ERDOGAN’S L ONG ARM IN THE US: Turkish Influence Operations Among American Muslims Ahmet S Yayla TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 Background 5 United States, Erdogan and American Muslims 8 President Trump and Erdogan 9 Erdogan’s Intelligence in the U.S. 2010 Onward 10 Executive Summary 11 Groups and Individuals in the United States Working Closely with Erdogan Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Diyanet Center of America (DCA) Introduction 12 Personnel and Budget 14 Historical Evolution of Diyanet under the AKP 16 Imam Hatip Schools (Religious Vocational Schools) Mosques and Foundations and Diyanet’s “Spy Imams” Overseas Turkey Overseas 17 International Spying Imams of Diyanet 24 The Turkish American Community Center (TACC): American operations 26 Diyanet Center of America (DCA) 29 Functions of DCA 30 Coordination of the Turkish-American Mosques 32 Affiliated Diyanet Institutions Activities Events, Training, and Panels 34 Friday Khutbah (Sermon) Invitations 35 Turkish American Religious Foundation (TARF) 38 ForumUSA – AKP Influence Operation 40 Turkish Heritage Organization (THO) 41 Funding 42 Establishment of the THO 45 The FBI Probe and Warnings about the THO Activities 47 Structure, Hierarchy, Links to Erdogan Family and Espionage 55 THO and Turkish Diplomacy/Bureaucracy in the U.S. Anti-Semitism and Hostility towards the U.S. 56 The Zakat Foundation of America (ZF) 57 Terrorism Connections: al-Qaeda and IHH 59 Close Ties with Turkish Bureaucrats and Institutions 61 Ties with U.S. Organizations 64 Muslim Groups and Individuals in the United States Working Closely with Erdogan The United States Council of Muslim Organizations (USCMO) 70 Annual MAS-ICNA Conventions (The Muslim American Society and the Islamic Circle of North America) 75 Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 86 Islamic Circle of North American (ICNA) 89 International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) 95 Muslim Legal Fund of America (MLFA) 99 American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) 104 Zaytuna College 105 Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) 113 Conclusions 116 Exhibits 2 ERDOGAN’S LONG ARM IN THE U.S.: TURKISH INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AMONG AMERICAN MUSLIMS nderstanding the mindset of Turkish President Erdogan has never disguised his ambitions to URecep Tayyip Erdogan, and how it led to behind- become the leader of the Islamic world.3 As the-scenes funding of not only Turkish but also Turkey’s economic prosperity progressed, American Muslim nonprofits in the United States is Erdogan invested in international diplomacy and essential to assess the strategic changes in Turkish humanitarian aid to leverage his influence in the foreign policy since 2011.1 It helps to explain Turkey’s Islamic world and among Muslim migrants in the deliberate drift away from the West and NATO and West. The religious aspirations of deeply devoted rapprochement with Muslim Brotherhood affiliates Muslims were fueled by Erdogan’s frequent and other political Islamist movements. visits and support to several Muslim civil-society organizations that promoted his agenda. Erdogan gradually increased his influence operations in the U.S. first after he took office When the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, spreading in 2002, but more importantly, after 2010 when to Egypt and arriving in Libya, Erdogan carefully he consolidated his hold on the MIT through the planned and produced policies to increase his appointment of its head. He worked through influence in those countries. For example, he means including reassignment of friendly officials took an official trip to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, to Washington DC as embassy and consulate beginning in 2010. During his visit, he often personnel, working with different lobbying firms, mentioned his plan to visit Gaza during the same reaching out to American Muslim communities trip4 in September 2011. in an effort to facilitate their lobbying power to boost his policies and objectives in the U.S., Erdogan spoke from this perspective on May 11, establishing new Turkish-backed institutions as 2011, in a PBS interview with Charlie Rose, saying, long-term policy investments, hiring of prominent “Let me give you a very clear message. I don’t people close to President Trump and intensified see Hamas as a terror organization. HAMAS is a intelligence operations in an effort to influence political party. And it is an organization. It is a Trump’s policies toward Turkey and himself. resistance movement trying to protect its country under occupation. So, we should not mix terrorist 5 BACKGROUND organizations with such an organization.” Furthermore, Erdogan openly and officially fter President Erdogan secured a decisive victory supported the Muslim Brotherhood and Ain the June 2011 elections, he immediately and Muhammed Morsi in Egypt after he was elected deliberately started to shift Turkey’s decades-old on June 30, 2012. He advised Morsi to counter the established secularist government legacy and opposition harshly, in particular when the Egyptian foreign policy away from the West and towards the military started to oppose Morsi openly.6 The New Islamic world. In the eyes of many Muslim activists, York Times reported that Erdogan, while in Egypt he is a leading contender for the title of Caliph of a in September 2011 said publicly “as a Turk, I didn’t post-ISIS Caliphate. want to be watching this situation from afar as if I was watching a football game.”7 Erdogan’s self-understanding likely was shaped by two important historical events, the so-called Arab Spring demonstrations, chiefly in Egypt, beginning on December 18, 20102, and the Syrian civil war beginning on March 15, 2011. Both historical turning points affected Erdogan, seeing an opportunity to promote himself in the Islamic world as the person to lead the ‘Ummah” or community of believers. 3 Erdogan’s 2011 visit Egypt was well received in Similarly, Kadir Misiroglu, a well-known author the region. The press praised his speeches and known for his support of Osama bin Laden and the extolled him as the person to unite the Islamic 9/11 attacks, claimed that “anyone who does not world and counter Israel. Die Welt, reporting on the vote for Erdogan is an infidel.” 13 same trip, was among the first Western platforms to draw attention to Erdogan’s Islamic ambitions Erdogan used these incidents to extend his in the region. DW called him the “New Caliph,” influence both domestically and internationally 8 in headlines and framed his role as a game- in three ways. First, he used the Arab Spring and changing player in the region, dubbing “Erdogan the military takeover by President Sisi in Egypt as the new Saladin?”.9 Similarly, HAMAS leader to certify his leadership position in the Sunni Khaled Meshaal praised Islamic world. Second, Erdogan after he was he tried to extend re-elected to lead the Turkey’s influence in AKP at the 4th ordinary Syria by supporting the congress of his party overthrow of Bashar in September 2012. Assad and his Shia Meshaal addressed government. Third, the 40,000-person and more importantly, audience, “Turkey’s he utilized the global support for the people Islamist movements, of Syria and Palestine particularly the Muslim is unforgettable. My Brotherhood and brother Erdogan, thank HAMAS networks14 goodness God gave around the world, to you so much. And you support his policies deserve it. You are and to increase his also a leader of the Muslim influence. world.”10 “You are also a leader of the Erdogan started to see and 10 Meanwhile, Erdogan Muslim world.” present himself as the only successfully used leader that could represent Israel’s conflict with and lead the Muslim world, the Palestinians for his domestic and political including the Muslim Brotherhood. ambitions, particularly after his infamous angry exchange with Shimon Peres, the Israeli president, In fact, to this end, Erdogan and the AKP during the World Economic Forum at a panel supporters not only rallied behind the Muslim discussing Gaza, when he rebuked Peres with the Brotherhood and HAMAS establishments around following: “When it comes to killing, you know well the world, but commercial groups and big investors how to kill.”11 began to pour in continuous financial support. As documented by Aylin Unver, a non-resident Additionally, several Islamist figures in Turkey fellow at Johns Hopkins’ Center for Transatlantic promoted Erdogan as the leader of the new Relations, in her 2014 book, titled “Islam and “Islamic world.” For example, Abdurrahman Democracy: Perspectives on the Arab Spring,” Dilipak, a close ally of Erdogan, publicly claimed Turkish businessmen with close ties to Erdogan that “Erdogan will establish the real Islamic included the MUSIAD (the Independent Industrialists Caliphate.”12 and Businessmen’s Associations) and Turkish charities such as IHH (the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief).15 4 UNITED STATES, ERDOGAN AND AMERICAN MUSLIMS hen Erdogan’s new AK Party won the general Islam, and Erdogan adhered a form of political Welections on November 3, 2002, he could Islam along with traditional Turkish Nakshi Islam. not become the Prime Minister of the Turkish While both Erdogan’s and Gulen’s bases were Republic due to a court ban. In fact, only through close to each other, having supported each other a delicate process and international support as Islamic movements against the secularist was Erdogan able to get elected to the Turkish establishment in the country for a long time, Parliament and become the Prime Minister on everyone understood that their comprehension of March 15, 2003.16 Erdogan, in this era, was skeptical religion when it comes to politics and education about possible American support for his rule as was completely different. the leader of the AK Party, and he sought ways to establish connections with the U.S., particularly Erdogan lacked widespread support in the U.S. with President George W.
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