Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 1 1/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 2 ATENAS EDITORES ASOCIADOS 1998-2016 www.thegermanarmy.org Tittle: Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 © Gustavo Urueña A www.thegermanarmy.org More information: http://www.thegermanarmy.org/heer/index.html First Published: October 2014 We include aditional notes and text to clarify original and re- produce original text as it in original book All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a re- trieval system, or transmited in any form or by any mens, electronic, mechanical, photocopyng or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the autor or publisher. Design: Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 © Atenas Editores Asociados 1998-2016 The Editors welcome all comments and observations: [email protected] 2/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 3 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 .............3 Battle of Uman.......................................................................45 Battle of Kiev......................................................................... 49 First Battle of Kharkov...........................................................56 Battle of Rostov......................................................................65 Hitler’s War Directives 1939-1945.........................................67 Kesselschlacht........................................................................87 Bibliography.......................................................................... 89 Index ..................................................................................... 96 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 As early as 1925, Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf that he would invade the Soviet Union, asserting that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space", i.e., land and raw materials) and that these should be sought in the East. Na- zism viewed the Soviet Union (and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by "Untermensch" Slavs, ruled by "Jewish Bolshe- vik" masters. Mein Kampf said Germany's destiny was to turn "to the East" as it did "six hundred years ago" and "the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State." Thereafter, Hitler spoke of an inescapa- ble battle against "pan-Slav ideals", in which victory would lead to "permanent mastery of the world", although he also said they would "walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us". Accordingly, it was stated Nazi policy to kill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and other Sla- vic populations and repopulate the land with Germanic peo- ples. Before World War II, observers believed that in a war with the Soviet Union, Germany would attack through the Baltic states while the Kriegsmarine would seize Leningrad from the sea. They assumed that possessing the entire Baltic basin would satisfy Hitler, who would not repeat Napoleon's mista- ke of attacking Moscow. Some historians also believe that a decision to invade Russia was premeditated, based on Hitler being afraid of having to fight a war both against the allies in 3/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 4 the west as well as against the Russians in the east. This pre- ventative war would allow the Germans to avoid making the same mistake they had made in World War 1. 1939–1940 German-Soviet relationship The Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact in August 1939, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, shortly before the German invasion of Poland that triggered World War II, which was followed by the Soviet invasion of that country. A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the border states between their respective "spheres of influence". The Soviet Union and Germany would split Poland if an inva- sion were to occur, and Latvia, Estonia and Finland were defi- ned as falling within the Soviet sphere of influence. The pact surprised the world because of the parties' mutual hostility and their conflicting ideologies. As a result of the pact, Ger- many and the Soviet Union had reasonably strong diplomatic relations and an important economic relationship. The coun- tries entered a trade pact in 1940, in which the Soviets recei- ved German military and industrial equipment in exchange for raw materials, such as oil or wheat, to help Germany cir- cumvent a British blockade. Despite the parties' ongoing relations, each side was highly suspicious of the other's intentions. After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it began negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into the pact. After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12–14 November, Germany pre- sented a proposed written agreement for a Soviet entry into the Axis. 4/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 5 The Soviet Union offered a written counterproposal agree- ment on 25 November 1940, 1to which Germany did not res- pond. As both sides began colliding with each other in Eas- tern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they sig- 1 Map Operation Barbarosssa 5/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 6 ned a border and commercial agreement addressing several open issues in January 1941. Historians also believe that Sta- lin, despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might ha- ve had intentions to break off from Germany and proceed with his own campaign against Germany as well as the rest of Europe. 2 Germany plans the invasion Joseph Stalin's own reputation as a brutal dictator contribu- ted both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and their faith in success. In the late 1930s, many competent and expe- rienced military officers were killed in the Great Purge, lea- ving the Red Army with a relatively inexperienced leadership compared to that of their German counterparts. The Nazis of- ten emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda. German propaganda claimed the Red Army was preparing to attack them, and their own inva- 2 Map Operation Barbarossa Army Groups Objectives 6/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 7 sion was thus presented as a preemptive strike. In the summer of 1940, when German raw materials crises and a potential collision with the Soviet Union over territory in the Balkans arose, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union looked increasingly like Hitler's only solution. While no concrete plans were yet made, Hitler told one of his gene- rals in June that the victories in western Europe "finally freed his hands for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism". 3 Although German generals told Hitler that occupying Wes- tern Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Germany's economic situation," the Führer anticipated addi- tional benefits: When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labor shortage in German industry could be relieved by demobilization of many soldiers. 3 Map Operation Barbarossa Plan A 7/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 8 Ukraine would be a reliable source of agricultural pro- ducts. Having the Soviet Union as a source of forced labor under German rule would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position. Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies, especially the United Kingdom. The German economy needed more oil – controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve this; as Albert Speer, the Ger- man Minister for Armaments and War Production, later said in his post-war interrogation, "the need for oil cer- tainly was a prime motive" in the decision to invade. On 5 December 1940, Hitler received the final military plans for the invasion which were drawn since July 1940 already under the codename Operation Otto. He approved them all, with the start scheduled for May 1941. On 18 December, Hi- tler signed War Directive No. 21 to the German High Com- mand for an operation now codenamed "Operation Barbaros- sa" stating: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign." The operation was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Ro- man Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th cen- tury. The invasion was set for 15 May 1941. The plan for Bar- barossa assumed that the Wehrmacht would emerge victo- rious if it could destroy the bulk of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper Rivers. This assumption would be proven fatally wrong less than a month into the invasion. In a 1978 essay "Das Russlandbild der führenden deutschen Militärs" Andreas Hillgruber made the case that the invasion plans drawn up by the German military elite were coloured by hubris stemming from the rapid defeat of France at the hands of the "invincible" Wehrmacht and by ignorance tem- pered by traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primi- tive, backward "Asiatic" country -- a colossus with feet of clay. Red Army soldiers were considered brave and tough, but the officer corps was held in contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid little attention to politics, the economy or culture and the considerable industrial capacity of the So- 8/97 Army Group South Operation Barbarossa June 1941 9 viet Union was ignored as a factor, in favour of a very narrow military view. As a result the Wehrmacht was ill-informed about the Soviet military and economic capacity. It was assu- med that the Soviet Union was destined