The Agent Intellect in Aquinas: A Metaphysical Condition of Possibility of Human Understanding as Receptive of Objective Content by Andres Ayala A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Theology at St. Michael’s College and the Theology Department of the Toronto School of Theology in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology awarded by the University of St. Michael's College © Copyright by Andres Ayala 2018 The Agent Intellect in Aquinas: A Metaphysical Condition of Possibility of Human Understanding as Receptive of Objective Content Andres Ayala Doctor of Philosophy in Theology University of St. Michael’s College 2018 Abstract The following is an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological views; whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of this same object. We can find in Aquinas’ text many indications that the agent intellect is not productive of the universal as content but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or intelligible mode of being of the universal nature. This is because for Aquinas the universal nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but with a different mode of being. Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding (the universal nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the ii things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible mode of being (Chapter 4). iii Acknowledgments Behind this dissertation and, on each page, I can see the contributions of many people. I want to thank particularly Nancy Marrocco, for the English corrections and inspirational advice; Amanda Wagner for the format corrections; Pat Fleming and the Institute of the Incarnate Word for their economic support; and Jeremy Wilkins for his advice to write on the agent intellect. For his constant support and wise advice, I thank Fr. Gilles Mongeau, SJ, my supervisor; I thank Professors R. Sweetman, J. Ginther, M. Levering, J. Berkman, Giulio Silano and Dennis O’Hara for their precious suggestions and corrections. For their prayers and their constant encouragement, I would like also to thank in particular the parishioners, Sisters and staff of St. Michael’s, Cobourg, and of St. John the Baptist and Sacred Heart, Peterborough (the parishes where I served as pastor during the writing process). A special thank you to Rita Marrocco and Margaret Newman. Thanks also to Fr. Gerardus Hauwert, IVE and Dr. Donald Graham, and many other priests and professors for their advice and support. I wish to thank also all those who, during my years of formation, handed on to me so generously that which they themselves had received. Finally, all those others who have supported and helped me, though not named here, are no less appreciated. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgments......................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... v Abbreviated References............................................................................................... vii Opening Note ................................................................................................................ 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 2 1) Main Concepts, Method and Procedure .............................................................. 5 2) The Controversy with Latin Averroism ................................................................. 9 3) Some Renowned Scholars................................................................................... 12 Étienne Gilson ..................................................................................................... 12 Joseph Owens ..................................................................................................... 16 Eleonore Stump .................................................................................................. 20 Armand A. Maurer .............................................................................................. 24 W. Norris Clarke .................................................................................................. 32 John F. X. Knasas ................................................................................................. 37 4) Cornelio Fabro .................................................................................................... 44 4.1. A Metaphysical A Priori in The Metaphysical Notion of Participation ........ 45 4.2. A Metaphysical A Priori in La Svolta ........................................................... 47 4.3. Intellectual Knowing as Receptive in Fabro ................................................ 50 5) Other Relevant Authors ...................................................................................... 51 Chapter One: The Thomistic Fact and the Role of the Agent Intellect ....................... 57 1) The Thomistic Fact .............................................................................................. 57 2) The Object of Intelligence in its Formal Aspect: The Universal as Different from the Particular...................................................................................................... 66 3) The Object of Intelligence in its Real Aspect: The Universal is in the Things Themselves. ....................................................................................................... 83 4) The Role of the Agent Intellect and its Necessity: To Make Intelligible in Act the Universal in re ................................................................ 102 Chapter Two: The Thomistic Distinction between the Object and the Mode of Being of the Object (res intellecta and modus rei intellectae) ................... 110 1) The Distinction in 84, 1, c.: The “Platonic Problem” ........................................ 111 2) The Distinction in Other Texts .......................................................................... 115 3) The Two Meanings of Universal ....................................................................... 119 3.1. In the Summa ............................................................................................. 120 3.2. Two Meanings of “Universal” in other Works of Aquinas. ........................ 123 4) The Distinction between “ex parte rei intellectae” and “ex parte intelligentis” .............................................................................. 129 5) Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 130 v Chapter Three: Knowing as Receptive ...................................................................... 135 1) The Metaphysical Explanation of Knowing as a “Remedy” .............................. 137 2) Alterity and Identity in Human Knowing .......................................................... 144 2.1. Alterity........................................................................................................ 144 2.2. Identity: What Identity is Not .................................................................... 149 3) The Identity is by Means of the Species ........................................................... 151 3.1. The Aristotelian Identity ............................................................................ 155 3.2. Species, Identity and Alterity ..................................................................... 159 4) Knowing as Receptive ....................................................................................... 171 5) The Comparison between Intelligence and Sensitivity .................................... 190 6) Corollaries: Agent Intellect, Possible Intellect and Will .................................... 197 Chapter Four: The Thomistic Agent Intellect as a Metaphysical A Priori rather than a Formal A Priori ....................................................................... 209 1) The Text of St. Thomas: the Agent Intellect as a Formal A Priori? ................... 210 1.1. Infinity in the Human Intellect ................................................................... 210 1.2. “Quodammodo omnia” .............................................................................. 217 1.3. The Process of Learning ............................................................................. 221 1.4. The Natural Desire to Know ....................................................................... 222 1.5. “Naturaliter nota vel indita” .....................................................................