U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CIWAG Case Studies 11-2012 Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq Richard H. Shultz Jr Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies Recommended Citation Shultz, Richard H. Jr, "Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq" (2012). CIWAG Case Studies. 2. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/2 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Draft as of 121916 ARF R W ARE LA a U nd G A E R R M R I E D n o G R R E O T U N P E S C U N E IT EG ED L S OL TA R C TES NAVAL WA Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq Dr. Richard Shultz United States Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq Richard H. Shultz, Jr. Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG) US Naval War College, Newport, RI [email protected] Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps CIWAG Case Studies Water Wars: The Brahmaputra River and Sino-Indian Relations— Mark Christopher Taliban Networks in Afghanistan—Antonio Giustozzi Operationalizing Intelligence Dominance—Roy Godson El Salvador in the 1980s: War by Other Means—Donald R. Hamilton Operational Strategies to Counter IED Threat in Iraq—Michael Iacobucci Sovereign Wealth Funds as Tools of National Strategy: Singapore’s Approach—Devadas Krishnadas Varieties of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2003-2009— Jon Lindsay and Roger Petersen Piracy—Martin Murphy An Operator’s Guide to Human Terrain Teams—Norman Nigh Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution—John Scott-Railton Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps: The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq—Richard Shultz Reading the Tea Leaves: Proto-Insurgency in Honduras—John D. Waghelstein 2 Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps This work is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. This case study is available on CIWAG’s public website located at http://www.usnwc.edu/ciwag 3 Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps Message from the Editors In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting edge research on Irregular Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world- renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles and books. Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world. Dr. Richard Shultz is the author of this case study, which examines how the Marine Corps was able to learn from and adapt to conditions on the ground in Anbar province from 2006–2008, developing a three-dimensional strategy that resulted in stability from previous chaos and overwhelming violence. The author views this success through the lens of organizational theory, discussing the barriers to change in military organizations and the characteristics of organizations that are able to learn. The Marines’ focus on learning, adaptability, and institutional memory are seen as keys to their success in Anbar. Ten lessons are drawn from this case that relate to the future irregular conflict environment and to the efficacy of counterinsurgency, engagement, and counterterrorism as instruments for managing these future challenges for both US military and civilian security institutions. It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case study. First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical 4 Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps matters as well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that real people faced in high-pressure situations. Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students conducting research on Iraq and Anbar Province will probably find the extensive bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the case study author, the bibliography is a selection of the best books and articles on a range of related topics. We hope you find it useful and look forward to hearing your feedback on the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the Naval War College. 5 Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps Author Biography Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School, Tufts University, where he teaches graduate-level courses in various aspects of international security affairs, internal/transnational conflict, war studies, and intelligence and armed groups. He is also the director of the Fletcher School’s International Security Studies Program. He has held three chairs: the Olin Distinguished Professorship of National Security Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, and Brigadier General H. L. Oppenheimer Chair of War-fighting Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps. His forthcoming book, The Marines Take Anbar: The Four-Year Fight against al Qaeda, will be published in early spring 2013 by the Naval Institute Press. Other recent books include Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (Columbia University Press, 2006) and The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins, 1999). Since the mid-1980s he has served as a security consultant to various U.S. government departments and agencies concerned with national security affairs. Currently he is a consultant to the U.S. Special Operations Command. 6 Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps Suggested citation: Shultz, Richard. 2012. Organizational learning and the Marine Corps: The counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. CIWAG case study series 2011-2012, ed. Marc Genest and Andrea Dew. Newport, RI: US Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups. 7 Shultz: Organizational Learning and the Marine Corps Table of Contents CIWAG Case Studies ............................................................................... 2 Message from the Editors ...................................................................... 4 Author Biography ................................................................................... 6 List of Acronyms and Terms ................................................................. 10 List of Maps and Figures....................................................................... 11 I. Introduction ...................................................................................... 12 A. How Organizations Learn ............................................................. 14 B. Anbar Case Study ........................................................................ 21 A. Anbar Narrative............................................................................ 24 B. All the Wrong Moves ................................................................... 32 III. Insurgents and Marines ................................................................... 39 A. The Insurgents.............................................................................. 39 B. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force ................................................... 43 C. Ugly Surprise ................................................................................ 47 IV. Learning........................................................................................... 49 A. Highly Persistent Conflict ............................................................. 49 B. Assessing the Insurgency ............................................................. 50 C. II MEF’s 2005 Campaign Plan ....................................................... 52 D. Clear and Hold ............................................................................. 53 E. No ISF Solution ............................................................................. 56 F. Opportunity .................................................................................