Public Opinion and Passive Complicity during the Algerian War: Simone de Beauvoir and the Djamila Boupacha Affair Mairéad Ní Bhriain The concept of the affaire as a socio-political phenomenon represents an important site of investigation for the study of intellectual activity within the French public sphere.1 Often linked to judicial proceedings, this type of public campaign is frequently symptomatic of a broader political crisis and became particularly prevalent during the French Algerian war. Unlike previous colonial conflicts in Madagascar and Indo-China, where the distance from metropolitan France and general apathy among the French public had enabled governments to ride out the storms of opposition to colonial policy, the Algerian war provoked much debate and proved to be a terminal crisis for the Fourth Republic. Three key factors can be identified as contributing to the unique character and long-term consequences of the Algerian conflict. The first of these was Algeria’s official status as an integral part of the Republic, while the second concerned the one-million strong European settler community living in Algeria. However, it was undoubtedly the third factor, the government decision to send conscripts to fight in Algeria, which resulted in a keener awareness of the colonial question in metropolitan France and ultimately transformed a passive public into an active and highly influential political actor within the process of decolonization. Testimonies given by traumatized conscripts returning from Algeria who, unlike the professional soldiers who had served in Indo-China, had little or no experience of revolutionary warfare, exposed the true extent of colonial oppression and specifically the 1. For a more detailed discussion of this, see Affaires, scandales et grandes causes: De Socrate à Pinochet, ed. by Nicolas Offenstadt, Luc Boltanski, Elisabeth Claverie and Stéphane Van Damme (Paris: Stock, 2007). IJFrS 10 (2010) 94 NÍ BHRIAIN army’s systematic use of torture. The moral outrage provoked by such revelations put the government under severe pressure to find a solution to the Algerian problem. Within this context, the Algerian conflict became a veritable theatre of war for the French intelligentsia as it sought to engage public opinion in opposition to colonial policy. Aptly described by Michel Crouzet as ‘une bataille de l’écrit’, it represented what Philip Dine has variously termed ‘the intellectuals’ last stand’, ‘their last great crusade’ and the ‘final rallying-point for the advocates of artistic commitment’.2 Although a minority did speak out in favour of L’Algérie française, French intellectuals, for the most part, opposed the war or, at the very least, the methods being used by the army to conduct it. Central to their predominantly moralistic discourse of engagement was the question of torture, which had been denounced by leading intellectuals such as Claude Bourdet and François Mauriac from as early as January 1955.3 Bourdet’s provocative ‘Votre Gestapo d’Algérie’ was particularly controversial. More than a condemnation of army brutality, the article was, in fact, an attack on the politicians of the Fourth Republic, whom Bourdet held responsible for facilitating such violent methods: ‘Ce sont MM. Mendès-France et Mitterrand qui sont responsables devant l’opinion et l’histoire’.4 By clearly identifying ‘vous’ as the culprit, Bourdet sought to dissociate himself and the broader public from the actions being carried out by the army in France’s name. Such attempts to avoid passive complicity not only motivated intellectual intervention in the conflict but also represented a serious crisis of conscience for French citizens, particularly in the wake of wartime experiences under the German occupation. Consequently, individual intellectuals very often used the notion of passive complicity in acts of torture and 2. Michel Crouzet, ‘La Bataille des intellectuels français’, La Nef, 12–13 (October 1962–January 1963), p. 47; Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954–1992 (Oxford and New York: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 5–6. 3. Claude Bourdet, ‘Votre Gestapo d’Algérie’, France-Observateur (24 January 1955), pp. 6–7; François Mauriac, ‘La Question’, L’Express (24 January 1955). 4. Bourdet, ‘Votre Gestapo d’Algérie’, p. 6. PUBLIC OPINION AND PASSIVE COMPLICITY 95 its link to wartime collaboration in an attempt to rouse public opinion throughout the Algerian conflict.5 This type of intellectual discourse was at its most prolific during the Battle of Algiers (1956–1957) which gave rise to a series of highly publicized intellectual-led affaires such as the Affaire Djamila Bouhired and the Affaires Alleg et Audin. In addition to the impact of press articles and public declarations inspired by individual cases, Catholic intellectual Pierre-Henri Simon’s more general Contre la torture — also published in 1957 — served to highlight further for the public the dangers of passive complicity and guilt by association as it outlined the historic origins of and the moral objections to the act of torture. However, it was undeniably the publication — and subsequent seizure — in early 1958 of La Question, Henri Alleg’s disturbingly honest account of his ordeal at the hands of the 10th Division of paratroopers under the leadership of General Jacques Massu, that had the most profound effect on French public opinion. This was perhaps due to the fact that, unlike the hundreds of faceless and undifferentiated Algerians who had been tortured, Henri Alleg represented the French Self, as men and women all over the country could identify with this white ‘European’. 6 5. The links between the French wartime experience and subsequent revelations of torture in Algeria have been much discussed in literature relating to colonial conflicts, particularly with regard to their impact on collective memory and questions of historiography. Recent studies of French colonial historiography have revealed the manner in which public apathy and general failure to engage with the realities of torture carried out by the French army during the period of decolonization ultimately resulted in, and were for many years mirrored by, a widespread refusal among the French to discuss or accept these dark episodes of their national history. Central to debates surrounding this historical narrative is the question of identity as the return of the ‘colonial question’ to the public arena has forced the Republic to digest and incorporate into its very being un passé qui ne passe pas. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Raphaëlle Branche’s La Guerre d’Algérie: Une histoire apaisée? (Paris: Seuil, 2005) and Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Françoise Vergès, La République coloniale: Essai sur une utopie (Paris: Albin Michel, 2003). For a comprehensive bibliography on memory and the Algerian war see Jo McCormack, Collective Memory: France and the Algerian War (1954–1962) (Lanham: Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 207–15. 6. For a detailed account of the Alleg Affair see Alexis Berchadsky, ‘La Question’ d’Henri Alleg: Un livre-événement dans la France en guerre d’Algérie (Paris: Larousse, 1994) and Henri Alleg, La Question (Paris: Minuit, 1957). 96 NÍ BHRIAIN The continued publicity and condemnation of torture throughout 1957 and 1958, coupled with a growing number of troubled conscripts, led to much public unrest and the intensity of public campaigns ultimately forced the government to re-examine its colonial policy and find a solution to the Algerian problem. Consequently, in May 1958, under the leadership of radical premier Félix Gaillard, the government sought to set up negotiations with the Algerian nationalist movement. This provoked rebellion among right-wing pro-French Algeria elements in the army. Led by General Jacques Massu, the army effectively seized power in Algiers, threatened to attack Paris and demanded that General Charles de Gaulle be brought to power as head of the Republic. Thus it was that, under the threat of attack by its own army and — critically — as a direct result of actions taken in response to pressure from public opinion, the Fourth Republic succumbed under the weight of an apparently endless colonial war. After twelve long years spent in the political desert, Charles de Gaulle — erstwhile hero of the nation — returned triumphantly as le sauveur de la France, and the Fifth Republic was born. Once De Gaulle came to power, promises were made by his government that torture was no longer being used as a method of war in Algeria and the general perception was that this great resistance hero would control the situation and restore France’s reputation. Torture and the shame associated with complicity in such acts were broadly considered to have been excesses of the intense Battle of Algiers and thus no longer represented a major issue of public concern once De Gaulle had returned to power. It is for this reason that the Djamila Boupacha affair, which took place after May 1958, is of particular significance. It could not be justified as a mere ‘overstepping of the mark’ in the counter-terrorist Battle of Algiers, which was well and truly over by 1959. Moreover, it represented a moment of crisis for the nascent Fifth Republic, as it raised the question that if De Gaulle’s government was unable to prevent the use of torture, was it really any improvement on its predecessor? These were the issues and questions addressed by Simone de Beauvoir as she sought to inform public opinion of the rape and torture PUBLIC OPINION AND PASSIVE COMPLICITY 97 of Algerian nationalist Djamila Boupacha at the hands of the French army. However, despite previous public outrage, Beauvoir and other intellectuals were to meet with a somewhat passive and apathetic public, many of whom refused to believe De Gaulle would permit the use of torture. Moreover, many French citizens who had endured and learned of the horrors of torture during the Occupation, the Indo- Chinese war and the earlier years of the Algerian conflict simply did not want to know or hear any more.