South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare programme 1981 – 1995 Thesis Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTORATE OF HISTORY of RHODES UNIVERSITY by CHANDRÉ GOULD August 2005 Abstract In 1981 the apartheid military initiated a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programme (code-named Project Coast). The programme, terminated in 1993, was aimed at developing novel irritating and incapacitating agents for internal and external use, covert assassination weapons for use against apartheid opponents, and defensive equipment for use by South African Defence Force (SADF) troops in Angola. The CBW programme was driven by a single individual, Dr Wouter Basson, who reported to a military management committee (the Co-ordinating Management Committee) which comprised a select group of high ranking officers. Practical and financial oversight of the programme was weak which allowed both for the abuse of programme funds and for senior military officers to deny knowledge of aspects of the programme. The biological component of Project Coast was conducted in violation of the commitments of the South African government to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). While the state’s commitment to the BTWC was one of the factors considered when initiating the programme, it was not a sufficient constraint to prevent the development of the biological weapons programme, but rather influenced its structure such that the programme could avoid national and international detection. Despite efforts to conceal the military front companies where the chemical and biological warfare (CBW) research and development was undertaken, evidence presented in this thesis shows that the United States had sufficient information about the programme to have been aware of its existence. Yet, it was only in 1993, on the eve of the democratic election in South Africa, that any attempt was made by the US administration to pressure the government to terminate the programme. This thesis considers the factors which influenced the decision to develop Project Coast; the structure and nature of the programme; the motivations of scientists to become involved in the programme and remain involved; the use of chemical and biological agents against opponents of the state, and the factors which influenced the termination of the programme on the eve of the first democratic elections in 1994. It also considers the nature and exent of international support, both tacit and overt, for the programme and argues that the failure of Western nations to call for the termination of the programme before the early 1990s was a function of political expediency and indicates a significant weakness in the ability of international agreements to constrain the development of such programmes. ii Table of Contents CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Aim of the thesis 3 Assessment of sources 5 Review of Literature 8 CHAPTER 2: THE BACKGROUND TO AND CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CBW PROGRAMME Chemical weapons in South African prior to Project Coast 20 South Africa and the Region 28 The Rhodesian CBW experience 34 The assimilation model analysis of the motivation for Project Coast 42 The Botha Regime and Total Strategy 47 CHAPTER 3: PROJECT COAST Overview of Project Coast: Motivations and Intentions 58 The initiation of Project Coast and the Role of Wouter Basson 64 Assessing the Threat 68 Structure and Management of Project Coast 76 The Phases of Project Coast’s Development 94 CHAPTER 4: THE OPERATION OF PROJECT COAST Introduction 100 Getting Down to Business 102 Chemical and Biological Agents for Covert Use 136 iii Scaling-up and Closing Down 148 The Nature and Effect of Secrecy at RRL and Delta G Scientific 153 The Private Companies 158 The Cost of Project Coast 170 The Relationship between the CBW Programme and the Police and Operational 172 Units of the Military CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL LINKS 185 Initial Information Gathering 189 The Mid-1980s: Building the International Web of Deceit 192 Larry Ford 193 The Croatian Deal: Out Running the CWC 197 Germany and Israel 202 Libya and the International “CBW Mafia” 204 Breaking the Silence: US and UK Concerns Come to the Fore 205 Coming Clean? South Africa’s Response to its BTWC Obligations 213 CHAPTER 6: THE FINAL YEARS (1989 – 1993) Project Coast and Political Change 218 Closing Down 237 Allegations of Fraud 251 Proliferation Threats 262 CHAPTER 7: BASSON’S ARREST AND THE TRC HEARING 269 The Criminal Trial of Wouter Basson 276 iv CHAPTER 8: LESSONS FOR DISARMAMENT 288 APPENDIX 1: TRC FINDINGS ON THE CBW PROGRAMME 299 BIBLIOGRAPHY 302 v Acronyms ANC African National Congress BWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (commonly known as the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention) BW Biological warfare BZ α-hydroxy-α-phenylbenzeneacetic acid, 1- azabicyclo[2.2.2]oct-3-yl ester, 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate. An incapacitating agent, CBDE Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, UK. CBM Confidence Building Measure CBW Chemical and biological warfare CCB Civil Co-operation Bureau CDC Centre for Disease Control, US CDU Chemical Defence Unit (of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) CEO Chief Executive Officer CIA Central Intelligence Agency, United States CIO Central Intelligence Organisation, Rhodesia CMC Co-ordinating Management Committee CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa CR dibenz(b,f)-1,4-oxazepine (teargas) CS O-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (teargas) vi CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research CW Chemical warfare CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (commonly known as the Chemical Weapons Convention) EMLC Afrikaans acronym: Electronies, Meganies, Landbou and Chemies (Electronics, Mechanical, Agricultural, Chemical) FAPLA Military wing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, US FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) FXI Freedom of Expression Institute IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency MDMA N,alpha-Dimethyl-1,3-benzodioxole-5-ethanamine ( 3,4- methylenedioxymethamphetamine) or Ecstasy. MI Military Intelligence MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola MRC Medical Research Council NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical NIA National Intelligence Agency NIZA Netherlands Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika NP National Party NSMS National Security Management System OSEO Office for Serious Economic Offences PAC Pan African Congress vii PLAN People’s Liberation Army of Namibia RRL Roodeplaat Research Laboratories SADF South African Defence Force SAHA South African History Archive SAMS South African Medical Services SANDF South African National Defence Force (after April 1994) SAP South African Police SAPS South African Police Service (after 1994) SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIU Special Investigation Unit SRD Systems Research and Development SSC State Security Council SWAPO South West African People’s Organisation TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UDF United Democratic front UN United Nations UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola USA United States of America USMMIIA United States Military Medical Intelligence and Information Agency VNOR Armscor’s Defence and Research Council WHO World Health Organisation ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army viii ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union ZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s Union ZIPRA Zimbabwe African People’s Revolutionary Army ix Acknowledgements This thesis is the result of many years of research, none of which would have been possible without the generous financial support of the Ford Foundation, the Ploughshares Trust, the Norwegain Embassy in South Africa and the Frederich Ebert Stiftung. I am grateful for their support. Professor Peter Folb was involved in the TRC investigation as a technical advisor and expert pharmacoclogist and toxicologist. He not only guided the TRC investigation but, provided invaluable support and guidance to me throughout the process of research and writing. For his support and belief in me, his advice and mentoring, I would like to thank him deeply. Laurie Nathan, former Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, allowed me the space and institutional support to conduct this research and write about the chemical and biological warfare programme, I thank him for that. An international advisory panel reviewed the research findings from an early stage. As experts in the field of chemical and biological weapons they were able to point out my errors, question my judgments and ensure that the technical references are correct. My sincere thanks to Professor Milton Leitenberg, Professor Julian Perry Robinson, Dr Patricia Lewis, Prof Barbara Rosenberg, Dr Jean Pascal Zanders and Dr Oliver Tranert. My supervisor, Professor Paul Maylam has guided me through the process of writing this thesis, his input and support has been invaluable. Final thanks go to my family. My son Khaya and daughter Mila for their patience with a mother who was always working. To my sister, Mignon who was extremely supportive and who proofread the bibliography, to my parents who made sure that I did not drop the ball – thank you. And to my life partner, Helet, who read and commented on the text, but more importantly was there to support