Order Code RL34387 Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress Updated March 28, 2008 Catherine Dale Specialist in International Security Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the Bush Administration, was to remove the regime, including destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.”1 In October 2002, Congress had authorized the President to use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”2 Over time, the focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to the more open- ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. With that shift in focus, the character of the war has evolved from major combat operations to a multifaceted counter-insurgency and reconstruction effort. The next major marker in the development of U.S. Iraq strategy and practice is likely to be the update reports to the Congress from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Commanding General of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) General David Petraeus, scheduled for April 8 and 9, 2008. A second major marker is a security agreement between the governments of the United States and Iraq, expected to be achieved by July 31, 2008, and to include the parameters for the presence of U.S. personnel in Iraq after December 31, 2008. The most important short-term OIF issue for the Congress concerns the next steps after the surge — the military strategies and approaches to be adopted in Iraq after U.S. forces draw down to the pre-surge level. How OIF experiences to date are evaluated — including policy decision-making, planning, and execution of both the major combat and post-major combat efforts — are likely to have a significant bearing not only on further U.S. government decisions about Iraq policy, but also on broader, longer-term U.S. strategic concerns. Some of these include the future U.S. military footprint in Iraq, Iraq as a U.S. national security concern, the future of the U.S. military force, and the distribution of roles and responsibilities among U.S. government agencies in complex contingencies. This report is designed to provide background and analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom to support consideration of these short-term and long-term issues. 1 See “President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” the televised speech that included a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html]. 2 See “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” H.J.Res. 114, Section 3(a), signed into law on October 16, 2002, (P.L.107-243). The Senate vote was 77-23, and the House vote 296-133. Contents Introduction ......................................................1 Upcoming Events..............................................1 Issues for Congress ............................................2 Short-term Issues: Post-Surge Options .........................2 Longer-term Issues.........................................4 Structure and Aim of the Report ..................................5 Decision to Go to War in Iraq ........................................6 Antecedents in the 1990s ........................................6 Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations...........7 Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein ...................................8 War Planning.....................................................8 Strategic Objectives............................................9 Military Objectives ...........................................10 Planning for Major Combat.....................................10 Post-War Planning............................................13 Inter-Agency Post-War Planning.............................14 Military Post-War Planning .................................16 Organizational Decisions...................................17 Major Combat Operations..........................................18 Early Infiltration ..............................................19 The Launch .................................................19 The Ground Campaign .........................................20 Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat .............................22 End of Major Combat .........................................23 Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization ...........................24 Legal Basis for Coalition Presence ...............................24 Formal Occupation........................................24 Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force ........................25 Future Security Framework Agreement........................26 Coalition Command Relationships ...............................27 Post-Major Combat: The Force......................................29 Structure and Footprint ........................................29 Headquarters Organization .................................29 Provincial Iraqi Control....................................30 U.S. Forces in Iraq............................................30 Coalition Partner Forces .......................................32 Post-Major Combat: Security Situation................................35 Major Sources and Forms of Violence ............................35 Sunni Extremism .........................................35 Shi’a Extremism .........................................36 Nature of Sectarian Violence................................38 Criminality ..............................................38 Other Security Challenges......................................38 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) .............................39 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) .................................39 Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations ....................40 Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict.........................40 Military Operations During Occupation ...........................41 Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II).............................44 Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar ..................................46 “Clear, Hold, Build” ..........................................48 Operation Together Forward....................................50 New Way Forward............................................51 “New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case .......51 Surge Forces.............................................52 Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case ....................53 Surge Operations.........................................56 Counter-IED Efforts .......................................58 Special Operations Forces in the Surge........................59 The Use of Air Power in the Surge ...........................59 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)..........................................61 Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces ........................61 ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation..................62 Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq...........................................64 ISF Training: Theory of the Case.................................65 ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities ...........66 ISF Training: Transition Teams..................................67 Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers ..............................70 Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results .......................71 Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole.............................71 Iraqi Army..............................................73 Iraqi Air Force...........................................76 Iraqi Navy...............................................77 Iraqi Special Operations Forces..............................78 Iraqi Police Service .......................................78 Iraqi National Police ......................................79 Department of Border Enforcement...........................81 Ministry of the Interior.....................................82 Ministry of Defense.......................................83 Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation” ....................................84 Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected .............................84 “Awakening” Movements......................................86 Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar...............86 Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North...............87 Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South...............87 Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq”............................88 Who the “Sons of Iraq” Are.................................88 Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement.......................89 How the “Sons of Iraq” System Works........................89 Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force........90 Concerns About the “Sons of Iraq” ...........................91 “Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs..................92 Detainee Operations...........................................94 Accountability ...........................................94 “COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program.....................94 Detainee Releases ........................................95 Civil/Military Partnership