 1928, the defeated Fengtian forces began to retreat to Manchuria through Shanhaiguan. On June 3, Zhang Zuolin left Beijing by train. The next day he was assassinated by Japanese agents at Huanggutun, a small station at the crossroads of the Beijing-Fengtian Railroad and the South Manchuria Railroad under Japanese manage­ ment. Beijing then came under the control of Yan Xishan. The completion of the Kuomintang’s Northern Campaign greatly concerned the North Chinese, espeeially the people of Beijing, the stronghold of “counterrevolution.” In addition to the excitement evoked by the military and political events, the national flag was changed. The Kuomintang victors changed the “Flag of Five Colors” (which equally represented the Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans), used for sev­ enteen years, to the new flag of “Blue Sky, White Sun, and Red Earth,” adopted in 1924 by Sun Yatsen, and which implied a more unitary state.' The slogans the Kuomintang agitators recited and pasted on the walls produced a strange new feeling. The name of Beijing, “The Northern Capital,” was changed to Beiping, “The Pacified Northern [Area].” Except for the intelligentsia, most people had no knowledge of the Kuomintang, its doctrines, or its differences with the Communists. They believed that the Communists were frightful but really did notknow why. The Mongols in Beiping also lost their sense of direction for a while. At first the con­ servatives feared that this revolution might enable Feng Yuxiang to further help the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang (as the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was called in Chinese) accelerate the social revolution. The conservatives also feared that the revo­ lution would damage faith in Buddhism, as had already happened in Outer Mongolia. Moreover, because of their fear of anything political that was “red, ” they misunderstood the meaning of the new flag, interpreting its “Red Earth” as signifying “communism all over the earth,” This only served to increase their misgivings about the Chinese govern­ ment. (Before the KMT’s break with the Communists in 1927, many Western diplomats shared this fear that the KMT’s victory would mask a Communist takeover.) The leaders also gradually realized that the words concerning Mongolia’s future, written by Sun Yat-sen in his works and declarations, were ambiguous or even self­ contradictory. In his Outline of NationBuilding he said, “Regarding the weak and minor­ ity peoples inside the country, the government should foster them and make it possible forthem to carry out self-determination and self-rule.” Nevertheless, in his Three Princi- ' John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 180. IV; The Kuomintang’s Second Northern Expedition and After 35 pies of the People, Sun said that in reality, China had only one single Zhonghua (Chi­ nese) nationality, and that within it were several subnationalities. Sun argued that peoples living within China’s borders other than the Han Chinese were minorities who could be assimilated easily. The Mongols were, of course, unhappy about being classified as a “weak and minority people” when they previously had been designated as one of the “five peoples of the commonwealth.” They especially detested the word “assimilation” and worried about being ethnically subsumed by the Chinese, but they took comfort from Sun’s seeming offer of self-determination and self-rule. They were, however, still worried that no Mon­ gol outside the Inner Mongolian Kuomintang had established contact with the Kuomin- tang and its new government in Nanjing. They feared that the social revolution advocated by this group might become the guiding principle for the new government’s policy to­ ward Mongolia. On June 8, 1928, the National Government in Nanjing promulgated the new Organizational Law for the reconstituted Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission {Meng- Zang Wei-yuanhui). This new government continued to recognize a separate administra ­ tive framework for Mongolia and Tibet within the orbit of the central administration and acknowledged the special political significance of these two regions. The only changes were the alteration of the name of the office from yuan (ministry) to weiyuan-hui (com­ mission) and its head ’s title from zongcai (general director) to weiyuan (commissioner). This announcement somewhat appeased the Mongols in Beiping. On the fifteenth day of the same month, the government appointed the eight members of this commission, in­ cluding Zhang Ji (a senior member of the party), Bai Yunti (Serengdongrob), Li Feng- gang (Mandaltu, also known as Li Danshan), Lubsangnanja (a khambu of the Panchen Lama), and Liu Puchen (former parliamentarian from Shanxi). This signaled that the ministerial level Mongolian-Tibetan administrative formerly led by an high-ranking Mongolian prince was now transformed into an office ruled in actuality by the Chinese and only ostensibly by Mongols and Tibetans. On the eighteenth, the government ap­ pointed Zhang Ji, Bai Yunti, and Liu Puchen as standing commissioners of this commis­ sion.^ At Bai Yunti’s recommendation, Li Danshan (Mandaltu) and Yu Lanzhai (Bay- antai) were sent to Beiping as representatives to accelerate the party’s work and to take over the facilities and properties of the former Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry. In order to forestall a hostile confrontation, the Mongolian leaders prepared a formal reception to welcome them. In order to express their “revolutionary character,” however, the two “dignitaries ” from Nanjing did not show up for the reception. Although I was only thir­ teen years old at this time, I still recollect my impressions of this embarrassing moment. In the face of so unfriendly an attitude, to avoid further unpleasant encounters. Prince Gungsangnorbu quietly left Beiping and moved into the Japanese Concession in Tianjin with his family. ^ The appointment of Bai Yunti as one of the leading figures in the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Commission was the natural result of his early contact with the KMT. His appointment, however, was cause for great worry among many Mongolian conservatives, who were very skeptical of his activities during the era of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. 36 The Last Mongol Prince The Rise of Wu Heling and the Mongol Delegation The Mongolian community in Beiping deeply resented the unfriendly and arro­ gant attitude of the two delegates from Nanjing. In addition, there was a report that the new government still had no set policy toward Mongolia, and that the Mongol party members wielded no significant influence within the KMT. The Mongolian community resolved to establish direct contacts with the new government and concentrate on unify­ ing the Mongols in order to deal with the new situation. Experienced elders such as Ayulugei and Lobsangchoijur (my father) agreed to assign the trustworthy youngster Wu Heling (the husband of my father’s niece) to lead the way in achieving this goal of unity. Prince Gungsangnorbu agreed to this plan. Then, in the name of the Beiping Office of the Two Leagues of Josotu and Juu-uda, the elders gathered the city’s Mongolian leaders and proposed organizing a Mongol Delegation to discuss the future of Mongolia with the new government. After receiving positive re­ sponses, the Beiping Office of the Two Leagues of Josotu and Juu-uda sent out a general notice to all Inner Mongolian leagues, inviting them to send delegates to Beiping for dis­ cussions on how to ensure Mongolian rights and privileges under the new government. By the end of the summer, most of the delegates had arrived in Beiping. They usually held their official meetings in a big hall on Ma shi Dajieh (Horse Bazaar Street). Many informal discussions were, however, held in the homes of the two elders, and I thus became acquainted with Mongolian politics while 1 was still a junior high school student. In the late fall they finally agreed to establish a Mongol Delegation and designated Wu Heling, the delegate of the Josotu League, as the delegation’s spokesman. During this period. Prince De did not visit Beiping as he usually did; the news he received by way of Kalgan was mostly indirect and uncertain. His worries about the new situation therefore multiplied. In order to strengthen the Mongol Delegation, my father persuaded Prince Sodnamrabdan, the head of the Shilingol League, to support Wu Heling. Prince So, agreeing to this request, sent Bagaturchilagu to join the delegation as his personal representative. He also suggested that the deputy head of the league send a personal delegate as well. The latter agreed and sent his most trusted associate, Jungnai tusalagchi. Prince So was faithful to his word: having given his promise, he supported Wu Heling without hesitation. This greatly influenced the career of Wu and the later po­ litical development of Inner Mongolia. By this time, the Chinese Government had already established the Beiping Pre­ liminary Branch Political Commission to handle the political affairs of northern China. Two senior comrades, Zhang Ji and Li Shizeng, and two North Chinese warlords, Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang among others, were appointed as commissioners. According to Wu Heling, the Mongolian delegates visited with Zhang Ji and Li Shizeng to ask him to consider the possibility of fulfilling Sun Yat-sen’s promise of self-determination and self- rule for the minority peoples. They also attempted to inquire into the Mongolian policy of the new government. They soon discovered that although their counterparts were quite sympathetic and hoped to reach a reasonable solution for Mongolia’s problems, the cen­ tral government still had no definite policy toward the Mongols. This superficial sympa­ thy and the lack of a concrete policy toward Mongolia led the delegation to believe that it had to come up with its own solutions for Mongolia’s problems.